Gambrell v. Schriver

• Citation: 312 S.C. 354,440 S.E.2d 393
• Decision Date: 07 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 2129,2129
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Parties: Ronald H. GAMBRELL, John Redd, Danny Kelly, Donny and Deloris Hill, William Chandler, Steve McWhorter, Phillip Maxwell, Tommy Campbell, William H. Lusk, Curtis and Rosemary Moore, Steve and Linda Wilson, Jack E. and Sarah Frances Ashley, Mike Hughes and Larry Bryant, South Carolina Individuals, Appellants, v. Evelyn P. SCHRIVER, Melven C. Powell and Sherry M. Powell, and Sammy C. Posey, South Carolina Individuals, Respondents. . Heard

Page 393

440 S.E.2d 393

312 S.C. 354

Ronald H. GAMBRELL, John Redd, Danny Kelly, Donny and

Deloris Hill, William Chandler, Steve McWhorter, Phillip

Maxwell, Tommy Campbell, William H. Lusk, Curtis and

Rosemary Moore, Steve and Linda Wilson, Jack E. and Sarah

Frances Ashley, Mike Hughes and Larry Bryant, South Carolina Individuals, Appellants, v. Evelyn P. SCHRIVER, Melven C. Powell and Sherry M. Powell, and Sammy C. Posey, South Carolina Individuals, Respondents.

No. 2129.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Dec. 7, 1993.

Decided Jan. 24, 1994.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1994.

Certiorari Denied July 14, 1994.

J. Stephen Welch, of Welch & Associates, Greenwood, for appellants.

W. Richard McClellion, Anderson, for respondents.

CURETON, Judge:

Ronald Gambrell and others (collectively "Gambrell") brought an action against Evelyn Schriver and others (collectively "Schriver") ¹ for an order declaring certain real property in a subdivision subject to a negative reciprocal easement against mobile homes. They also sought damages and injunctive relief. Schriver counterclaimed for slander of title. The circuit court issued a temporary injunction and referred the matter to the master-in-equity for final judgment with direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Schriver's counterclaim was severed from the main action and placed on the jury roster. The master denied the request for injunctive relief, and declared the property not subject to negative reciprocal restrictions, covenants or conditions. Gambrell appeals. We affirm.

Since this is an action for injunctive relief which is equitable in nature and it was tried by a judge alone, this court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Butler v. Sea Pines Plantation Co., 282 S.C. 113, 317 S.E.2d 464 (1984).

The property involved in this dispute is referred to as the Estate of Emmie Pinson (Pinson estate) and originally totaled about 320 acres. Approximately 44 acres of this tract were conveyed by Mrs. Pinson to her son, leaving 276.921 acres. Prior to her death in 1972, Mrs. Pinson sold about 50 individual lots from the remaining property which accounted for about 25 percent of the land. All of these lot sales were restricted by covenants placed in individual deeds. However, no blanket or general restriction was placed on this property. After Pinson's death, the balance of the property was divided among her six children.

There were a total of 64 deeds of property from or within the Pinson tract. Six of these deeds partition property among the Pinson heirs and contain no restrictions. Of the remaining 58 deeds to persons outside the Pinson family, 55 contain restrictions. While the restrictions are similar on several of these deeds, the only restriction which can be found on all of the deeds states the property "shall be used for residential purposes only."

The tract which is the subject of this controversy was deeded to Schriver by Douglas Mosteller, Jr. who was a grantee of one of the Pinson grandchildren, Dwight Pettus. Neither the deed to Mosteller nor to Schriver contains a restriction against mobile homes.

Gambrell contends a negative reciprocal easement was created over the entire 320 acre tract by the individual restrictions in the deeds from Emmie Pinson and the heirs of Mrs. Pinson. Gambrell further asserts that he and the other adjoining landowners purchased property and developed residential estates in reliance upon the restrictions in the deeds, and in reliance upon the representations of the Pinson heirs.

The master found no evidence showing a common scheme of restrictions covering the lot sales. Rather, each lot was restricted by covenants placed in the individual deeds. He further noted that while the covenants were similar on several of the deeds, the only covenant which can be found on all of the deeds states the property "shall be used for residential purposes only." We agree with the master in holding there is no valid reciprocal negative easement Gambrell can enforce.

Covenants, expressed or implied, restricting the free use of land are not favored and must be strictly construed. Edwards v. Surratt, 228 S.C. 512, 90 S.E.2d 906 (1956). An easement restricting the use of property must be created in express terms or by plain and unmistakable implication. Bomar v. Echols, 270 S.C. 676, 244 S.E.2d 308 (1978); Shoney's, Inc. v. Cooke, 291 S.C. 307, 353 S.E.2d 300 (Ct.App.1987). Where they arise by implication and subdivided land is involved, the restrictions are said to create a reciprocal negative easement. Bomar, 244 S.E.2d at 310. Ordinarily, four elements must be established to show a...