Gamble, Givens & Moody by Gamble v. Moise, 0636

Decision Date10 December 1985
Docket NumberNo. 0636,0636
Citation341 S.E.2d 147,288 S.C. 210
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesGAMBLE, GIVENS & MOODY, a Partnership by John M. GAMBLE, Jr., Ronnie M. Givens, William A. Moody, Jr., and John G. Game, its Partners, Appellants, v. Robert M. MOISE, Humphries & Moise, a Partnership, by Robert M. Moise and Francis A. Humphries, Respondents, and Francis A. HUMPHRIES, Respondent, v. John M. GAMBLE, Jr., Ronnie M. Givens, William A. Moody, Jr., and John G. Game, Individually and as Co-Partners under the name and guise, Gamble, Givens and Moody, Appellants. . Heard

Diane Schafer Goodstein and Arnold S. Goodstein of Goodstein & Goodstein, North Charleston, for appellant.

Robert N. Rosen of Rosen, Oberman & Rosen and Charles C. Bernstein, Charleston, for respondents.

GOOLSBY, Judge.

This appeal from cases consolidated for trial involves actions for an accounting and for the recovery of payments allegedly owed by a withdrawing partner for goodwill. The questions on appeal relate to the interpretation of a partnership agreement and to the value of certain partnership assets.

John M. Gamble, Jr., Ronnie M. Givens, William A. Moody, Jr., and Francis A. Humphries formed an accounting partnership in 1972. John G. Game became a partner in 1975, the year the partners reduced their partnership agreement to writing.

Robert M. Moise joined the partnership in 1978. The partnership agreement was amended to include him as a partner. The partners agreed in a separate written agreement to value the goodwill "purchased" by Moise from the other partners at $48,000.

In 1981, Moise and Humphries withdrew from the partnership and formed their own firm.

Gamble, Givens, Moody and Game as partners in a partnership (hereafter "the Partners") brought this action initially against Moise. Among other things, the Partners sought an accounting and payment for the value of goodwill Moise allegedly owed them when he withdrew as a partner.

The Partners later amended the complaint to assert an action based on an alleged constructive trust against Moise and Humphries as partners in a partnership formed by the latter two.

Moise counterclaimed against the Partners and alleged an action for an accounting. Humphries brought an action against the Partners in which he also sought an accounting. Moise and Humphries both claimed an interest in two assets of the partnership, a share of First Magnolia Partnership and stock in Management Design Associates, Inc.

The trial court tried the consolidated cases in equity and found against the Partners. It held the Partners were not entitled to recover payments from Moise for goodwill, Moise and Humphries were entitled to their interests in First Magnolia, and Humphries was entitled to his interest in Management Design. The trial court valued First Magnolia and Management Design according to their fair market value. It dismissed the action against Moise and Humphries based on an alleged constructive trust.

The Partners appealed. In oral argument before this court, their counsel abandoned the constructive trust claim.

I.

The Partners contend the trial court erred in finding that the partnership agreement does not require a withdrawing "new partner" to satisfy any debt he may owe the original or "existing partners" for goodwill.

The partnership agreement provides in pertinent part as follows:

IX. SETTLEMENT UPON WITHDRAWAL OR EXPULSION

The goodwill provisions of this agreement as stated in Article X will be null and void as respects the interest therein of any withdrawing or expelled partner.

A withdrawing or expelled partner who has been receiving goodwill payments from another partner shall not be entitled to receive any such goodwill or interest payments which become due after notice of withdrawal or expulsion, whether such payments become due under their original terms or deferred terms as stated in Article XI.

The withdrawing or expelled partner's interest in cash basis capital, less accounts payable and accrued expenses allocable to his interest, shall be paid within 120 days from the date of disassociation, without interest....

....

X. GOODWILL

Goodwill of the firm is to be computed as 100% of one year's accrual basis fees of the firm based on the average accrual basis fees for the two full calendar years immediately preceding the date of computation, less the average client advances computed in the same manner.

The percentage of the firm's goodwill allocable to a partner is determined by applying such partner's current profit sharing percentage to the total goodwill of the firm.

....

Any transfer of profit sharing percentages between partners ... must include the transfer of goodwill allocated to such profit sharing percentage transferred and shall be paid for in the same manner as a newly admitted partner pays for goodwill....

XI. ADMISSION OF NEW PARTNERS

....

Upon admission of a new partner, goodwill shall be computed in accordance with Article X and a sale of goodwill between the existing partners and the new partner shall be made. The sale of goodwill shall be between the individual partners based on the profit sharing percentages transferred from partner to partner; however, the firm will collect payments made by the purchaser and will credit such payments to the selling partners' capital accounts.

....

Payment for goodwill by the newly admitted partner may be made in ten (10) equal annual installments with interest at the rate of 6% per annum computed on the remaining balance. During the period of payment for goodwill, the newly admitted partner's percentage of cash basis partnership earnings in excess of guaranteed salary equivalent ... is applied first to his cash basis capital requirement, then to accumulated interest on his goodwill balance, then to his annual goodwill installment, then to availability for withdrawal.

When the newly admitted partner's cash basis earnings in any year are insufficient to meet any of the applications above, then the following payment schedule is effective for ... deferred payments:

1. Cash basis capital requirement--To be paid out of the first increment of cash basis earnings above guaranteed salary equivalent for the following year.

2. Interest on goodwill balance--To be paid in the first year in which cash basis earnings exceed guaranteed salary equivalent and cash basis capital requirements.

3. Annual goodwill installment--To be paid in the year following completion of the original term of goodwill payments plus one year for each previously deferred full annual goodwill payment. Two or more partial annual goodwill payments which have been deferred shall be added together to determine the number of years of deferral as defined above.

The partnership agreement nowhere specifically requires a "new partner," who still owes the "existing partners" an amount for the goodwill Article XI obligates him to purchase on admission to the partnership, to pay the "existing partners" for the amount owed by him for goodwill upon his withdrawal from the partnership. Because it does not do so, the trial court found the partnership agreement ambiguous and held Article IX's language extinguishes any debt owed by a "new partner" for goodwill when he withdraws from the partnership.

In construing a contract, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. Williams v. Teran, Inc., 266 S.C. 55, 221 S.E.2d 526 (1976); Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E.2d 439 (1962). The parties' intention must, in the first instance, be derived from the language of the contract. Superior Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maners, 261 S.C. 257, 199 S.E.2d 719 (1973). If its language is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no construction is required and the contract's language determines the instrument's force and effect. Blakeley v. Rabon, 266 S.C. 68, 221 S.E.2d 767 (1976); Fryar v. Currin, 280 S.C. 241, 312 S.E.2d 16 (Ct.App.1984). Mere lack of clarity on casual reading is not the standard for determining whether a contract is afflicted with ambiguity. McCann v. Glynn Lumber Co., 199 Ga. 669, 34 S.E.2d 839 (1945).

We examine, then, the partnership agreement to determine whether the intention of the parties regarding a "new partner's" obligation to pay for goodwill in the event he still owes therefor on withdrawal from the partnership can be discerned from its language alone.

Although Article IX affects a withdrawing "new partner's" interest in goodwill, Article IX cannot reasonably be construed to relieve him from any debt resulting from his purchase of goodwill on becoming a partner.

Article IX's first paragraph renders inapplicable to a withdrawing or expelled partner the provisions relating to goodwill contained in Article X. Those provisions prescribe the methods by which the value of goodwill is to be determined and allocated among the partnership and by which a partner is to pay for goodwill when a transfer of profit sharing percentages occurs between partners. By voiding the application of Article X's provisions to a withdrawing or expelled partner, Article IX extinguishes the withdrawing or expelled partner's right to the goodwill allocated by Article X.

Article IX's second paragraph terminates a withdrawing or expelled partner's right to receive payments for goodwill and interest from another partner after notice of his withdrawal or expulsion.

To construe Article IX to mean that a debt owed by a "new partner" for goodwill is extinguished by his withdrawal or expulsion from the partnership is to rewrite the contract. A court, however, under the guise of "interpretation" or "construction" may not rewrite an agreement for the parties. Ames v. American National Bank of Portsmouth, 163 Va. 1, 176 S.E. 204 (1934); see McElmurray v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co., 236 S.C. 195, 113 S.E.2d 528 (1960).

The failure of the partnership agreement, either...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • In re Dunes Hotel Associates
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of South Carolina
    • March 28, 1997
    ...The parties\' intention must, in the first instance, be derived from the language of the contract. Gamble, Givens & Moody v. Moise, 288 S.C. 210, 341 S.E.2d 147, 150 (S.C.Ct.App.1986) (citation omitted). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank, ___ S.C. ___, 479 S.E.2d 524, 526......
  • Flair Broadcasting Corp. v. Powers
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • March 16, 1990
    ...contract is afflicted with ambiguity. McCann v. Glynn Lumber Co., 199 Ga. 669, 34 S.E.2d 839 (Ga.1945). Gamble, Givens & Moody v. Moise, 288 S.C. 210, 341 S.E.2d 147, 150 (Ct.App.1986); accord Jacobs v. Service Merchandise Co. Inc., 297 S.C. 123, 375 S.E.2d 1 (Ct.App. 1988). Accordingly, th......
  • SOUTHERN ATLANTIC FINANCIAL v. Middleton, 3455.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • February 25, 2002
    ...on casual reading is not the standard for determining whether a contract is afflicted with ambiguity. Gamble, Givens & Moody v. Moise, 288 S.C. 210, 341 S.E.2d 147 (Ct.App. 1986). A contract is ambiguous when its terms are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation. Hawkins v. G......
  • Jacobs v. Service Merchandise Co., Inc., S-R
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • September 21, 1988
    ...794 (Ct.App.1984). Additional rules governing the construction of contracts are stated in the case of Gamble, Givens & Moody v. Moise, 288 S.C. 210, 341 S.E.2d 147 (Ct.App.1986), as In construing a contract, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT