García-PagáN v. United States, CIVIL NO. 17-1273 (PG)
Decision Date | 22 October 2018 |
Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 17-1273 (PG) |
Parties | Luis A. García-Pagán, Petitioner v. United States of America, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Before the court is petitioner Luis A. García-Pagán's ("Petitioner" or "García-Pagán") amended motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 13), and the United States' (or the "government") response in opposition thereto (Docket No. 39). For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES Petitioner's motion to vacate.
On February 28, 2013, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging García-Pagán and co-defendant Ricardo Urbina-Robles ("Urbina") of aiding and abetting a carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) ("Count One"), and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ("Count Two"). See Crim. No. 13-123 (PG) (hereinafter "Crim."), Docket No. 11.
For expediency purposes, the court takes the facts relevant to the matter at hand directly from the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. García-Pagán, 804 F.3d 121, 122-124 (1st Cir. 2015).
Following trial by jury, the court sentenced García-Pagán to a total term of 420 months--180 months as to Count One, plus 240 months as to Count Two, to be served consecutively. See Crim. Docket No. 201. García-Pagán filed a notice of appeal on May 9, 2014. See Crim. Docket No. 239.
The First Circuit affirmed García-Pagán's conviction and sentence and dismissed without prejudice two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying García-Pagán's request for a continuance of trial for counsel to file a motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. See García- Pagán, 804 F.3d at 126 (1st Cir. 2015).
On February 23, 2017, García-Pagán filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. See Docket No. 1. He later amended his motion. See Docket No. 13.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to imposesuch sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C § 2255(a); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-427 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 641 (1st Cir. 2002).
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused have a right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. It has long been recognized that the right to counsel means the right to effective legal assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)). Where, as here, García-Pagán moves to vacate his sentence on an ineffective assistance of counsel basis, he must show that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; see also Argencourt v. United States, 78 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) ( ).
For García-Pagán's claim to succeed, he must satisfy a two-part test. First, García-Pagán needs to show that "counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, petitioner must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been more favorable to him. See United States v. Carrigan, 724 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012)). Thus, the petitioner must demonstrate both incompetence and prejudice. Failure to prove one element proves fatal for the other. See United States v. Caparotta, 676 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, the court "need not address both requirements if the evidence as to either is lacking." Sleeper v. Spencer, 510 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice...that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
In the pending motion, García-Pagán claims that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she did not secure alibi witness testimony from co-defendant Urbina; failed to investigate and secure evidence in Petitioner's favor and failed to advocate for mitigation at sentencing. See Docket No. 13. He also challenges his conviction under Section 924(c)'s residual clause arguing that it is unconstitutionally vague after Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Johnson II). See id.
In its response, the government submits these claims fail because (1) counsel's failure to present the testimony of co-defendant Urbina as an alibi witness did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and, at any rate, Petitioner was not prejudiced as a result; (2) counsel did not fail to investigate and secure evidence in favor of Petitioner; (3) counsel neither failed to advocate for mitigation nor failed to object to a leadership role enhancement at the sentencing stage, and (4) Johnson II does not support Petitioner's collateral attack to his Section 924(c) conviction. See Docket No. 39.
As noted earlier, García-Pagán claims attorney Shepard-De-Mari rendered him ineffective assistance because she did not request a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to procure Urbina as an alibi witness. He avers that counsel's failure prejudiced his defense. See Docket No. 13 at 9. Attached to Petitioner's motion to vacate is an affidavit where Urbina states he is willing to testify that "all [he] knows is that Luis García Pagán has nothing to do with the events in this case because I do not know him." See Docket No. 19-1.
The government counters that counsel's "failure" to call Urbina was a tactical decision made as part of her overall trial strategy and that, at any rate, Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a substantial likelihood that the testimony in question would have secured a different, favorable result. See Docket No. 39 at 12. In support, the government points to notes obtained by Petitioner's attorney from the forensic investigator who interviewed Urbina back in 2013—and concluded he would be an unreliable witness. See id. at 14. The government further argues that his testimony would have been against the testimony of the government's witnesses, including the victim's. See id. at 14-15 (citing Gonzalez-Soberal v. United States, 244 F. 3d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 2001)) (discussing the elements with which to evaluate whether counsel's performance for failure to call a prospective witness, including the potential value of the witness's testimony in undermining the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses).
As the First Circuit...
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