Garcia v. Bunnell
Decision Date | 02 September 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-16312,93-16312 |
Citation | 33 F.3d 1193 |
Parties | Mario GARCIA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. William BUNNELL, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
John Fresquez, Deputy State Public Defender, Sacramento, CA, for petitioner-appellant.
Robert D. Marshall, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, CA, for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
Before: ALDISERT *, WIGGINS, and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.
Mario Mark Garcia is a California state prisoner serving a sentence of 33 years to life imposed upon his 1986 conviction on counts of first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon. He appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 petition regarding his conviction. 1
In an ex parte hearing on the morning of trial, defense counsel Craig Holmes announced that he had accepted a position, to commence at the end of the trial, with the prosecution--the San Joaquin County District Attorney's office. Garcia expressed reservations about proceeding, and the trial judge granted him a five-day continuance to seek advice from other attorneys and family members. After this hiatus, Garcia declared that he would accept Holmes' representation. The trial proceeded, and the jury found Garcia guilty as charged.
After unsuccessful state appeals, Garcia petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. He claimed that in obtaining his conviction the state violated his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the potential conflict raised in Garcia's petition. On the basis of Holmes' deposition testimony, 2 the court found that Holmes had faced no actual conflict of interest in representing Garcia at trial and thus denied Garcia's petition.
Garcia timely appeals. We find that Garcia waived this Sixth Amendment right. Irrespective of Garcia's waiver, we also agree with the district court that Holmes did not face an actual conflict of interest. Therefore, Garcia's conviction did not violate his constitutional right and we affirm.
This court reviews de novo the decision of whether to grant or deny a petition for habeas corpus. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir.1994). A petitioner's claim of conflict of interest on the part of counsel represents a mixed question of fact and law equally meriting de novo review. Id.
Garcia's right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63-64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel requires effective assistance by an attorney, which has two components: competence and conflict-free representation. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981).
Even if counsel is subject to an actual conflict of interest, however, the trial court may generally allow the attorney to proceed if the defendant makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 n. 5, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883-84, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ( ); United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1494 (9th Cir.1987).
We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if it differs from the reasoning of the district court, United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1945, 123 L.Ed.2d 651 (1993), and our close examination of the trial court transcript indicates that Garcia knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily decided to accept continued representation from Holmes despite the potential conflict presented by Holmes' future employment. 3 To the extent that Garcia's right to conflict-free counsel was at all impaired by Holmes' impending move, we hold that he waived it.
Holmes informed Garcia of his plans several hours before their court appearance. Garcia's comments to the court clearly indicated his knowledge of the potential for conflict and his recognition of his role in protecting his interests. The in camera discussion began as follows:
I have faith in Mr. Holmes, like I explained to him, but in view that he is going to be going over to the other side, it makes--my reservations are, you know, not that clear as to whether or not he will strike a deal or if he is palsy-walsy with Mr.--with the district attorney, Mr. Bowers, so I would like at least two days to consult with people.
COURT: All right. I think that is a reasonable request, Mr. Garcia.
After granting Garcia's request for a continuance to consult with other people as to whether he should continue with Holmes, the trial judge offered his own opinion. He explained that he had some personal knowledge of Holmes' work, and that he did not "think this would affect his performance as [Garcia's] attorney at all." Moreover, he observed that some degree of camaraderie between prosecutors and defense lawyers was normal and indeed healthy.
Garcia did not hesitate to maintain his own perspective:
The judge went on to explain that he had some concern for the convenience of witnesses and the court's docket. Reflecting that a two-day continuance meant that the case would resume on a Friday, he decided:
The court concluded:
The hearing actually resumed the following Tuesday, such that Garcia had a total of five days to consider the situation and to consult with his family as well as other attorneys he knew. The judge began:
COURT: This is an In Camera hearing to follow up on our hearing from last week. I gave Mr. Garcia a couple of days to consult and think about whether he wished to continue to have Mr. Holmes represent him.
Mr. Garcia, what did you decide on that issue?
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