Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Pigott
Decision Date | 10 February 1909 |
Citation | 116 S.W. 841 |
Parties | GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. CO. v. PIGOTT et al.<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL> |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; J. L. Camp, Judge.
Action by Michael Pigott and another against the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company, in which the San Antonio Gas & Electric Company was made a party defendant. From a judgment dismissing the case as against the San Antonio Gas & Electric Company and in favor of plaintiffs against the original defendant, it appeals. Reversed and remanded in part, and conditionally affirmed in part.
Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood, D. C. Bolinger, and W. F. Ezell, for appellant. H. C. Carter and Perry J. Lewis, for appellees.
This suit was brought by Michael Pigott and his wife, Mary, against the appellant to recover damages for the death of their son, Thomas Pigott, alleged to have been killed by appellant's negligence. The negligence is alleged in plaintiffs' petition substantially as follows: That on August 7, 1906, plaintiffs' son, Thomas, was in the service of defendant in its boiler making department in the city of San Antonio, Tex., and while working underneath a metallic tank, in performance of the duties of his employment, through the negligence of defendant he received an electric shock which resulted almost instantly in his death. That defendant used and maintained electric lights where Thomas was at work, one of which lights was attached to a flexible extension cord about 30 feet long, so that it could be moved in the shop from place to place where it was needed. That at the time Thomas was shocked and killed this light was being used inside the metallic tank under which he was working, with the cord fastened to or resting upon some part of the tank. That by reason of the extension cord being unfit, defective, and in unsafe condition for such use, a current of electricity passed therefrom into the tank and completely charged it with an electric current, so that when Thomas touched or came in contact with the tank he was shocked and killed. That the extension cord and wire used by defendant were defective, unsafe, and dangerous, in that the wire did not have an approved insulation and covering to thoroughly insulate and prevent the escape of the electric current, nor did the wire have an approved waterproof or weatherproof covering to withstand the effect of moisture. That the insulation of the wire was also worn and broken in places to such an extent that in coming in contact with a metallic surface the electric current would pass from the wire into such surface. That the wire was too long and not a proper wire or cord to be exposed to moisture or water, or to be thrown over or laid upon metallic surfaces, and unfit and insufficient to prevent the escape of the electric current. That it was negligence on the part of defendant to have and maintain said wire and extension cord in its defective, dangerous, unsafe, and improper condition. That, at the time deceased was shocked and killed, there was in force a valid city ordinance, which prescribed the requisites of electric wiring of the kind used on said occasion by defendant. That paragraph 27, § 15, c. 52, of the Criminal Ordinances of the City of San Antonio, is as follows: That it is further provided in section 27 that every violation of the terms of the ordinance, where a penalty is not otherwise prescribed, shall constitute a misdemeanor punishable by fine. That there was also in force when Thomas Pigott was killed a valid city ordinance, regulating electric wiring and construction, section 13 of which is as follows: That the rules and regulations of the National Electrical Code, referred to and made a part of said ordinance, provide as follows:
That said extension or flexible cord used by defendant, as alleged, was in direct violation of the terms of said ordinances of the city, in that the cord did not have an approved insulation and covering, and in places the insulation was worn off and was too thin to prevent the escape of the electric current, and did not have an approved weatherproof covering and was not protected from mechanical injury by a tough braided outer covering, as required by said ordinance. That, in addition, the extension cord was spliced in places, and the joints were not soldered or insulated so as to prevent the escape of the electric current. That defendant was also negligent in having said joints in such uninsulated and defective condition and in violating a valid city ordinance, in force at the time, which provides as follows: That by reason of said defective, dangerous, unsafe, and improper condition of the electric wiring, the said wire was unfit and insufficient to restrain and confine the said electric current, and that the current, on that account, passed from the wire into the metallic tank, and it became charged with a deadly and dangerous current of electricity, and that when Thomas Pigott, working underneath the tank, and having no knowledge of the fact that it was charged with electricity, came in contact with the tank, he received a severe electric shock which almost instantly caused his death, which was caused from negligence of defendant as alleged.
In its first amended original answer the defendant interposed, by a general and special exception to plaintiffs' petition, a general denial, and pleaded specially that, if deceased received injuries resulting in his death, they were not caused by negligence on its part, but by the negligence of the San Antonio Gas & Electric Company, or were caused by his contributory negligence and risks assumed by him as incident to his employment. It also pleaded a written contract made between it and plaintiffs, whereby the latter consented to their son's employment by defendant, and, in consideration of its paying him for his services, they expressly waived any and all claims they might have against defendant for damages in the event their son, Thomas, should be killed or injured in the company's employment. The defendant also impleaded the San Antonio Gas & Electric Company, against which they pleaded as follows:
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