Gant v. City of Fort Wayne
| Decision Date | 02 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-380-TLS |
| Parties | ANTHONY GANT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FORT WAYNE, OFFICER DANIEL HARTMAN, OFFICER JASON PALM, and OFFICER BRADLEY GRIFFIN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 37] filed by Defendants Officer Daniel Hartman, Officer Jason Palm, Officer Bradley Griffin, and the City of Fort Wayne ("the Defendants"). The Plaintiff, Anthony Gant, filed his First Amended Complaint against the Defendants on March 13, 2017 [ECF No. 27], brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging (1) the unconstitutional use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Hartman, (2) failure to intervene against Defendants Griffin and Palm, (3) failure to adequately train against the City of Fort Wayne, and (4) the unreasonable denial of emergency medical care in violation of the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Griffin. In his prayer for relief, the Plaintiff included a request for punitive damages. On October 25, 2017, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 37] on all counts and assert a claim of qualified immunity as to Defendants Hartman, Griffin, and Palm. The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff's request for punitive damages must fail as a matter of law. The Plaintiff responded on November 11, 2017 [ECF No. 41], and the Defendants replied on November 22, 2017 [ECF No. 42]. This matter is now fully briefed and ripe for review.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2015, Defendants Hartman and Griffin responded to a call regarding an armed robbery at a Dollar General store. Other police officers soon arrived at the scene, including Defendant Palm. Previously, there had been multiple armed robberies at various Dollar General stores in the City of Fort Wayne, which were carried out in similar fashion. Typically, two men would enter the store, display hand guns, confine/zip tie employees, wait for registers to open, and depart, taking cash, cigarettes, and employees' cell phones.
As Defendant Hartman approached the front door of the Dollar General on August 23, 2015, the first suspect, later identified as Christopher Johnson, ran out the front entrance. After determining that the person was a suspect and not a victim, Defendant Hartman commanded Johnson to stop and get on the ground, but Johnson ignored him and kept running. Soon after, the second suspect, later identified as Anthony Gant, exited the store through the front entrance. Defendant Hartman also commanded Gant to stop and get down on the ground. Defendant Hartman stated that he was fearful for his life because there was no cover available to him and believed that Gant was holding a handgun. Defendant Hartman discharged two rounds from his firearm, one of which struck Gant in the abdomen. It was later determined that Gant was not holding a handgun.
Defendants Griffin and Palm testified that, while observing Johnson running across the parking lot despite being commanded to stop and while concerned for their safety and the safety of others, they heard shots fired. Defendant Palm began to pursue Johnson. Defendant Griffintook the canine that was with him to the front door of the store and observed the Plaintiff in a seated position inside the vestibule. Defendant Griffin ordered the Plaintiff to get on the ground at which point the Plaintiff informed Defendant Griffin that he had been shot. Defendant Griffin called for an ambulance, handcuffed the Plaintiff, and told him to lie down.
An ambulance arrived about two minutes later. However, Defendant Griffin did not allow ambulance personnel to approach the Plaintiff until the scene had been cleared, which occurred about four minutes later. A total of six minutes elapsed between the time at which Defendant Griffin called the ambulance and the time at which emergency medical personnel were able to administer aide.
Defendant Hartman stated that when he shot the Plaintiff, he believed that the Plaintiff had a handgun in his left hand, and when the Plaintiff turned towards Defendant Hartman and began moving his hand toward the center of his body, Defendant Hartman feared for his life. Neither Defendant Griffin nor Palm saw anything in the Plaintiff's hands that appeared to be a handgun. Defendant Hartman states that the Plaintiff showed no signs of following the command to get on the ground, but the Plaintiff argues that he was given no chance to obey because he was shot almost immediately after exiting the store.
The incident was captured by Defendants Hartman and Griffin's in-car cameras.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper where the evidence of record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record itbelieves demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings" to cite evidence of a genuine factual dispute that precludes summary judgment. Id. at 324. "[A] court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial." Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). If the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in its favor on a material issue, then the Court must enter summary judgment against it. Id.
ANALYSIS
Claims of excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" are to be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). "[T]here can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
To determine whether the amount of force used was excessive, the Court "looks to whether the force used to seize the suspect was excessive in relation to the danger he posed—to the community or to the arresting officers if left unattended." Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d758, 773 (7th Cir. 2000). All decisions about the reasonableness of the use of deadly force "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). Courts must examine the reasonableness of the actions "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
"When an officer believes that a suspect's actions place[] him, his partner, or those in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the officer can reasonably exercise the use of deadly force." Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988). The officer does not necessarily need to be certain that the suspect was armed before using deadly force. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12. However, an officer's subjective beliefs regarding the reasonableness of the force applied is not relevant to the inquiry. Common v. City of Chi., 661 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2011). "[A] person has a right not to be seized through the use of deadly force unless he puts another person (including a police officer) in imminent danger or he is actively resisting arrest and the circumstances warrant that degree of force." Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2014).
Here, at the time the Plaintiff was shot, he did not in fact have a gun in his hands. A jury must assess whether it was reasonable for an officer in Defendant Hartman's position to believe that the Plaintiff had a gun. Viewing the facts most favorably to the Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could conclude either that the Plaintiff was in the process of obeying Defendant Hartman's commands or that he did not have the opportunity to obey Defendant Hartman's commands. Therefore, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant Harman's use of deadly force was excessive.
Regardless of whether his use of deadly force was reasonable, Defendant Hartman argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. "The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The matter of qualified immunity is for the court, not the jury, to decide. Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988); Rackovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1988).
Issues on summary judgment regarding qualified immunity require a two-pronged inquiry. "The first asks whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury show the officer's conduct violated a federal right." Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014) (internal...
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