Gamble v. General Foods Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. A047757,A047757
• Citation: 280 Cal.Rptr. 457,229 Cal.App.3d 893
• Parties: , 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1248, 6 IER Cases 1172 Brenda J. GAMBLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 457

280 Cal.Rptr. 457

229 Cal.App.3d 893, 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1248,

6 IER Cases 1172

Brenda J. GAMBLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A047757.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

April 29, 1991.

As Modified on Denial of

Rehearing May 23, 1991.

[229 Cal.App.3d 896] Frederick John James, Oakland, for plaintiff and appellant.

Richard N. Hill, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

In this action we consider whether a federal court judgment in favor of defendant General Foods Corporation and against plaintiff Brenda J. Gamble on plaintiff's title VII action is a res judicata bar to plaintiff's state-law claim for wrongful termination. We hold that the federal judgment bars plaintiff's state claim and affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 15, 1984, plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that her employment was terminated as a result of race discrimination in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 United States Code section 1981 (hereafter "Gamble I"). In that complaint plaintiff sought reinstatement, back wages and benefits and attorney fees.

Pursuant to a status conference order, all pretrial motions were to be heard by July 12, 1985, the discovery cutoff date was August 2, 1985, and trial was set for September 3, 1985. On July 12, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint in order to add an additional count for wrongful termination based on breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing ¹ and to join one Michael T. Shade as a party plaintiff. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that it would be prejudiced by the filing of an amended complaint since the trial date was less than three months away, the discovery cutoff date was only three weeks away, and amendment of the pleadings would necessitate new discovery. Additionally, defendant argued that the new claim could just as easily have been filed at the time of filing the original complaint. The trial judge denied the motion.

Gamble I was subsequently tried and District Court Judge Eugene F. Lynch rejected plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination, concluding that she was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons. Plaintiff did not appeal the judgment entered against her.

Prior to the time the federal court rendered its decision in Gamble I, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Alameda County ² (hereafter "Gamble II"). The complaint alleged, among other things, that defendant had breached an implied-in-fact contract to terminate plaintiff's employment only for good cause as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Defendant removed Gamble II to the United States District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. In an opinion and order dated September 22, 1986, District Court Judge D. Lowell Jensen granted defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied.

Plaintiff appealed Judge Jensen's summary judgment ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding the plaintiff's wrongful termination claims were barred by the res judicata effect of the judgment entered in Gamble I. However, in March of 1989, the federal court found that Gamble II improvidently had been removed to federal court, and the case was therefore remanded to the Superior Court of Alameda County.

On August 30, 1989, Superior Court Judge Winton McKibben granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the judgment in Gamble I was a res judicata bar to the prosecution of the pending complaint in Gamble II. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy when the doctrine of res judicata refutes all triable issues of fact suggested by the pleadings. (Southwell v. Mallery, Stern & Warford (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 140, 144, 239 Cal.Rptr. 371.) The issue presented here is the appropriate res judicata analysis and whether it serves as a bar to plaintiff's state claim.

Res Judicata Analysis

It is established that the doctrine of res judicata precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. (Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 874, 151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098; Koch v. Rodlin Enterprises (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1595, 273 Cal.Rptr. 438.) However, the way in which a court defines "cause of action" differs. The federal courts utilize a transactional analysis; i.e., two suits constitute a single cause of action if they both arise from the same "transactional nucleus of facts" (Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Bd. of Realtors (9th Cir.1983) 724 F.2d 1347, 1349) or a single "core of operative facts." (Shaver v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (7th Cir.1988) 840 F.2d 1361, 1365.) California follows the primary right theory of Pomeroy; i.e., a cause of action consists of 1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, 2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and 3) a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such primary right and duty. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3rd ed. 1985) Pleading, § 23, pp. 66-67.) Thus, two actions constitute a single cause of action if they both affect the same primary right. Where, as here, an action is filed in a California state court and the defendant claims the suit is barred by a final federal judgment, California law will determine the res judicata effect of the prior federal court judgment on the basis of whether the federal and state actions involve the same primary right. (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 954-955, 160 Cal.Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58.)

Defendant's cited authorities do not hold otherwise. Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 87 Cal.Rptr. 526, 470 P.2d 662 and its progeny hold that a federal court judgment has the same effect in California courts as it would in a federal court. That is, once a federal order or judgment is rendered, as for instance in district court, that judgment is final for purposes of res judicata until it is reversed on appeal or set aside or modified in the court rendering the order or judgment. (Id., at p. 761, 87 Cal.Rptr. 526, 470 P.2d 662.) The California cases cited by defendant do not hold that California courts must employ the transactional approach for the purposes of a res judicata analysis when a prior judgment has been rendered in federal court. Although Costantini v. Trans World Airlines (9th Cir.1982) 681 F.2d 1199, 1200 reaches a different conclusion, we believe that court misconstrued the holdings in Younger v. Jensen (1980) 26 Cal.3d 397, 161 Cal.Rptr. 905, 605 P.2d 813 and Levy v. Cohen (1977) 19 Cal.3d 165, 137 Cal.Rptr. 162, 561 P.2d 252.

Plaintiff's Claim under Primary Right Analysis

Citing Agarwal and Sawyer v. First City Financial Corp. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 390, 177 Cal.Rptr. 398, plaintiff contends her federal claim involved a different primary right than that pleaded in her state claim. Whereas her federal claim asserted her right to be free from racial discrimination, her state claim asserted her "right to be [sic ] recover damages for a breach of contract and to be free from the tortious conduct of her employer."

The fact that California employs the primary right analysis for res judicata purposes does not benefit plaintiff. As previously stated, under the primary right analysis each invasion of a primary right gives rise to a separate cause of action. (Agarwal v. Johnson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 954, 160 Cal.Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58.) A single cause of action is based on the harm suffered, rather than the particular legal theory asserted or relief sought by the plaintiff. (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 795, 126 Cal.Rptr. 225, 543 P.2d 593; Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 441, 447, 164 Cal.Rptr. 913.)

In Agarwal, the plaintiff, an East Indian, was terminated from private employment without notice and was unable to find work for 13 months. The plaintiff's former employer made unfavorable statements about him to prospective employers. The plaintiff filed a complaint in state court, alleging causes of action for defamation, infliction of emotional distress and interference with business relationships. He also filed a title VII action in federal court. Prior to the final judgment in the state action, the federal court determined the plaintiff had not met his burden of proving discrimination. The defendants then argued the federal judgment was a res judicata bar to the state action.

Our Supreme Court disagreed, holding that while the federal action was based on the same underlying facts, it did not necessarily follow that the federal judgment was res judicata. Employing a primary rights analysis, the high court reasoned: "Title VII vests employees with independent federal statutory rights against discriminatory employment practices. It does not supplant state remedies. Accordingly, 'Since monetary damages under title VII are limited to recovery of back pay, alternate causes of action under state law may be particularly important where the discriminatee might recover damages other than back pay.' [Citation.] Defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress are specifically recognized as potentially available causes of action under state law." (Agarwal v. Johnson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 955, 160 Cal.Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58.)

In Takahashi v. Bd. of Trustees of Livingston (9th Cir.1986) 783 F.2d 848, the plaintiff was a public school teacher who had a statutory right to be terminated only for good cause. (Ed.Code, § 44932.) When her school district terminated...