Garcia-Hicks v. Vocational Rehab. Admin.

• Decision Date: 30 November 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 13–1491 (FAB)
• Citation: 148 F.Supp.3d 157
• Parties: Jaslind Garcia–Hicks, Plaintiff, v. Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, et. al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

148 F.Supp.3d 157

Jaslind Garcia–Hicks, Plaintiff,

v.Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, et. al, Defendants.

Civil No. 13–1491 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed November 30, 2015

Michelle M. Acosta–Rodriguez, Canovanas, PR, for Plaintiff.

Aurea Yadira Rivera–Alvarado, Rivera–Munich & Hernandez Law Offices PSC, Wandymar Burgos–Vargas, Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA

, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendants Ivan A. Clemente–Delgado (“Clemente”), Kimiris Concepcion (“Concepcion”), and Isabelita Vallejo (“Vallejo”)'s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

(“Rule 12(b)(6) ”). (Docket No. 38.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On June 20, 2013, plaintiff Jaslind Garcia–Hicks (“Garcia”) filed a discrimination complaint pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),¹ 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,

and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. against the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration (“VRA”). (Docket No. 2.) On June 30, 2014, plaintiff Garcia filed an amended complaint pursuant to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Protection Clause² of the United States Constitution against defendants the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources (“DLHR”), Vance E. Thomas–Rider (“Thomas”), Clemente, Concepcion, and Vallejo. (Docket No. 22.) On October 27, 2015, the Court granted plaintiff Garcia's motion to dismiss defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, DLHR, and Thomas voluntarily. (Docket Nos. 44, 50, 51.) The remaining defendants are Clemente, in his official capacity as Administrator of the VRA, and Concepcion and Vallejo, in their individual capacities. (Docket No. 44 at p. 4.)

Plaintiff Garcia alleges that she was a disabled person who was qualified for her job but denied reasonable accommodations by her employer, VRA. (Docket No. 22 at pp. 10–11.) She claims that this denial exacerbated the injuries she received in a car accident and caused her to develop high blood pressure

due to stress. Id. at pp. 5–6.

On March 31, 2015, defendants Clemente, Concepcion, and Vallejo³ moved to dismiss plaintiff Garcia's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

. (Docket No. 38.) On April 23, 2015, plaintiff Garcia opposed defendants' motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 40.)

B. Factual Background

Following standard Rule 12(b)(6)

procedure, the Court views the following non-conclusory factual allegations stated in plaintiff's amended complaint as true. See

Ocasio

–

Hernández v. Fortuño

–

Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 5, 10 (1st Cir.2011).

Plaintiff Garcia has been employed as a vocational counsel for VRA since July 5, 2005. (Docket No. 22 at pp. 3–4.) The position includes handling heavy case files, tracking consumer cases through the CRIS computer system, purchasing medical rehabilitation equipment, creating transportation and maintenance checks, and other tasks which require long periods of sitting. Id. at pp. 4, 8. Garcia holds two masters degrees, including a Master's Degree in Social Work with a concentration in Supervision and Administration of Social Agencies. Id. at pp. 4, 7. Each VRA vocational counselor is assigned an assistant and may be assigned student interns to assist in managing their caseloads. Id. at pp. 7–8. Despite having a steady caseload of 300 to 500 cases, Garcia was not assigned an assistant and was only assigned one student intern for a period in 2010. Id. at pp. 4–5, 7–8.

On July 28, 2009, Garcia was involved in an automobile accident that injured her back.⁴ (Docket No. 22 at p. 5.) These injuries made it painful to sit for extended periods of time, so her doctor recommended an ergonomic chair. Id. Garcia presented medical evidence of her injuries to VRA. Id. In spring 2010, she also requested a parking space close to the VRA building's entrance. Id. Her request was denied by her supervisor, defendant Vallejo, who speculated that Garcia did not have a physical condition because she appeared to be healthy. Id. Garcia obtained a handicapped parking license by filing a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for Persons with Disabilities (“OPPI”). Id. at p. 6.

On August 31, 2010, defendant Vallejo was reassigned to the central office and two other employees received ergonomic chairs. (Docket No. 22 at p. 6.) Garcia did not receive an ergonomic chair despite having requested one before these two employees. Id. at pp. 6–7. In December 2010, Garcia was diagnosed with high blood pressure

due to stress. Id. at p. 6.

In November 2011, defendant Concepcion was assigned as Garcia's supervisor. (Docket No. 22 at p. 7.) In January 2012, Concepcion revoked Garcia's handicapped parking privilege and assigned the parking space to a wheelchair-using employee whose parking space was under construction. Id. at p. 8. In February 2012, after several months of strong pain, Garcia was diagnosed with cervical strain

, lumbosacral strain, and bulging disks in her lower back. Id. at pp. 6, 8. She made another request for an ergonomic chair, filed a complaint with the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund Corporation (“CFSE”), and filed a second complaint with OPPI. Id. at pp. 6, 8.

On October 31, 2012, Garcia suffered a high blood pressure

episode. (Docket No. 22 at p. 9.) Garcia was taken to the hospital by ambulance following an emergency call. Id. Concepcion did not aid Garcia, nor was an employee provided to accompany Garcia in the ambulance. Id. Following this event, Garcia filed a second complaint with CFSE. Id. Garcia was assigned a new supervisor on January 17, 2013. Id. at p. 8.

II. RULE 12(b)(6)

STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

, a court may dismiss a complaint when it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts are “obligated to view the facts of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and to resolve any ambiguities in their favor.” Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17. For Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, even “unrealistic or nonsensical” factual allegations must be accepted, as long as they are not conclusory. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A plaintiff's complaint must set forth “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; see also

Rodriguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2013) (stating that by requiring plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in his or her complaint, the court was holding the plaintiff to a “crucible hotter than the plausibility standard demands”). Detailed factual allegations are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss as “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if ... a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Ocasio–Hern á ndez, 640 F.3d at 7, 13

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Plaintiffs cannot, however, rest on “labels and conclusions” or a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,” but instead must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955. For motions to dismiss employment discrimination cases, the United States Supreme Court has declined to establish a heightened pleading standard, but instead, has applied the general ‘plausibility of the claim’ standard. Id. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (upholding the ruling in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) ).

When determining plausibility of a claim on a motion to dismiss, the court does not focus on particular factual allegations, but instead, on the “cumulative effect of the [complaint's] factual allegations.” Rodriguez–Reyes, 711 F.3d at 55

(quoting Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 14 ). The cumulative plausibility analysis “focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Individual Capacity Suits for Damages Under the ADA

Defendants argue that the individual capacity suits against Concepcion and Vallejo are barred under the ADA.⁵ (Docket No. 38 at p. 7.) Looking to the prohibition of individual suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the First Circuit Court of Appeals resolved the issue of individual capacity suits under the ADA. Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 28–31 (1st Cir.2009)

. In Fantini, the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained how the language in Title VII that excludes liability for small employers with less than fifteen employees indicates that Congress intended also to exclude liability for individuals. Id. at 29. The court also explained that the 1991 Amendments to Title VII, which laid out a detailed scheme of remedies against employers based on their number of employees, did not include details regarding remedies for claims against individual employees. Id. at 31. The Fantini court held that the language and amendments to Title VII indicated that Congress did not intend Title VII to allow for individual capacity suits. Id. at 28–31 (“[I]t is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees.”).

In Roman–Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority,

the First Circuit Court of Appeals looked to its previous examination of the congressional intent behind Title VII as discussed in Fantini. 655 F.3d 43, 51–52 (1st Cir.2011). Finding that the language of Title VII and Title I of the ADA is nearly identical and that remedies under both laws were expanded by identical 1991 amendments, the...