Gandy v. State

• Decision Date: 17 January 1889
• Citation: 5 So. 420,86 Ala. 20
• Parties: GANDY v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

5 So. 420

86 Ala. 20

GANDY v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 17, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Butler county; JOHN P. HUBBARD, Judge.

Mich Gandy was indicted and convicted of the offense of illegal voting, and he appeals. For opinion on former appeal, see 2 South, Rep. 465.

John Gamble, for appellant.

T N. McClellan, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SOMERVILLE J.

The indictment in due form charges the defendant with having voted illegally at a special election held in Butler county under the authority of an act approved November 27, 1886 providing for the expression of the popular voice in that county on the subject of adopting or rejecting a prohibitory liquor law. The appellant assails the constitutionality of this act as violative of section 2 of article 4 of the constitution of Alabama, which provides that "each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title;" and that "no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be reenacted and published at length." Const. 1875, art. 4, § 2. On December 12, 1882, the general assembly had amended section 1544 of the Code of 1876, so far as applicable to Butler county, so as to prohibit the granting of any license by the probate judge to sell vinous, spirituous, or malt liquors in that county, unless on the recommendation of a majority of the qualified voters residing in the election precinct where the applicant desired to sell such liquor. Acts 1882-83, p. 272.

The act here assailed is entitled "An act to amend an act approved December 12, 1882, to amend section 1544 of the Code of Alabama, so far as applies to Butler county, Ala., so as to authorize the probate judge of said county to order an election to determine whether spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors, or intoxicating beverages, or intoxicating preserved fruits, shall be sold, given away, or otherwise disposed of in precinct 12 of said county." After this title follows a law original in form, and complete in itself, in nine sections, providing for the details of an election to be ordered by the probate judge to determine the question of "prohibition" or "no prohibition," in precinct 12, of said county of Butler, and making it unlawful to grant licenses under the general law to sell any liquors of an intoxicating character in such precinct, in the event that a majority of the electors voting at such election should vote for "prohibition."

If the first part of the foregoing act, which purports to be amendatory, had been omitted, or if we now were permitted to expunge it, there could be no doubt as to the constitutionality of the law. It would be no objection that it amended or repealed by implication several sections of the Code without referring to them in any manner, or publishing them at length as amended. The constitutional provision in question, (article 4, § 2,) as said in Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77, 100, and often since reiterated in substance, "reaches those cases where the act is strictly amendatory or revisory in its character. Its prohibition is directed against the practice of amending or revising laws by additions, or other alterations, which without the presence of the original are usually unintelligible. If a law is itself complete and intelligible, and original in form, it does not fall within the meaning and spirit of the constitution." Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 340; 3 Brick. Dig. p. 133, § 88 et seq.; Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) *152.

It was said by Judge COOLEY, in construing a similar clause in the constitution of Michigan, in People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 497: "The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to, but not republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such legislation. But," he concludes, "an act complete in itself is not within the mischief designed to be remedied by this provision, and cannot be held to be prohibited by it without violating its plain intent." This view is generally sustained by the adjudged cases: Stewart v. County Com'rs, 82 Ala. 209, 2 South. Rep. 270; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 572, 605; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W.Va. 74, 88; Insurance Co. v. Taxing Dist., 4 Lea, 644; Cooley, Const. Lim. *151, *152.

The act under consideration being original in form, and complete and independent in itself, is not, therefore, repugnant to the section of the constitution above quoted, provided there be unity in the subject of the law, and that subject is "clearly expressed in its title." If the law were entitled "An act to authorize the probate judge of Butler county, Ala., to order an election to determine whether spirituous and other named liquors shall be sold, or otherwise disposed of, in precinct 12 of said county," as the latter part of the title purports to do, it would be unobjectionable on any constitutional ground. This title would express the true purpose and object of...