Ramos v. Toperbee Corp.

• Citation: 241 F.Supp.3d 305
• Decision Date: 13 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIvil No. 15–1462 (CVR)
• Parties: Jannette Castro RAMOS, Plaintiff, v. TOPERBEE CORPORATION, et. als., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

241 F.Supp.3d 305

Jannette Castro RAMOS, Plaintiff,

v.TOPERBEE CORPORATION, et. als., Defendants.

CIvil No. 15–1462 (CVR)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 13, 2017

Edgardo J. Hernandez–Oharriz, Hernandez–Oharriz & Santiago Law Firm, PSC, Centro Internacional De Mercadeo I, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiff.

Debbie Rivera–Rivera, San Juan, PR, Maria Eugenia Santori–Aymat, Santori Aymat & Rivera LLC, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CAMILLE L. VELEZ RIVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

The present cause of action arises after co-Defendant Toperbee Corporation ("Toperbee") and Luxottica (operating under the name "Pearle Vision") entered into an asset purchasing agreement whereby Toperbee acquired the Pearle Vision store located in San Patricio Plaza Mall, together with several assets, from Luxottica. Toperbee operates several franchises of Pearle Vision stores in Puerto Rico, and provides eye care services, including contact lenses, treatments and products for eye care, and designer eyewear and sunglasses, among others. Co–Defendant William Juarbe ("Juarbe") is Toperbee's President (collectively "Defendants").

Plaintiff Jannette Castro Ramos ("Plaintiff"), a former employee, avers that Toperbee undertook certain actions against her that culminated in her constructive discharge from her position as an optometrist assistant. She now seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq . ; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq . ; ("ADEA"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , ("Title VII"); and under several Puerto Rico laws pertaining to discrimination, retaliation and unlawful termination. Among Plaintiff's claims are that she suffered from a visual impairment and is therefore disabled as defined by the ADA, and that in spite of knowing this, Toperbee failed to grant her reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff also alleges age-based discrimination, and retaliation.

Defendants now move for summary disposition of all claims, arguing that Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability for purposes of the ADA, and thus is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation. Defendants further posit that they never challenged Plaintiff's alleged impairment, which in any event was not supported by the most recent documentation in her personnel file. Instead, Toperbee bent over backwards to make concessions to address Plaintiff's requests for accommodation, including working from her home, all of which were unreasonably turned down by her. They also assert that the alleged discriminatory actions complained of are clearly not actionable, and are instead a reflection of Plaintiff's resentment over the changes brought about by the commercial transaction between Luxottica and Toperbee, which she opposed. Defendants finally aver that no personal liability can ensue against co-Defendant Juarbe for causes of action arising under Title VII, ADA, and ADEA.

Plaintiff counters, stating categorically that she is a disabled person under the ADA, and that she was discriminated and retaliated against for such condition, and that Defendants' discriminatory actions pushed her to the limit, where an unwanted resignation was her only choice that gave rise to the constructive discharge. Furthermore, as part of Plaintiff's opposition, she also asserts that partial summary judgment should be granted in her favor instead, insofar as the facts clearly show that she was disabled, retaliated against and was constructively discharged.

For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 30) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's request for partial summary judgment (Docket No. 41) is DENIED.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c). Pursuant to the language of the rule, the moving party bears the two-fold burden of showing that there is "no genuine issue as to any material facts," and that he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vega–Rodríguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. , 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997).

After the moving party has satisfied this burden, the onus shifts to the resisting party to show that there still exists "a trial worthy issue as to some material fact." Cortés–Irizarry v. Corporación Insular , 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997). A fact is deemed "material" if it potentially could affect the outcome of the suit. Id. Moreover, there will only be a "genuine" or "trial worthy" issue as to such a "material fact," "if a reasonable fact-finder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party's favor." Id. At all times during the consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the entire record "in the light most flattering to the non-movant and indulge all reasonable inferences in the party's favor." Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodríguez , 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has "emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico]." Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) ; see also Colón v. Infotech Aerospace Servs., Inc. , 869 F.Supp.2d 220, 225–226 (D.P.R. 2012). Rules such as Local Rule 56"are designed to function as a means of ‘focusing a district court's attention on what is—and what is not-genuinely controverted.’ " Calvi v. Knox County , 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006) ). Local Rule 56 imposes guidelines for both the movant and the party opposing summary judgment. A party moving for summary judgment must submit factual assertions in "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs." Loc. Rule 56(b). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must "admit, deny, or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of facts." Loc. Rule 56 (c). If they so wish, they may submit a separate statement of facts which they believe are in controversy. Facts which are properly supported "shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted." Loc. Rule 56(e) ; P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera–Vázquez , 603 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 2010) and Colón , 869 F.Supp.2d at 226. Due to the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, "litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril." Hernández , 486 F.3d at 7.

UNCONTESTED FACTS

At the outset, the Court must mention that Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' statement of uncontested material facts was procedurally non-compliant with the Local Rules, insofar as many of the denials do not oppose the truth of the statement offered. A review of Plaintiffs' qualifications of Defendants' fact statements shows that they are either irrelevant to the matter at hand, offered additional evidence not related to the fact in question and/or failed to contradict it, or consisted of mere "speculation, generalities, conclusory assertions, improbable inferences, and, for lack of a better phrase, a lot of ‘hot air.’ " Domínguez v. Eli Lilly and Co ., 958 F.Supp. 721, 728 (D.P.R. 1997). As a result of this procedural mishap, unless otherwise stated, the Court deemed admitted most facts from Defendants' statement of uncontested material facts.

1. On July 3, 1997, Plaintiff obtained a diploma from the National College of Business and Technology after completing an associate degree as an optometrist assistant. D. Exhibit 3, p. 34, l. 7–19.

2. Plaintiff started working for Pearle Vision in 1997 as an optometrist assistant at the Vega Baja store. D. Exhibit 3, p. 62, l. 16–18. Most of the time throughout Plaintiff's employment with Pearle Vision, she held the same position. D. Exhibit 3, p. 38, l. 8–17.

3. As an optometrist assistant, Plaintiff conducted the following preliminary examinations on patients: measuring the pressure of the eye, auto refraction (to determine whether a patient needs prescription), and instructed patients in the care and use of glasses or contact lenses. D. Exhibit 3, p. 35, l. 6–24; p. 36, l. 1–21.

4. Plaintiff learned the task of medical billing and coding. D. Exhibit 3, p. 39, l. 15–24; p. 40, l. 1–4. For seven years, from 2000 until 2007, while working for Pearle Vision (under Luxottica's operation), Plaintiff was in charge of the medical billing and coding for the Pearle Vision San Patricio ("PVSP") store. D. Exhibit 3, p. 42, l. 9–17; p. 43, l. 3–8.

5. On May 2007, while working for Pearle Vision, Plaintiff obtained a diploma from Nova College after completing a certification as a Medical Office Assistant with Medical Billing and Coding. She completed said training with high honors. D. Exhibit 3, p. 39, l. 7–22; p. 40, l. 1–2.

6. Under Luxottica's administration of PVSP, Plaintiff worked Monday thru Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays, and alternate Sundays. Basically, since Plaintiff started working in San Patricio, she was off Thursdays. D. Exhibit 3, p. 104, l. 9–24. Additionally Plaintiff, like other employees with greater seniority, had the following fringe benefits: health insurance, including dental; retirement plan; accrual of sick and vacation leave greater than the statutory rates; a free pair of glasses once a year, and additional holidays or special days with pay. She also left work at 6:00 pm. D. Exhibit 3, p. 53, l. 12–24; p. 54, l. 1–24; p. 55, l. 1–24; p. 56, l. 1–24; p. 57, l. 1–15.

7. From 1997 until 2000, Plaintiff was relocated throughout the following Pearle Vision stores: Vega Baja, Bayamón Shopping Center, Montehiedra and Trujillo Alto. D. Exhibit 3, p. 62, l. 5–24; p. 63; l.

...