Hart v. Backstrom

• Decision Date: 13 June 1927
• Docket Number: 26307
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HART v. BACKSTROM. [*]

113 So. 898

148 Miss. 13

HART v. BACKSTROM. ^[*]

No. 26307

Supreme Court of Mississippi

June 13, 1927

Suggestion of Error Overruled Sept. 26, 1927.

(In Banc.)

1 STATUTES. Requirement that law shall be set out at length as amended or revived held not applicable to amendments by implication where amending statute is complete within itself (Constitution 1890, section 61).

Section 61 of the Constitution of 1890, providing that "no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only but the section or sections, as amended or revived, shall be inserted at length," has no application to amendments by implication when the amending statute is complete within itself.

2 STATUTES. Prohibition against reviving or amending law by reference to title only was intended to prevent deceiving legislators and public; statutes amending other statutes by implication need not even refer to acts or sections amended (Constitution 1890, section 61).

"The mischief designed to be remedied by section 61 of the Constitution of 1890 was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effects, and the public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to, but not published was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was thus introduced into the law, and the Constitution wisely prohibited such legislation....

"Statutes which amend other statutes by implication are not within this provision; and it is not essential that they even refer to acts or sections which by implication they amend."

3. STATUTES. Statute dispensing with requirement of another statute that lists of land struck off to state for taxes should be filed with land commissioner amends it by implication and does not violate constitutional provision that law amended or revived shall be inserted at length (Laws 1920, chapter 231; Code 1906, sections 2933, 2935, 2937; Hemingway's Code, sections 5268, 5270, 5272, 6967; Constitution 1890, section 61).

Chapter 231, Laws 1920, dispensing with the requirement of section 2933, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code, section 5268), that the lists of lands struck off to the state for their taxes shall be filed with the land commissioner, is not violative of section 61 of the Constitution of 1890, providing that "no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the section or sections, as amended or revived, shall be inserted at length;" the reason being that the amendment of the latter statute by the former is not an express amendment but an amendment by implication, and the former statute is complete within itself.

4. STATUTES. Statute postponing tax sales held not to violate constitutional provision against suspending general law (Laws 1922, chapter 137; Code 1906, section 4326; Hemingway's Code, section 3811; Constitution 1890, section 87).

Chapter 137 of the Laws of 1922 is not violative of section 87 of the Constitution of 1890, providing "that the operation of a general law shall not be suspended by the Legislature for the benefit of any individual or private corporation or association," for the reason that the suspending statute (chapter 137, Laws of 1922) is as broad and general in its terms as the operation of the statute suspended (section 4326, Code of 1906; Hemingway's Code, section 3811), which is a general statute.

5. STATUTES. Taxation Section of statute held not unconstitutional as suspending preceding section providing for sale of lands generally for taxes; statute as to sales for taxes held not special law granting land under state's control; statute as to sales for taxes held not invalid as donating land under state's control to private corporations or individuals (Laws 1926, chapter 185, sections 1, 2; Constitution 1890, sections 87, 90, par. [u]; section 95).

Section 2, chapter 185, Laws of 1926, is not violative of either section 87 of the Constitution, paragraph (u) of section 90 of the Constitution of 1890, nor of section 95 of the Constitution, in that it suspends the operation of section 1 of chapter 185 of the Laws of 1926, which section of the statute provides for the sale of lands generally for their taxes to any and all persons; the statute not being an unconstitutional effort to give preference to those who had purchased from the land commissioner, but who by reason of want of authority in that officer were without title, nor a donation of state lands.

6. TAXATION. Purchaser from state of land it bought for taxes, held entitled to decree quieting title (Laws 1922, chapter 137; Laws 1926, chapter 185).

Where land situated in a municipality was sold to state for taxes in accordance with Laws 1922, chapter 137, on the first Monday of May, and list as required by such chapter was certified and filed in office of chancery clerk, including such land, purchaser of land from state at a price exceeding $1.25 per acre, who repurchased under authority of laws 1926, chapter 185, held entitled to decree quieting title.

Suggestion of Error Overruled Sept. 26, 1927.

APPEAL from chancery court of George county.

HON. V. A. GRIFFITH, Chancellor.

Suit by Oscar Backstrom against Sydney Hart and others to quiet title. From a decree for plaintiff, the named defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Hughes, Nobles & Lane, for appellant.

By reference to chapter 135, Acts of 1922, it will be found that the legislature had in mind making it unlawful for any sheriff and tax collector to collect any damages on taxes for the fiscal year 1921 until on and after April 1, 1922, as section 1 of said chapter clearly shows.

Section 3 of said chapter 135 provides: "That this is an emergency act and shall expire on April 1, 1922." But section 4, chapter 137, Acts of 1922, took up chapter 135, Acts of 1922, with all its provisions and continued it therein in full force and effect until May 1, 1922. It seems to us perfectly clear that chapter 137 of the Acts of 1922 intended to change the law only with reference to what the published notices should state, as to the date of sale, and by its own terms failed to accomplish this purpose. But if the court should take the view that the operation of section 4326, Code of 1906, providing and directing what the posted and published notices shall contain as to the date of sale, was suspended and that section 1, chapter 137, Acts of 1922, fixed the date of sale as provided in section 4326 and made it to read by the said act, first Monday of May, 1922, instead of first Monday of April, 1922, then in that event it must be clear to the court that the change thus made in the law with reference to recitals in notices already published, hopelessly conflicted with chapter 199, Acts of 1908, or section 6962, Hemingway's Code, fixing the date when sales for delinquent lands should take place, for the first Monday of April.

On the first day of April, 1922, the date on which chapter 137, Acts of 1922, was passed and approved, every tax collector in the state, under the existing laws, had his list of delinquent lands already advertised in newspapers of their respective counties, to be sold on the following Monday, only three days from the date of the approval of this emergency act.

It is positively certain that it did not occur to the legislature that the change with reference to the notices of sales already published throughout the state to take place on the first Monday of April, but changed to make it read the first Monday of May, hopelessly conflicted with chapter 199, Acts of 1908, or section 6962, Hemingway's Code, which provided for sale of delinquent tax lands to take place on the first Monday of April, and further provided that failure to advertise or error in the advertisement should not invalidate the sale at the proper time and place, but that a sale at the wrong time or the wrong place would be void.

But this is not the first time the legislature of this state has made the law fixing dates providing for published notices for sale of delinquent lands to conflict with the law providing when and how delinquent lands would be sold. See Simpson v. Interstate Cooperage Co., 58 So. 4, construing sections 4326 and 4328, Code of 1908.

The legislature by the enactments of chapter 137, Acts of 1922, did not undertake to suspend the operation of chapter 199, Acts of 1908, or section 6962, Hemingway's Code, which fixes the date for the sale of delinquent taxes on the first Monday of April, because neither chapter 199, Acts of 1908, or section 6962, Hemingway's Code, anywhere appears in the Code of 1906 and could not have been remotely in the mind of the legislature in the passage of chapter 137, Acts of 1922. If it is contended by the appellee that it was the purpose of the legislature in passing chapter 137, Acts of 1922, to suspend the operation of chapter 199, Acts of 1908, or section 6962, Hemingway's Code, by implication, then we say that the chapter would fail under condemnation of section 71 of the Constitution, requiring that every bill introduced into the legislature shall have a title and the title ought to indicate clearly the subject-matter or matters of the proposed legislation. Levee Commissioners v. Royal Ins. Co., 51 So. 2. Repeal by implication is not favored by our courts.

We submit that when this land was sold on the first day of May the first Monday of May, 1922, that sections 5268, 6965 and 5271, Hemingway's Code, embraced all...