Gantes v. Kason Corp., I-V
| Citation | 145 N.J. 478,679 A.2d 106 |
| Decision Date | 23 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | I-V |
| Parties | Samuel GANTES, Administrator Ad Prosequendum of Graciela Gonzalez, on behalf of the Estate of Graciela Gonzalez and on behalf of the heirs-at-law of Graciela Gonzalez, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KASON CORPORATION, Defendant-Respondent, and Otto Cuyler Associates and Xyz Co.(being fictitious business entities whose identities are currently unknown), Defendants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Alan Y. Medvin, Newark, for appellant (Medvin & Elberg, attorneys).
Peter B. Van Deventer, Jr., Newark for respondent (Robinson, St. John & Wayne, attorneys; Douglas H. Amster and John S. Wisniewski, on the brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
In this case, a young woman, working in a chicken processing plant in Georgia, was killed when struck in the head by a moving part of a machine. The machine had been manufactured more than thirteen years before the fatal accident by a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Linden, New Jersey.
Representatives of the decedent, asserting that the machine was defective, brought this personal-injury action based on claims of survivorship and wrongful-death against the New Jersey manufacturer in the Law Division in Union County. The action was filed within New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, but beyond Georgia's ten-year statute of repose applicable to products-liability claims against manufacturers. Because of the conflict between the two statutes, the case poses a fundamental choice-of-law issue over which statute applies and whether, depending on that choice, the action will be barred.
Graciela Gonzalez was a twenty-two year-old who lived in Georgia with her husband and two small children. She was employed at a chicken processing plant called Dutch Quality House in Gainesville, Georgia. On February 27, 1991, Ms. Gonzalez was killed at work when she was struck in the head by a moving part of a shaker machine. Plaintiff Samuel Gantes, also a Georgia resident, is the administrator ad prosequendum for the estate and heirs of the decedent.
The shaker machine was manufactured by defendant Kason Corporation, which is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Linden, New Jersey. It was disputed below whether the machine was manufactured at defendant's New Jersey plant, or at one of its plants in New York. However, for purposes of the disposition by summary judgment, the courts below assumed that defendant manufactured the machine in New Jersey.
Evidence indicating New Jersey manufacture included the original certification to the trial court of Kason's president, Lawrence H. Stone. This certification expressly stated that defendant manufactured the shaker machine, a forty-eight inch "Kason Vibroscreen," in the Linden, New Jersey plant. In addition, numerous documents affixed to Stone's original certification, consisting of correspondence, invoices, receipts, and the like, indicate that the machine was manufactured in and shipped from New Jersey. They indicate that defendant originally sold the shaker machine in 1977 to Salvo Corporation of Fall River, Massachusetts, for shipment to Snyder's Potato Chips in Berlin, Pennsylvania. Thus, all of the correspondence from defendant regarding that original sale and shipment to Snyder's Potato Chips contain a New Jersey return address. With one exception, all of the receipts, invoices and other similar documents regarding that sale and shipment contain defendant's New Jersey letterhead. In addition, the "purchase order" sent from Salvo Corporation to defendant was directed to a New Jersey address belonging to defendant. Finally, the Federal Express invoice that documents the shipment of the machine to Snyder's Potato Chips reflects that defendant made that shipment from its offices in Linden, New Jersey. The "Instruction Manual" for the Kason Vibroscreen, another document affixed to Stone's original certification, also supports the conclusion that defendant manufactured the machine in New Jersey. That manual lists defendant's Linden, New Jersey address and telephone number as the point of contact for "additional information or assistance." 1
It is undisputed that defendant placed the shaker machine into the stream of commerce in November 1977 when it shipped the machine to Snyder's Potato Chips in Pennsylvania. After April 1985, Snyder's Potato Chips sold the machine to Otto Cuyler Associates. Otto Cuyler Associates later sold the machine to Dutch Quality House, Ms. Gonzalez's Georgia employer.
On February 23, 1993, plaintiff filed this action on behalf of the estate and heirs of Ms. Gonzalez against defendant Kason Corporation and Otto Cuyler Associates and various unidentified business entities. The complaint seeks money damages based on strict liability. Defendant filed an answer that contained a general denial of liability, as well as numerous affirmative defenses, crossclaims for contribution and indemnification against all co-defendants. The trial court, in a published opinion, 278 N.J.Super. 473, 651 A.2d 503 (Law Div.1993), determined that Georgia's statute of repose applies and bars plaintiff's action, and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed that judgment. 276 N.J.Super. 586, 648 A.2d 517 (App.Div.1994). Based on a dissent in the Appellate Division, the appeal is before us as of right. R. 2:2-1(a)(2).
The issue before the Court is whether to invoke the Georgia statute of repose or the New Jersey statute of limitations. Because the action was brought in New Jersey, the issue must be determined in accordance with this State's choice-of-law rule. New Jersey's rule applies a flexible "governmental-interest" standard, which requires application of the law of the state with the greatest interest in resolving the particular issue that is raised in the underlying litigation. Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247-49, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986); see State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 84 N.J. 28, 36-37, 417 A.2d 488 (1980); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 490, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
The initial prong of the governmental-interest analysis entails an inquiry into whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the respective states, a determination that is made on an issue-by-issue basis. Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248, 510 A.2d 1187. The particular issue to be resolved in this case--whether the action was filed timely--is subject to an obvious and direct conflict between Georgia's ten-year statute of repose and New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations.
The Georgia statute of repose bars the commencement of strict products-liability actions "after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury." O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2). See Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (), rev'd on other grounds, 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994); LFE Corp. v. Edenfield, 187 Ga.App. 785, 371 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1988) (). Ms. Gonzalez's accident occurred more than ten years after defendant made its "first sale for use" of the shaker machine, in November 1977. It is undisputed that this action is barred by Georgia's ten-year statute of repose applicable to products-liability actions.
New Jersey law provides that personal-injury actions, including those based on strict-products liability, are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. It is clear that under New Jersey's statute of limitations, plaintiff's suit would not be barred because the complaint was filed less than two years after Ms. Gonzalez' accident.
The second prong of the governmental-interest analysis seeks to determine the interest that each state has in resolving the specific issue in dispute. That analysis requires the court to "identify the governmental policies underlying the law of each state and how those policies are affected by each state's contacts to the litigation and to the parties." Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248, 510 A.2d 1187. We look first to the policies that underlie the respective state statutes that are in conflict in this case.
In 1978, the Georgia legislature enacted its statute of repose, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2), as an amendment to its strict products- statute. Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 304 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1983). In Love v. Whirlpool Corporation, 264 Ga. 701, 449 S.E.2d 602 (1994), the Georgia Supreme Court explained that its legislature adopted the statute of repose to serve the dual purposes of stabilizing insurance underwriting and eliminating stale claims. In so concluding, the court indicated that the statute of repose was the legislature's response to a 1978 report of the Senate Products Liability Study Committee that addressed insurance-industry problems generated by the open-ended liability of manufacturers, and recommended "that a ten-year statute of repose be enacted." Id. 449 S.E.2d at 605. Just one month after its decision in Love, the Georgia Supreme Court again had occasion to address the statute of repose. Chrysler Corp., supra, 450 S.E.2d at 211-13. There the court reiterated: "The ten-year statute of repose was enacted in order to address problems generated by the open-ended liability of manufacturers so as to eliminate stale claims and stabilize products liability underwriting." Id. at 212.
New Jersey's statute of limitations applicable to personal-injury actions reflects well-articulated policy. In ...
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