Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 94-2076-KHV. |
| Citation | 873 F. Supp. 547 |
| Parties | Karen GARCIA-PAZ, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT TEXTILES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
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Ruth M. Benien, Benien & Kaplan, Chtd., Kansas City, KS, for Karen Garcia-Paz.
David J. Adkins, Bennett, Lytle, Wetzler, Martin & Pishny, L.C., Prairie Village, KS, Michael L. Blumenthal, Edward Katze, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Atlanta, GA, for Swift Textiles Inc.
Karen Garcia-Paz, a former account executive for the Kansas City office of Swift Textiles, Inc., alleges that Swift discriminated against her on the basis of age, sex, and perceived disability, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Kansas Age Discrimination in Employment Act KADEA, K.S.A. § 44-1111 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended, the Kansas Act Against Discrimination KAAD, K.S.A. § 44-1001 et seq., and the Americans With Disabilities Act ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. In addition, plaintiff brings pendent state law claims for breach of an implied contract of employment and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 36) filed November 1, 1994.1 Having considered the entire record in this case, for reasons stated more specifically below, the Court finds that said motion should be and hereby is sustained.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs the entry of summary judgment in favor of the party who "shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A principal purpose "of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court's inquiry is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Entry of summary judgment is mandated, after an adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 893 (10th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if there is sufficient evidence on which a trier of fact could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 684 (10th Cir.1991).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by informing the court of the basis for its motion. Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993). This burden, however, does not require the moving party to "support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (emphasis in original). Once the moving party properly supports its motion, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his or her pleadings, "but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial...." Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir.1993). The court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, e.g., Thrasher v. B & B Chem. Co., Inc., 2 F.3d 995, 996 (10th Cir.1993), under the substantive law and the evidentiary burden applicable to the particular claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14.
On January 20, 1989, Swift hired plaintiff — a white woman over the age of 40 — to open a one-person office in Kansas City. Swift manufactures denim fabric, and the primary purpose of the Kansas City office was to better service and sell more denim to one of its customers, the Lee Company Lee. Plaintiff was hired as an account executive and her primary duty, at least initially, was to service the Lee account. Effective working relationships were a critical element of plaintiff's position, and her position required her to effectively interface with all areas of both Swift and Lee. As an account executive, plaintiff did not merely sell fabric to Lee; she was responsible for positioning Swift fabric by knowing how it would fit into Lee product lines in order to influence Lee's manufacturing process. As an account executive, plaintiff was responsible for orchestrating product presentations, presenting product, developing relationships, and making sure that Swift followed up on all product opportunities with Lee and other key accounts. Within the Lee organization, Linda Illiff (director of procurement) and Mike McEntire (her boss) were important contact relationships for plaintiff.
On August 21, 1990, some 19 months after she assumed her position with Swift, plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis MS. After the onset of plaintiff's MS, she experienced fatigue and loss of energy. Beginning in January 1992, she experienced a dramatic decrease in her energy level, so that by June 1992, her energy level was 15 to 20 per cent of normal.
In the spring of 1991, Larry Addison, plaintiff's supervisor, discussed with plaintiff certain customer service complaints which he had received from McEntire. Plaintiff disputed the legitimacy of the complaints because she thought that McEntire was a "chronic complainer" and "notorious back stabber," but she admits that his complaints were important and if true, gave Swift legitimate grounds for concern.
On July 1, 1991, John Heldrich became president of Swift's North American Marketing division. In September 1991, Heldrich assigned plaintiff the Lands' End account. Lands' End was a "huge player" and a billion-dollar account. Plaintiff was delighted with the assignment and welcomed the added responsibility even though it required more work.
Over time, Heldrich became concerned about retaining the Lee account. In March or April of 1991, Lee had asked Swift to become a vendor partner. Such a relationship involved a larger magnitude of business and, according to plaintiff, "we at Swift were delighted because we came from nowhere with these people." Meanwhile, it had become clear to Heldrich that the key to Swift's success with Lee was the account executive, and that person was plaintiff. Heldrich believed that the single most important ingredient to success at Lee was the account executive's ability to quarterback Swift's support mechanisms and provide the product and service that Lee required.
Between November 1991, and March/April 1992, however, Heldrich received criticism of plaintiff from sources at Lee, including McEntire and Illiff. Those complaints included the following:2
In March 1992, McEntire asked Heldrich whether Swift could get plaintiff more motivated, more involved and more understanding in working with Lee. McEntire complained that plaintiff did not know the Lee account and, as a result, Swift was not focused on Lee's product the way it needed to be. McEntire also complained that Swift was not working the various areas from a merchandising standpoint the way it needed to and that this was a real barrier in Swift's ability to become a close and comfortable partner with Lee. McEntire attributed the problem to plaintiff. McEntire also told Heldrich that while Swift's competitors "lived at Lee," plaintiff was not there a lot of the time, arrived late and left early, failed to return telephone calls, was often rude, and refused to carry out simple requests like labelling products.
Heldrich also received complaints from Swift employees about plaintiff's handling of the Lee account. In April 1992, Tony Carnot, Swift's Director of Merchandising, complained that plaintiff did not understand Lee's product line and other requirements. He told Heldrich that there was an "uncomfortability" in meetings between Lee and plaintiff and that plaintiff had created a hostile environment by disagreeing with him about price in front of Lee employees.
Ed Davis, Swift's Director of Development, complained to Heldrich that plaintiff lacked the ability to pull the areas together and to communicate Swift products to Lee Company and that there was antagonism between plaintiff and some areas within Lee.
Arnold Elder, Swift's Vice President of Marketing, complained to Heldrich that based upon his communications with Lee, Lee was uncomfortable with plaintiff, and she could not have the relationships at Lee which were necessary to support the growth which Lee and Swift had planned together.
Carla Argall, women's merchandiser at Lands' End, also criticized plaintiff's performance to Heldrich. Hal Durant told Heldrich that Argall had also complained to him that she had a difficult time working with plaintiff, that she could not get information from plaintiff on a regular and punctual basis, that she was not being called upon by plaintiff the way she desired, and that she was not being shown product in the way she wanted to be shown product.
Ron Kohler of Hagle Industries also called Heldrich. Kohler said that he wanted Irene Troost to handle the Hagle account because he had not had good experiences with plaintiff or he did not hear good things about her.
In late April or early May of 1992, Heldrich ran into Jerry Hair of Rocky Mountain Clothing, a Swift customer. Hair told Heldrich that he would like him to do something about replacing plaintiff because his people did not want to...
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