Gamble v. Ware County Bd. Of Educ., No. A01A2201

Decision Date19 February 2002
Docket Number No. A01A2468., No. A01A2228-A01A2230, No. A01A2464-A01A2467, No. A01A2475, No. A01A2202, No. A01A2201
Citation561 S.E.2d 837,253 Ga. App. 819
PartiesGAMBLE et al. v. WARE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. (Ten Cases). GAMBLE v. Ware County Board of Education et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

George K. Gamble, Jr., pro se.

Keith Gamble, pro se.

Monica Gamble, pro se.

Lutria Gamble, pro se.

Harben & Hartley, Sam S. Harben, Jr., Gainesville, for appellees. RUFFIN, Judge.

Proceeding pro se, George Gamble presented to the Ware County Superior Court clerk 11 lawsuits naming the Ware County Board of Education and various school officials and employees as defendants.1 Gamble included a pauper's affidavit with each complaint stating that he could not pay the court filing fees. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-2(d), the court clerk submitted the complaints to the trial court for review before filing them. Concluding that the complaints contained no justiciable issue of law or fact, the trial court refused to permit their filing. Gamble now appeals. Although not all of these appeals are factually related, the same legal principles generally govern their disposition. Accordingly, we have consolidated them for appeal, and for reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Under OCGA § 9-15-2(d),

[w]hen a civil action is instituted by an indigent party who is not represented by an attorney the trial judge is required to review the pleading and, if the judge determines that the pleading shows on its face such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it cannot be reasonably believed that the court could grant any relief against any party named in the pleading, then the judge shall enter an order denying filing of the pleading.2

In conducting this review, the trial court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint state a claim for relief under which the plaintiff may recover.3 The court can deny filing "[o]nly if the pleading is completely devoid of any justiciable issue of law or fact."4 A complaint is sufficient if it places the defendant on notice of the claim against him, and on appeal, we must construe Gamble's complaints favorably to him.5 Furthermore, we will not hold his pro se complaints to the "[strict] standards of formal pleading."6

Applying these principles, we find no error in the trial court's order prohibiting Gamble from filing the complaints in Case Nos. A01A2201, A01A2228, A01A2229, A01A2464, A01A2465, A01A2466, A01A2468, and A01A2475. The trial court, however, should have permitted Gamble to file the complaints involved in Case Nos. A01A2202, A01A2230, and A01A2467.

1. As an initial matter, the defendants named in Gamble's complaints have filed a motion to dismiss these appeals or, in the alternative, have requested that we order Gamble to serve his appellate briefs on them. They argue that because Gamble failed to serve them with the complaints or any other pleadings, we should not consider his appeals. We disagree.

Because the trial court did not permit Gamble to file his complaints, suit has not begun, and these named defendants are not yet parties. The complaints were not filed, the clerk never issued summons, and process was not served.7 In short, the trial court halted the lawsuits before they started, and nothing obligated Gamble to serve the complaints on the defendants. Similarly, Gamble was not required to serve his notice of appeal on the defendants, who were never parties below and thus are not parties on appeal.8 Also, we cannot find that Gamble violated the rules of this Court by failing to serve his appellate briefs on these nonparties.9 Although the better practice in this type of appeal would be to serve the named defendants, the failure to do so does not warrant dismissal. The defendants' motion, therefore, is denied.

Case Nos. A01A2201, A01A2202, A01A2228, A01A2229, and A01A2230

These five appeals arise out of a November 12, 1999 school bus incident involving Gamble's son. As alleged in the complaints and attached documents, on that date, bus monitor Essie Mae Hands prepared a conduct form stating that K.G., Gamble's son, engaged in sexual misconduct on the bus. The conduct form was signed by bus driver Quincy Daniels, Transportation Director M.O. Beverly, and Assistant Principal Ken Williams.

K.G. was suspended from riding the bus from November 16, 1999, through November 18, 1999. Apparently, however, he was ill for the first two days and did not learn of the suspension until November 18, 1999, when he attempted to ride the bus and received a copy of the conduct form. Gamble immediately contacted the school to arrange a conference, and a meeting between Assistant Principal Williams, bus driver Daniels, bus monitor Hands, Gamble, and K.G. took place on November 22, 1999. At that meeting, Gamble questioned the bus employees about the incident. Ten days later, Gamble submitted to Williams an affidavit executed by K.G. denying the misconduct. The following November, Gamble requested that Superintendent Richard Brantley delete the reference to sexual misconduct from K.G.'s school record. Brantley refused, but school officials permitted Gamble to place a "rebuttal statement" relating to the incident in K.G.'s record.

2. Case Nos. A01A2201, A01A2228, and A01A2229. In three complaints, Gamble alleges that, with respect to the November 12, 1999 incident, the Board of Education, Superintendent Brantley, Assistant Principal Williams, and Ware County Transportation Director Beverly violated K.G.'s due process rights and engaged in tortious conduct that injured his family. We agree with the trial court that these complaints present no justiciable issue of fact or law.

(a) Gamble contends that he and K.G. did not receive adequate notice of the bus suspension, that school officials failed to immediately inform him about the alleged misconduct, and that the delay hindered any investigation into the incident. Citing the delays and inaction, Gamble asserts that the defendants violated his son's due process rights under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez.10 The Goss Court determined that

[s]tudents facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. 11

As we have noted, Goss "sets forth the principles relative to a student's constitutional rights" in cases involving school suspensions.12

Gamble's complaints involve a school bus suspension, rather than a suspension from school, and we question whether a student has a constitutionally protected interest in riding the school bus.13 We need not resolve this issue, however, because Gamble does not contend that the defendants violated due process or injured K.G. by temporarily banning him from the bus. Instead, his due process allegations involve the alleged damage to K.G.'s reputation and honor caused by the sexual misconduct report placed in his school record.14 Thus, we must consider whether school officials afforded K.G. a sufficient opportunity under Goss to challenge that misconduct report.

Gamble asserts that various school officials failed to provide K.G. and his family sufficient notice of the misconduct charge. According to Gamble, he and his son first learned about the charge when K.G. tried to ride the bus on November 18, 1999, seven days after the incident and during the suspension period. Gamble apparently contends that due process required the school to notify K.G. of the misconduct charge and hold a hearing before the suspension commenced.

Generally, "notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school."15 Even if this general rule applies to bus suspensions, however, it does not permit recovery here because Gamble does not complain about his son's inability to ride the bus for three days. His concerns involve the sexual misconduct report placed in K.G.'s school file.

Furthermore, assuming—without deciding—that notice of the suspension was late, school officials cured this deficiency by subsequently giving Gamble and K.G. an adequate opportunity to challenge and question the sexual misconduct allegations in K.G.'s file.16 Gamble's complaints show that he and K.G. received written notice of the charges seven days after the incident, met with and questioned the individuals who witnessed and reported the alleged misconduct, presented K.G.'s side of the story to authorities, and placed a rebuttal statement outlining K.G.'s version in his permanent student record. The complaints thus establish that K.G. received the minimum procedural protections required by Goss.17

In his complaints, Gamble asserts that the delay in notification prevented him from gathering evidence—such as a bus videotape that was erased—to support K.G.'s explanation of the incident. Under Goss, however, due process guarantees a suspended student only oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence against him, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.18 A school is not required to "afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident."19 Clearly, the school need not formally gather, preserve, and present evidence.20 Accordingly, the alleged delay in notification did not deny K.G. due process, and the trial court properly prohibited Gamble from proceeding with his due process claims against the school board, Superintendent Brantley, Assistant Principal Williams, and Transportation Director Beverly.

(b) Gamble also alleges that these defendants' decision to discipline K.G....

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