Game Craft, LLC v. Vector Putting, LLC
| Decision Date | 22 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:14-cv-243-Orl-28KRS |
| Parties | GAME CRAFT, LLC and SWEENEY HOLDINGS, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. VECTOR PUTTING, LLC, MICHAEL SCHY and DAVID BALBI, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida |
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:
I. BACKGROUND.
Plaintiffs created and own a system called AimPoint, "through which one can accurately predict optimum putting parameters and putt trajectories from any point on a golf-green to any other point on that golf-green." Doc. No. 82 at 3. Defendants Michael Schy and David Balbi became certified AimPoint instructors in 2010. Id. at 4.1 While they were certified AimPoint instructors, Schy and Balbi developed and marketed a competing product through Defendant Vector Putting, LLC ("Vector"). Id. at 4-5. Defendants' competing product was created using Plaintiffs'proprietary data and business methods. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs filed Game Craft I, alleging violations of Section 43 of the Lanham Act, unfair competition, conversion, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Id. at 5.
On June 27, 2013, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, settling all claims in Game Craft I. Doc. No. 82-2. United States District Judge John Antoon II, who was then the presiding judge, granted the parties' Joint Motion for Final Order and Judgment Approving Settlement Agreement and Permanent Injunction in part and entered a Final Order and Permanent Injunction (the "Permanent Injunction"). Doc. No. 82-1, at 2-4. In accordance with the terms of the Permanent Injunction, the Court granted the parties' request for a consent judgment (id. at 2-3), which was subsequently issued by the Clerk. Doc. No. 82-3.
Plaintiffs filed this second case, Game Craft II, after Judge Antoon denied their request to reopen Game Craft I to enforce the Permanent Injunction and obtain further declaratory relief. Doc. No. 1, at 13-18. Vector failed to appear in this case, and a clerk's default was entered against it on April 30, 2014. Doc. No. 45. Default judgment was entered against Vector on April 15, 2015. Doc. No. 74. In granting default judgment, the Court determined that Vector violated sections 3.1.1.4(i) and (iv) of the Settlement Agreement, that Plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment that Vector was in violation of the Permanent Injunction, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to execute on the consent judgment. Id.
Defendants Schy and Balbi initially appeared pro se and filed motions to dismiss. Doc. Nos. 36, 39. The Complaint was dismissed, and Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint and a Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. Nos. 68, 70. Defendants Schy and Balbi did not respond to either of those filings, but the Court nevertheless denied the motion for summary judgment against them after finding Plaintiffs failed to establish personal liability for any of the alleged violations. Doc. No. 74 at 13-15. The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend the Amended Complaint, which Plaintiffs did on May 20, 2015. Doc. No. 82. Neither Defendant Schy nor Defendant Balbi timelyresponded to the Second Amended Complaint. Taking note of the fact that both Defendants appeared to have abandoned the litigation and violated several Court Orders in doing do, the Court ordered that Clerk's defaults be entered against both. Doc. No. 85 at 2, 6.
A Clerk's Default was entered against Balbi on June 15, 2015, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, as a sanction for his failure to comply with the Court's Orders. Doc. No. 87. Balbi did not seek to set aside the Clerk's Default, but instead filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him. Doc. No. 90. The Court struck his motion as improper, in light of the default. Doc. No. 92.
Having already obtained default judgment against Vector, Plaintiffs moved for entry of default judgment against Schy and Balbi. Doc. No. 89. That motion was granted in part and denied in part on December 18, 2015, with the Court finding that Plaintiffs were entitled to entry of default judgment against Balbi for breach of Section 3.1.1.2 of the Settlement Agreement and that they were entitled to a declaratory judgment declaring that Balbi was in violation of the Settlement Agreement. Doc. No. 97. The Order further provided that a declaratory judgment be entered in Plaintiffs' favor against Vector for violating the Permanent Injunction. Id.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs on January 4, 2016. Doc. No. 101. Balbi subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on January 20, 2016. Doc. No. 102. In light of the appeal, the Court denied the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs without prejudice, pending the outcome of the appeal. Doc. No. 104. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit entered its corrected mandate dismissing the appeal on July 11, 2016. Doc. No. 108.
On August 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. Defendants Vector and Balbi, to whom the motion is directed, have not responded to the motion, and the time for them to do so has passed. The presiding District Judge referred the motion to me for issuance of this Report and Recommendation, and the matter is now ripe for review.
II. DISCUSSION.
Plaintiffs' motion presents two separate requests to the Court. First, Plaintiffs ask that the Court award them $155,560.00 in attorneys' fees. Doc. No. 111, at 24. Second, Plaintiffs ask that the Court award them $15,680.25 in costs. Id. at 27. I will address each of these requests in turn.
Because this is a diversity case arising under Florida law, Florida law determines whether the Court should award Plaintiff attorneys' fees. See Pavasini Constr. Co. (SE) v. Ace Am Ins. Co., 161 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2015). "Under Florida law, each party generally bears its own attorneys' fees unless a contract or statute provides otherwise." United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 289 F.3d 741, 742 (11th Cir. 2002), certified question answered, 850 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2003).
In the orders granting default judgment in Plaintiffs' favor, the Court determined that Balbi and Vector were in breach of the Settlement Agreement. Doc. No. 97, at 5-9. The Agreement provides in relevant part:
Doc. No. 82-2, at 5, 10-11. Based on these provisions in the Settlement Agreement, I recommend that the Court find Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney's fees from Balbi and Vector as a result of the default judgment against Defendants.
Just as a federal court must apply state law to determine whether a party is entitled to fees, it must also apply state law in determining the reasonableness of fees. See Trans Coastal Roofing Co. v. David Boland, Inc., 309 F.3d 758, 760 (11th Cir. 2002). The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the federal lodestar method as the starting point for determining reasonable attorneys' fees. Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985). Under the lodestar method, a court must multiply the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the customary fee charged in the community for similar legal services to reach the sum referred to as the "lodestar." Ass'n of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). "The court may then adjust the lodestar to reach a more appropriate attorneys' fee, based on a variety of factors, including the degree of the plaintiff's success in the suit." Id.
The fee applicant bears the burden of supplying the court with specific and detailed evidence from which it may determine the reasonable fee. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). A court may also, however, use its knowledge and experience to determine the reasonable and proper fees to award. Id.
With respect to the customary fee, Plaintiffs have filed the declaration of William B. Pringle III, Esq., their counsel of record. Doc. No. 111, at 6-8. They have also submitted the declaration of Douglas C. Bowdoin, Esq.2 Id. at 28-61. Attorney Bowdoin is a member of the Florida Bar and has practiced law in Florida for thirty-four years. Id. at 59. He is personally familiar with Attorney Pringle and represents that Pringle has been licensed in Florida and practicing civil litigation for twenty-six years. Id. at 60. He analyzed the pleadings in this case as well as AttorneyPringle's time records and opines that a rate between $400.00 and $450.00 is a reasonable rate for Attorney Pringle. Id. I recommend based on this evidence that the Court find that $400.00 is a reasonable rate for an attorney with Pringle's experience in this case in the absence of objection. See Kratom Lab, Inc. v. Mancini, No. 11-80987-CIV-MARRA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182410, at *8 (S.D. Fla. ...
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