Garcia v. Colo. Cab Co.

• Docket Number: 21SC895
• Decision Date: 14 November 2023
• Citation: 2023 CO 56
• Parties: Jose Garcia, Petitioner v. Colorado Cab Company, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company d/b/a Denver Yellow Cab. Respondent
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

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2023 CO 56

Jose Garcia, Petitioner
v.
Colorado Cab Company, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company d/b/a Denver Yellow Cab. Respondent

No. 21SC895

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

November 14, 2023

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 17CA1381

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Foster, Graham, Milstein & Calisher, LLP

Chip G. Schoneberger

Daniel S. Foster

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

White and Steele, PC

John Lebsack

Keith R. Olivera

E. Catlynne Shadakofsky

Denver, Colorado

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JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

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HOOD JUSTICE

¶1 Jose Garcia sued Colorado Cab Company, LLC ("Colorado Cab") to recover for severe injuries he suffered while attempting to aid one of Colorado Cab's drivers, Ali Yusuf. Garcia discovered Yusuf being assaulted by Yusuf's passenger, Curt Glinton. Enraged by Garcia's interference, Glinton attacked Garcia, first with his fists and then with the cab itself. The jury determined that Colorado Cab was liable for failing to install certain protective devices and awarded Garcia damages. ¶2 In a split decision, a division of the court of appeals concluded, as a matter of law, that Garcia's injuries resulting from Glinton's theft and use of the cab as a weapon were "outside the risks reasonably to be anticipated" from both Colorado Cab's negligence and Garcia's rescue attempt; that is, Glinton's theft of the cab and subsequent use of it as a weapon were superseding causes that broke the causal chain between Colorado Cab's negligence and Garcia's injuries. Garcia v. Colo. Cab Co., 2021 COA 129, ¶ 47, 503 P.3d 867, 877 ("Garcia III"). It is the division majority's superseding-cause ruling that Garcia challenges now.

¶3 The broader question presented to this court, however, is how to analyze proximate cause in the rescuer context. We hold that, to prove proximate cause, the rescuer must show that his injuries were reasonably foreseeable based on the defendant's alleged tortious conduct and the nature of the rescue attempt. While we agree with much of the division majority's analytical framework, we conclude

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that it erred by deciding the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the jury's verdict.

I. Facts and Procedural HistoryA. Initial Altercation

¶4 Near midnight on St. Patrick's Day in 2014, Yusuf picked up two men in northwest Denver. Both men were visibly intoxicated. Once in the cab, they refused to provide Yusuf with a destination, instead telling him when and where to turn as he drove. Glinton, one of the passengers, finally told Yusuf to pull over but then began to argue over the $6.50 fare. The argument escalated, and Glinton grabbed Yusuf from behind and began to punch him repeatedly.

¶5 Meanwhile, Garcia had called a cab and was waiting for it to arrive. He watched Yusuf's cab pass by and, believing the cab was for him, followed it down the road. After walking a few blocks, Garcia heard Yusuf cry for help. As he neared the cab, Garcia saw Glinton attacking Yusuf from the back seat.

¶6 Garcia approached the driver's side of the cab and told Glinton to stop. Glinton told Garcia to mind his own business, but Garcia refused to leave. Eventually, both Yusuf and Glinton exited the cab.

¶7 Glinton then assaulted Garcia before getting into the driver's seat of the cab. As he drove away, Glinton hit Garcia's knee with the vehicle. After briefly driving down the street with the stolen cab, Glinton turned around and accelerated toward

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Yusuf and Garcia, who were standing in the middle of the street. The two dodged the vehicle as Glinton sped by. Glinton then spun the cab around a second time and again quickly accelerated. While Yusuf sought refuge behind a light pole, Garcia remained exposed in the middle of the street, and Glinton ran over him with the cab. Glinton then continued driving, dragging Garcia into a nearby parking lot. He finally stopped, shifted the cab into reverse, and hit Garcia again before driving off. The entire ordeal lasted around seven minutes, and only four minutes elapsed between Garcia approaching the cab and Glinton assaulting him with it.

¶8 Garcia suffered extensive injuries, including shattered ear drums, a traumatic brain injury, a fractured eye socket, three broken ribs, numerous torn ligaments, and other injuries that continue to cause hip and back pain.

B. Trial and Appeals

¶9 Garcia sued Colorado Cab for negligence and unjust enrichment. Under Garcia's theory of the case, Colorado Cab breached its duty of care to Yusuf by failing to install a partition between the front and back seats of the cab and by failing to install interior cameras. Garcia further argued that he qualified as a rescuer and, under the rescue doctrine, Colorado Cab owed him a duty of care, which it also breached.

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¶10 At the close of Garcia's presentation of evidence, Colorado Cab moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Colorado Cab owed Garcia a duty of care under the rescue doctrine. The jury awarded Garcia $1,605,000 in damages, attributing 45% fault to Colorado Cab and 55% fault to Glinton. Colorado Cab then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court also denied.

¶11 Colorado Cab appealed, raising issues of duty, causation, and setoff. Garcia cross-appealed. The division addressed only the issue of duty, holding that Colorado Cab owed Garcia no duty of care. Garcia v. Colo. Cab Co., 2019 COA 3, ¶ 1, 490 P.3d 415, 416 ("Garcia I"), rev'd, 2020 CO 55, 467 P.3d 302 ("Garcia II"). Garcia petitioned for certiorari review, which we granted to address the rescue doctrine. We held that Garcia qualified as a rescuer and that Colorado Cab's duty to Yusuf extended to Garcia. Garcia II, ¶ 29, 467 P.3d at 307. We then reversed and remanded so the division could address Colorado Cab's remaining contentions. Id. at ¶ 34, 467 P.3d at 307.

¶12 On remand, the division addressed proximate cause. Garcia III, ¶¶ 38-41, 503 P.3d at 875-76. It noted that although an intervening cause may break the causal chain in some situations, id. at ¶ 40, 503 P.3d at 876, even intentionally tortious or criminal acts won't if the act was foreseeable and "the harm at issue was within the scope of the risks reasonably to be foreseen from the defendant's

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conduct or the rescuer's efforts," id. at ¶ 41, 503 P.3d at 876. The majority emphasized that, in rescuer scenarios, the Third Restatement of Torts requires consideration of "whether, at the outset of that particular rescue, the risk of such harm would reasonably be anticipated." Id. at ¶ 39, 503 P.3d at 876 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical &Emotional Harm § 32 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 2010)).

¶13 The majority then divided the seven-minute incident into three distinct criminal acts: (1) Glinton's initial assault of Yusuf in the cab, (2) his theft of the cab, and (3) his use of the cab as a weapon. Id. at ¶ 43, 503 P.3d at 876.

¶14 The division first concluded that Glinton's initial assault against Yusuf was foreseeable. Id. at ¶ 44, 503 P.3d at 876. And, under the rescue doctrine, Garcia's attempt to rescue Yusuf was also reasonably foreseeable. Id. at ¶ 45, 503 P.3d at 876-77. So, Colorado Cab was liable for the injuries Garcia sustained when Glinton assaulted him outside the cab.

¶15 The majority next concluded, however, that Garcia's injuries resulting from Glinton's theft and use of the cab as a weapon were neither "within the scope of the risk" that made Colorado Cab's failure to install safety features in the cab tortious nor the type of risk of harm "reasonably to be expected to arise in the course of a rescue of a cab driver being assaulted by a passenger." Id. at ¶ 46, 503 P.3d at 877. Thus, the majority determined, as a matter of law, that Glinton's

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theft of the cab and subsequent use of the cab as a weapon were superseding causes that absolved Colorado Cab of liability for Garcia's injuries related to that conduct. Id. at ¶ 47, 503 P.3d at 877.

¶16 Justice Martinez dissented.^[1] He criticized the majority for substituting its own judgment for the jury's, asserting that “a reasonable jury could-and did- find Colorado Cab liable for the injuries Garcia sustained when Glinton ran him over with the stolen cab.” Id. at ¶ 58, 503 P.3d at 880 (Martinez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at ¶ 70, 503 P.3d at 881-82. Justice Martinez also disapproved of the majority's reliance on the Third Restatement's section 32 because, in his view, the section departs from this court's more traditional proximate-cause analysis by considering whether the extent of harm, rather than the risk of harm, was foreseeable at the onset of a rescue. Id. at ¶ 81, 503 P.3d at 883.

¶17 We granted Garcia's petition to review the division's opinion.^[2]

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II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

¶18 We review de novo the division's conclusion that Glinton's commandeering of the cab constituted a superseding cause. See Dep't of Corr., Denver Reception &Diagnostic Ctr. v. Stiles, 2020 CO 90M, ¶31, 477P.3d 709, 716; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 37, 456 P.3d 1266, 1276. In conducting this review, we consider the division's obligation to review de novo a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Vaccaro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 2012 COA 9M, ¶40, 275 P.3d 750, 759; Parks v. Edward Dale Parrish LLC, 2019 COA 19, ¶ 9, 452 P.3d 141, 144. Such motions should be granted only where "there is no evidence that could support a verdict against the moving party on the claim." Parks, ¶ 10, 452 P.3d at 144. In reviewing the trial court's denial,...