Gannon v. State
| Decision Date | 04 March 1903 |
| Citation | 75 Conn. 576,54 A. 199 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | GANNON v. STATE. |
Appeal from superior court, Fairfield county; Milton A. Shumway, Judge.
Michael Gannon was convicted of conspiracy to defraud. His petition for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was denied, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Stiles Judson, Jr., for appellant.
Galen A. Carter, Asst. State's Atty., for the State.
HAMERSLEY, J. A court which has rendered final judgment in a cause tried before it may, upon reasonable ground being shown, grant a new trial in the exercise of that discretionary power, within the limits of law, over their own judgments, vested in courts. Gen. St. (Revision 1902) § 815. Upon an application for this purpose, process is issued citing the opposite party to appear and be heard. This, however, does not make the application an independent action. Magill v. Lyman, 6 Conn. 59; Spear v. Coon, 32 Conn. 292. The finality of a judgment does not preclude the court that rendered it from entertaining further proceedings in the same action when it is made apparent that injustice has been done. When, however, a judgment has been rendered upon the verdict of a jury, and that verdict is based upon evidence sufficient to support it, and no error in law has intervened in the trial, and no mistake in pleading has occurred, or other mistake or accident to prevent the party from having a fair trial upon the merits, and the proceedings in the cause have been regular and lawful from its commencement to its close, any legal inference of injustice is excluded. The policy of the law treats it as final for all purposes, and forbids the court which rendered it from entertaining any further proceedings. It is possible that a losing party, by some mistake or misfortune, and without fault of his own, may have been unable to produce on the trial evidence now attainable, which, if produced and believed, would demonstrate the injustice of the judgment, and so a new trial may be granted for the discovery of new evidence of this character. The application is addressed to the discretion of the court (State v. Brockhaus, 72 Conn. 109, 111, 43 Atl. 850; Hamlin v. State, 48 Conn. 93), and must allege and set forth the evidence produced on the former trial and the newly discovered evidence, in order that the court may see whether injustice has probably been done, and whether the newly discovered evidence is likely to reverse the result. If the adverse party desires to controvert the accuracy of the statement of the former testimony or of the new testimony set forth, or to produce other testimony to be considered with that alleged, he may do so, and for this purpose no pleadings are essential. 1 Swift's Digest, 318. Or he may admit the accuracy of the statement of the testimony, both old and new, and for this purpose a demurrer is used. In either case, whether upon the testimony old and new—as found by the court after hearing witnesses—or upon such testimony as set forth in the application and admitted, the court decides in the exercise of a sound discretion whether a new trial should be granted or denied. Parsons v. Platt, 37 Conn. 563, 567. This discretion is a legal one; it is controlled by the well-established rules defining the requisites essential to granting a new trial. It may be abused by refusing a new trial where all essential requisites exist and the injustice of the judgment is apparent, and error may be affirmed where the trial court has erroneously held it had no power to exercise discretion. Wildman v. Wildman, 72 Conn. 262, 44 Atl. 224. But within these limits the power is discretionary, and its exercise in the denial of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence cannot be reviewed upon proceedings in error. This principle is firmly settled by many decisions of this court, extending from its organization to the present time. Kimball v. Cady, Kirby, 41; Granger v. Bissell, 2 Day, 364; Lewis v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 49; White v. Trinity Church, 5 Conn. 187, 189; Magill v. Lyman, 6 Conn. 59; Lester v. State, 11 Conn. 415; Norwich & W. R. Co. v. Cahill, 18 Conn. 484; Parsons v. Piatt, 37 Conn 563; Hamlin v. State, 48 Conn. 93; Hart v. Brainerd, 68 Conn. 50, 52, 35 Atl. 776; State v. Brockhaus, 72 Conn. 109, 43 Atl. 850. In the present case the application sets out in full the testimony on the former trial, and states the newly discovered testimony as it will be given by witnesses named. No question is made as to due diligence in discovery. The fact that the testimony detailed is the testimony given at the former trial, and that the witnesses named will testify as stated, is admitted by the demurrer. The court before which the first trial was had, upon the facts thus presented for its consideration, refused to grant a new trial. That action cannot be reviewed unless it appears that the court plainly abused its discretion, or did not act within the limits of its discretionary power. The substantial claim of the petitioner is that the denial is not an exercise of legal discretion, but is based on a misapprehension of the real question in issue and the relevancy of the newly discovered testimony to the controlling issue in the case. It is difficult to distinguish this claim from a mere objection to the result reached by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion. Assuming, without deciding, that the claim presents a reviewable question, we think that it is not well founded.
The case is this: The petitioner was prosecuted, with Carey and Hill, for a conspiracy to cheat and defraud John Griffin of $1,700 of his money by means of certain fraudulent devices. The information alleged that this money belonged to Griffin as part of the proceeds of a check for $2,500, payable to the order of Griffin, given by a life insurance company in payment of a policy for that amount on the life of Griffin's son, Michael P. Griffin, which had been procured by and through the defendants, and assigned by Michael P. to...
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Jones v. State
...This court expressly articulated an abuse of discretion standard for appeals involving new trial petitions in Gannon v. State , 75 Conn. 576, 578–79, 54 A. 199 (1903). We have applied that standard ever since. See, e.g., Skakel v. State , supra, 295 Conn. at 468, 487 n.25, 991 A.2d 414.Many......
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Skakel v. State Of Conn.
...cannot be so great as to deny a petitioner a new trial when the petitioner has satisfied such a standard.11 See Gannon v. State, 75 Conn. 576, 577, 54 A. 199 (1903) ("[t]he finality of a judgment does not preclude the court that rendered it from entertaining further proceedings in the same ......
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Stevenson v. State
... ... Several state courts, relying upon Sparf, have held that under jury trial clauses of state constitutions comparable to the Sixth Amendment, the proper role of the jury is limited to finding the facts. State v. Gannon, 75 Conn. 576, 52 A. 727 (1902); People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931); Roesel v. State, 62 N.J.L. 368, 41 A. 408 (1898). Furthermore, regardless of the original basis for Sparf, the decision in that case is viewed today as delineating the role of the jury under the Sixth Amendment ... ...
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Skakel v. State, (SC 18158) (Conn. 4/20/2010), (SC 18158).
...Lombardo v. State, 172 Conn. 385, 389-93, 374 A.2d 1065 (1977); Smith v. State, 141 Conn. 202, 207, 104 A.2d 761 (1954); Gannon v. State, 75 Conn. 576, 578, 54 A. 199 (1903). As we previously have noted, under the abuse of discretion standard, "every reasonable presumption should be made in......