Muller v. Hotsy Corp.

Decision Date21 February 1996
Docket NumberNo. C 94-3040.,C 94-3040.
Citation917 F. Supp. 1389
PartiesRoger MULLER, Plaintiff, v. The HOTSY CORPORATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

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Blake Parker, Parker Law Office, Fort Dodge, Iowa, for Roger Muller.

Neven J. Mulholland, Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good & Mulholland, Fort Dodge, Iowa, for The Hotsy Corporation.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, District Judge.

                                      TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ......................... 1396
                II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ................................ 1396
                III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................... 1398
                      A. Undisputed Facts ......................................... 1398
                      B. Disputed Facts ........................................... 1400
                IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ................................................ 1401
                      A. Disability Discrimination Under Federal Law .............. 1402
                         1. The origins of the ADA ................................ 1402
                         2. Disability discrimination under the ADA ............... 1405
                            a. "Regarded as having" a disability .................. 1406
                            b. Qualified individual with a disability ............. 1406
                            c. Analytical framework for ADA claims ................ 1408
                            d. The prima facie case under the ADA ................. 1408
                        3. Muller's qualification for ADA protection. ............. 1411
                    B. Disability Discrimination Under Iowa Law ................... 1413
                        1. Protected disability ................................... 1414
                        2. Qualified for the position.............................. 1415
                        3. Remaining elements of the prima facie case.............. 1416
                    C. Muller's Rehabilitation Act Claim .......................... 1417
                    D. Muller's Claim Under The FMLA .............................. 1418
                    E. Muller's ERISA Claim ....................................... 1419
                    F. Muller's Wrongful Discharge Claim .......................... 1420
                    G. Muller's Claim Under Iowa Code Ch. 91B ..................... 1421
                V. CONCLUSION...................................................... 1422
                

This litigation involves seven causes of action, all of which derive from the termination of plaintiff by his former employer after plaintiff's spinal injury in a motorcycle accident, and some of which require the court's analysis of the perceptions of plaintiff's supervisor regarding the magnitude of plaintiff's medical condition and the occupational limitations imposed on plaintiff as a result of his perceived injury. Specifically, plaintiff has alleged causes of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Iowa Civil Rights Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, along with two pendent state law claims of wrongful discharge and wrongful denial of his personnel file under Iowa Code Chapter 91B. Defendant employer has moved for summary judgment on each of plaintiff's causes of action, and plaintiff has resisted its motion as to each of his claims.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 25, 1994, Plaintiff Roger Muller filed a complaint against his former employer, the Hotsy Corporation ("Hotsy"), seeking reinstatement to his former position and damages resulting from his termination on August 19, 1993. In his complaint, Muller alleges seven causes of action, including (1) a claim pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) a claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"); (3) a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; (4) a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (P.L. 103-3); (5) a claim pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; (6) a pendent state law wrongful discharge claim; (7) a claim under Iowa Code Chapter 91B premised upon Hotsy's denial of Muller's request to see his personnel file after his termination.

Hotsy answered Muller's complaint on July 29, 1994, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Muller's claims on December 4, 1995. Muller resisted this motion on January 9, 1996, claiming there are material facts in dispute regarding each of his claims. In addition, Muller filed affidavits with the court on January 12, 1996 to supplement his resistance to Hotsy's motion for summary judgment. Likewise, Hotsy supplemented its motion for summary judgment on January 29, 1996 with answers to Muller's interrogatories. Lastly, on January 30, 1996, Hotsy filed a reply to Muller's resistance to Hotsy's motion for summary judgment.

On February 15, 1996, a telephonic hearing was held concerning Hotsy's motion for summary judgment. Hotsy was represented by Neven J. Mulholland, Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good & Mulholland, Fort Dodge, Iowa. Muller was represented by Blake Parker, Parker Law Office, Fort Dodge, Iowa. Before discussing the factual background of these proceedings, the court will first consider the standards for Hotsy's motion for summary judgment.

II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes "that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years "motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1992).

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:

Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon. ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir.1995); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990); Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).1 A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Muller, and give Muller the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Munz, 28 F.3d at 796; Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1993); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 667 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992).

Procedurally, the moving party, Hotsy, bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553); see also Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 7 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). Hotsy is not required by Rule 56 to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id.

"When a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355. Muller is required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.1995); Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1325. Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, ... to avoid summary judgment, `the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting Impro Products, Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1282, 79 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984)), cert. denied sub nom. Metge v. Bankers Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 798, 88 L.Ed.2d 774 (1986). The necessary...

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