Daniel v. American Optical Corp.
Decision Date | 28 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 39457,39457 |
Citation | 251 Ga. 166,304 S.E.2d 383 |
Parties | Norman DANIEL v. AMERICAN OPTICAL CORPORATION. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Kenneth J. Rajotte, Robert John White, Robert John White & Nackley, Atlanta, for Norman Daniel.
Michael Glenn Frick, Phillips, Hart & Sullivan, Atlanta, for American Optical Corp.
This case comes before us upon questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to Rule 36 of the Supreme Court of Georgia, OCGA § 15-2-9 (Code Ann. § 24-4536). The following statement of the case was submitted to us by the circuit court.
1. OCGA § 51-1-11(b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) is our statute governing strict liability in tort which is in derogation of common law and "must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms." Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 658, 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977); Wanson v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91, 252 S.E.2d 623 (1979). In the 1978 amendment to this subsection, the legislature expressly placed time restrictions on the bringing of a cause of action under the subsection, but it was not a traditional statute of limitations which typically declares "that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action unless brought within a specified period after the right accrued." (Emphasis supplied) Black's Law Dictionary, 1077 (4th Ed. 1968). OCGA § 51-1-11(b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) does not contain such a traditional statute of limitations. Since § 51-1-11(b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) must be strictly construed, we do not believe this 1978 amendment was intended to preclude the application of a general statute of limitations which would otherwise apply or to suggest that no general statute of limitations applied to strict liability actions under OCGA § 51-1-11(b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) prior to the 1978 amendment. See Eldridge, Products Liability in Georgia & 5-6.6 (1982 Supp.).
OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004) provides in relevant part, "Actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues ..." This is a traditional general statute of limitations. By its very language, the scope of application of this statute of limitations is determined by the nature of the injury sustained rather than the legal theory underlying the claim for relief. The nature of injuries covered are "injuries to the person." Physical injuries such as these are clearly covered by this language. Dalrymple v. Brunswick Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 Ga.App. 754, 181 S.E. 597 (1935). Because the nature of the injury sustained in this case is an injury to the person, OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004) applies. See Taylor v. Murray, 231 Ga. 852, 204 S.E.2d 747 (1974). 1 We find no reason to differentiate between actions for personal injuries brought under a theory of strict liability as opposed to negligence for purposes of applying OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004).
2. Based on the facts provided this action is barred by the two year statute of limitations for personal injuries expressed in OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004). The personal injury occurred on January 4, 1978, yet the complaint was not filed until May 21, 1981, more than two years after the cause of action accrued. See Gibson v. Kelley, 88 Ga.App. 817, 78 S.E.2d 76...
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