Garcia v. Angulo

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 89,89
• Citation: 644 A.2d 498,335 Md. 475
• Parties: Dilber E. GARCIA v. Victorino A. ANGULO et al. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 475

335 Md. 475

644 A.2d 498

Dilber E. GARCIA v. Victorino A. ANGULO et al.

No. 89, Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 15, 1994.

Joseph A. Trevino, Greenbelt, for appellant.

Stephen S. Brown (Victor I. Weiner, Lipshultz and Hone, Chartered, all on brief), Silver Spring, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW and BELL, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr. ^* and JOHN F. McAULIFFE, Associate Judges of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

RODOWSKY, Judge.

Involved here is the interrelation of the Maryland common law of domicile with an uncodified federal immigration statute and with presidential directives that have conferred protection from deportation on nationals of El Salvador who had illegally entered the United States. The principal question is whether federal law prevents an alien's intent to be domiciled in Maryland from having legal effect. This issue arises on an appeal from a circuit court's refusal to direct the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF) to pay a judgment entered against an uninsured motorist.

The appellant, Dilber E. Garcia (Garcia), was injured on December 13, 1991 in Langley Park, Maryland while riding as a passenger in a pickup truck owned by Victorino A. Angulo (Victorino) and operated by his son, Saul Angulo (Saul). The truck, temporarily registered in Pennsylvania, seems to have been uninsured. Saul failed to stop at a stop sign, and the truck collided with a bus. Garcia sued Victorino, and by amendment joined Saul, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Saul was served, failed to plead, and an order of default was entered against him. Victorino appeared, but ultimately was voluntarily dismissed. By an agreement between Garcia and MAIF, judgment by default in the amount of $12,000 was entered against Saul. Garcia, pursuant to Maryland Rule BW 6.a, then petitioned the court in the same action for an order directing MAIF to pay the judgment.

MAIF opposed on the ground that Garcia was not a "qualified person" under Maryland Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 48A, § 243H(a)(1). It provides, under the circumstances therein set forth, for claims against, and payment by, MAIF for "personal injury to a qualified person." Article 48A, § 243L(e) defines "qualified person" to mean, in relevant part,

"a resident of this State or the owner of a motor vehicle registered in this State or a resident of another state, territory, or federal district of the United States or province of the Dominion of Canada, or foreign country, in which recourse is afforded to residents of this State, of substantially similar character to that provided for by this subtitle...."

The term "qualified person" in Art. 48A, § 243L(e) is derived from Md.Code (1957), Art. 66 1/2, § 150(g), defining "qualified person" for purposes of eligibility to claim against the former Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund. Cases decided under the predecessor statute have established that "resident of this State" in the definition of "qualified person" means a domiciliary of Maryland. See Hawks v. Gottschall, 241 Md. 147, 215 A.2d 745 (1966); Walsh v. Crouse, 232 Md. 386, 194 A.2d 107 (1963); Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 186 A.2d 482 (1962); Holly v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 29 Md.App. 498, 349 A.2d 670 (1975); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 26 Md.App. 296, 338 A.2d 363 (1975). No party to the present action argues that these holdings have been altered by the transfer of the uninsured motorist program to MAIF. Indeed, these holdings underlie the arguments of the parties here and in the circuit court.

The circuit court conducted a hearing on Garcia's petition against MAIF, at which Garcia testified, exhibits were introduced, and the following facts were developed. At age nineteen, in 1990, Garcia left his native El Salvador to travel to the United States. He explained:

"I left my country to look for a better life, and I was very frightened of the war because at that time they were killing a lot of young men. And my mother was scared that they were going to kill me, so I decided to leave my country and I came."

He also stated that he wanted "[t]o be able to study, work, and do something better." ¹

Garcia entered Mexico illegally and made his way on foot and by bus to the Rio Grande. He crossed into the United States in the vicinity of Brownsville, Texas, without visa, and without presenting himself to the immigration authorities. Garcia traveled to Maryland where he has lived continuously since March 1990, principally in the Takoma Park-Silver Spring area.

Prior to the accident of December 13, 1991, Garcia obtained a social security number, a Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration identification card, and a replacement passport from the Republic of El Salvador. ² He worked as a carpenter and as a painter. He did not file 1990 income tax returns by the April 15, 1991 filing deadline, and there is no evidence that the time for filing was officially extended. After the accident, on or about January 27, 1992, Garcia filed federal and Maryland 1990 income tax returns reporting taxable income of $1,336 from his sole proprietorship as a contractor. Thus, there was no withholding of taxes by the person for whom Garcia rendered services. The explanation for the delay in filing, presented by Garcia to the circuit court, was that he had not been furnished with the tax form reflecting 1990 payments to him until January 1992.

Garcia also obtained from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) on October 28, 1991 what he referred to as a "work permit." A copy of this card was introduced into evidence. Its legal significance will be described, infra. Garcia has no intention of returning to El Salvador. Although he understands that he is in the United States only until temporary protection expires, he thinks that INS "will turn these permissions into a green card," i.e., permanent resident alien status. See W. Wilburn, Strangers in Paradise: An Overview of Maryland State Law Dealing With Noncitizens, 21 U.Balt.L.Rev. 87, 90 (1991).

The circuit court concluded that Garcia was not a qualified person because he was not a domiciliary of Maryland on December 13, 1991. Garcia appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but this Court issued the writ of certiorari on its own motion prior to consideration of the matter by the Court of Special Appeals.

In this Court the parties disagree as to the rationale that the circuit court applied in reaching its conclusion. ³ MAIF seeks to make the case an entirely factual one, emphasizing that the circuit court could have found a lack of intent to establish a Maryland domicile. Garcia, on the other hand, submits that the issue is one of law. He interprets the record to reflect that the circuit court applied an erroneous legal standard, by limiting the possibility of an alien's obtaining Maryland domicile only to persons recognized by the INS as permanent resident aliens.

We agree with Garcia that the domicile issue here turns on the status of Salvadorans who have illegally entered the United States. The factual component of the domicile issue focuses on Garcia's intent as of the date of the accident. See Hawks v. Gottschall, 241 Md. at 153, 215 A.2d at 749 (trial court fact-finding of domicile reversed for insufficient evidence where this Court could "find nothing that [the claimant] had done prior to the 1961 accident which would distinguish him from any other soldier who, during the course of his military career, happens to become stationed in Maryland but who still retained his domicile in another state"). With respect to the legal status component of the domicile issue, however, appellate courts decide cases according to the law in effect at the time of decision, absent some impairment of constitutional rights by a subsequent enactment. See Pickett v. Prince George's County, 291 Md. 648, 662, 436 A.2d 449, 457 (1981). Here, for reasons which we shall explain, there is no material contradiction of Garcia's testimony that he intended to make Maryland his home. In addition, this Court can decide the purely legal issue without first determining the rationale applied by the circuit court.

An overview of the various classes of aliens under United States law was furnished in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1891 n. 13, 48 L.Ed.2d 478, 489-90 n. 13 (1976), where the Court said:

"The classifications among aliens established by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), illustrate the diversity of aliens and their ties to this country. Aliens may be immigrants or nonimmigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). Immigrants, in turn, are divided into those who are subject to numerical limitations upon admissions and those who are not. The former are subdivided into preference classifications which include: grown unmarried children of citizens; spouses and grown unmarried children of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence; professionals and those with exceptional ability in the sciences or arts; grown married children of citizens; brothers and sisters of citizens; persons who perform specified permanent skilled or unskilled labor for which a labor shortage exists; and certain victims of persecution and catastrophic natural calamities who were granted conditional entry and remained in the United States at least two years. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(7). Immigrants not subject to certain numerical limitations include: children and spouses of citizens and parents of citizens at least 21 years old; natives of independent countries of the Western Hemisphere; aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence returning from temporary visits abroad; certain former citizens who may reapply for acquisition of citizenship; certain ministers of religion; and certain employees or former employees of the United States Government abroad. 8 U.S.C....