Garcia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:13-cv-501
• Parties: LINDA GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

LINDA GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Case No. 1:13-cv-501

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

February 11, 2015

Honorable Paul L. Maloney

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a social security action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. On December 18, 2009, plaintiff filed her applications for benefits. She alleged a May 27, 2009, onset of disability.¹ (Page ID 146-53). Her claims were denied on initial review. (Page ID 104-07). On July 27, 2011, plaintiff received a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), at which she was represented by counsel. (Page ID 63-100). On September 19, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled. (Op., Page ID 50-58). On April 16, 2013, the Appeals Council denied review (Page ID 25-27), and the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision.

Plaintiff filed a timely complaint seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision denying her claims for DIB and SSI benefits. She asks the court to overturn the Commissioner's decision on the following grounds:

1. The ALJ failed to evaluate the opinions of plaintiff's treating physician as required by social security regulations and rulings; and

2. The ALJ used "reasoning contrary to relevant case law" in making his factual finding regarding plaintiff's credibility.

(Statement of Issues, Plf. Brief at 1, docket # 13, Page ID 431). I recommend that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.

Standard of Review

When reviewing the grant or denial of social security benefits, this court is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner correctly applied the law. See Elam ex rel. Golay v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003); Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is defined as "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Heston v. Commissioner, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see Rogers v. Commissioner, 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). The scope of the court's review is limited. Buxton, 246 F.3d at 772. The court does not review the evidence de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or make credibility determinations. See Ulman v. Commissioner, 693 F.3d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012); Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). "The findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see McClanahan v. Commissioner, 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006). "The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because thereexists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. . . . This is so because there is a 'zone of choice' within which the Commissioner can act without fear of court interference." Buxton, 246 F.3d at 772-73. "If supported by substantial evidence, the [Commissioner's] determination must stand regardless of whether the reviewing court would resolve the issues of fact in dispute differently." Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993); see Gayheart v. Commissioner, 710 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2013)("A reviewing court will affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on substantial evidence, even if substantial evidence would have supported the opposite conclusion."). "[T]he Commissioner's decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence supports the claimant's position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Jones v. Commissioner, 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003); see Kyle v. Commissioner, 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010).

Discussion

The ALJ found that plaintiff met the disability insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on May 27, 2009, through the date of the ALJ's decision. (Op. at 3, Page ID 52). Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity on or after May 27, 2009. (Id.). Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: history of low back strain, back pain, bursitis of the right hip, hip pain and depression. (Id.). Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments which met or equaled the requirements of the listing of impairments. (Id. at 4, Page ID 53). The ALJ found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) for a limited range of light work:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and416.967(b) except the claimant requires a sit/stand option. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Furthermore, due to symptoms of depression, the claimant is limited to unskilled work.

(Id. at 5, Page ID 54). The ALJ found that plaintiff's testimony regarding her subjective functional limitations was not fully credible. (Id. at 6-7, Page ID 55-56). Plaintiff was not able to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 8, Page ID 57). Plaintiff was 47-years-old as of her alleged onset of disability and 50-years-old as of the date of the ALJ's decision. She was classified as a younger individual through August 14, 2011. On and after August 15, 2011, plaintiff was classified as an individual closely approaching advanced age. (Id.). Plaintiff has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English. The ALJ found that the transferability of job skills was not material to a disability determination. (Id.). The ALJ then turned to the testimony of a vocational expert (VE). In response to a hypothetical question regarding a person of plaintiff's age, and with her RFC, education, and work experience, the VE testified that there were approximately 12,900 jobs in the Michigan's Lower Peninsula that the hypothetical person would be capable of performing. (Id. at 9, Page ID 57-58; see Page ID 92-94). The ALJ found that this constituted a significant number of jobs. Using Rules 202.14 and 202.21 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework, the ALJ held that plaintiff was not disabled. (Op. at 8-9, Page ID 57-58).

.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to give adequate weight to the opinion of Daniel Mankoff, M.D. (Plf. Brief at 11-14, Page ID 441-444; Reply Brief at 1-4, Page ID 472-75). The issue of whether the claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1); see Warner v. Commissioner, 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). A treating physician's opinion that apatient is disabled is not entitled to any special significance. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), (3), 416.927(d)(1), (3); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007); Sims v. Commissioner, 406 F. App'x 977, 980 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he determination of disability [is] the prerogative of the Commissioner, not the treating physician."). Likewise, "no special significance"² is attached to treating physician opinions regarding the credibility of the plaintiff's subjective complaints, RFC, or whether the plaintiff's impairments meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment because they are administrative issues reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (3), 416.927(d)(2), (3); see Allen v. Commissioner, 561 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2009).

Generally, the medical opinions of treating physicians are given substantial, if not controlling deference. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 652 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2011). "[T]he opinion of a treating physician does not receive controlling weight merely by virtue of the fact that it is from a treating physician. Rather, it is accorded controlling weight where it is 'well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques' and is not 'inconsistent . . . with the other substantial evidence in the case record.'" Massey v. Commissioner, 409 F. App'x 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Blakley v. Commissioner, 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009)). A treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight where it is not "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" or is "inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); see Gayheart v. Commissioner, 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013) (A treating physician's medical opinion is entitled to controlling weight where "two conditions are met: (1) the opinion 'is well supported by medically acceptableclinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques'; and (2) the opinion 'is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.'" (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). The ALJ "is not bound by conclusory statements of doctors, particularly where they are unsupported by detailed objective criteria and documentation." Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). An opinion that is based on the claimant's reporting of her symptoms is not entitled to controlling weight. See Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Francis v. Commissioner, 414 F. App'x 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011) (A physician's statement that merely regurgitates a claimant's self-described symptoms "is not a medical opinion at all.").

Even when a treating source's medical opinion is not given controlling weight, it should not necessarily be completely rejected; the weight to be given to the...