Garcia v. Consol. Disposal Servs., L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:18-cv-0417-ODW (JPR)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: VERONICA GARCIA, an Individual, Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL SERVICES, L.L.C., a Delaware LLC; CORY LEWIS, an Individual; and Does 1-25, Inclusive Defendants.

VERONICA GARCIA, an Individual, Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL SERVICES, L.L.C., a Delaware LLC;CORY LEWIS, an Individual; and Does 1-25, Inclusive Defendants.

Case No. 2:18-cv-0417-ODW (JPR)

United States District Court Central District of California

May 14, 2018

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [18] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT CORY LEWIS'S MOTION TO DISMISS [14]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Veronica Garcia ("Garcia") brought this action in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Defendants Consolidated Disposal Services, LLC ("Consolidated") and Cory Lewis ("Lewis") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging various employment and termination related state law claims. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) Defendants removed the case to this Court, arguing that there is no legitimate basis for the joinder of Lewis, the only California Defendant. (Notice of Removal ("Not. Removal") ¶¶ 17-27, ECF No. 1.) Additionally, Lewis moved to dismiss Garcia's claims against him for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"). (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 14.) Garcia opposes Lewis's Motion and moves to remand the case, arguing that complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 does not exist because Lewis was not fraudulently joined. (Garcia Opp'n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 20; Mot. Remand, ECF No. 18.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Garcia's claims against Lewis fail as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court DENIES Garcia's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 18) and GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Garcia's claims against Lewis (ECF No. 14).¹

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Garcia's claims arise from the termination of her employment with Consolidated. (See generally Compl.) On November 22, 2017, Garcia filed this action in state court, asserting eleven causes of action. (Compl. at 1.) Two of these claims, IIED, and NIED, are against Lewis, Garcia's former manager at Consolidated. (Id. ¶¶ 24-30.) Garcia is a citizen of California; Consolidated is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona; and Lewis is a citizen of California. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 13-16.)

In August 2007, Garcia began working for Consolidated as a Customer Resource Representative. (Id. ¶ 8.) Garcia alleges she was a diligent employee during her time at Consolidated. (Id.) She claims that her yearly performance evaluations were positive, and that she won numerous awards for her job performance. (Id.) In 2015, Consolidated notified Garcia that it was merging with another call center and she might be laid off. (Id. ¶ 9.) Allegedly, Consolidated "promised that she would be provided with 16-week's severance if she was laid off, amounting to approximately $11,180.80, plus an additional lump sum for health benefits." (Id.) In the months following, Consolidated implemented stricter productivity standards, forcing Garcia to regularly work off-the-clock. (Id. ¶ 10.)

In February 2017, Garcia's manager, Lewis, called Garcia into his office to discuss customer service phone calls that she had missed. (Id. ¶ 11.) Garcia informed Lewis that the missed phone calls were a result of the company's aggressive productivity standards. (Id.) Lewis indicated that other employees, himself included, also missed phone calls and advised Garcia that "he did not know what Human Resources would do in this situation." (Id.) Later that week, Garcia heard from other employees that she was going to be fired, and she reached out to Lewis for confirmation. (Id. ¶ 12.) In response, Lewis called Garcia into his office and requested that she draft a resignation letter. (Id. ¶ 13.) He allegedly told Garcia "it was best for her to resign so that it would look better to future employers and that [Consolidated] would not have to explain the purported reasons for [Garcia's] termination to future prospective employers seeking a reference." (Id. ¶ 13.). Garcia claims that she asked for time to think about the decision, but that Lewis made her feel like she could not leave his office—insisting that she resign immediately. (Id.)

Ultimately, Garcia drafted the resignation letter in Lewis's office. (Id.) "The letter states ...that she was 'pushed to resign,' [] she disagreed with the way that [Consolidated] was treating her[,] and that she felt 'humiliated.'" (Id.) Garcia claims that Defendants' reason for firing her were pretextual and that the real reason for pressuring her to "voluntarily resign" was to deny her the severance pay she was promised. (Id. ¶ 14.) According to Garcia, Defendants' high productivity standards and "unfair treatment" caused her to suffer extreme humiliation, depression, anxiety, and mental distress. (See id. ¶¶ 17, 26, 30.)

B. Procedural History

On November 22, 2017, Garcia filed this action in state court (See id.) Defendants removed the action on January 18, 2018, claiming diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Not. Removal ¶ 1.) On February 16, 2018, Garcia moved to remand. (See Mot. Remand.) Defendants timely opposed and filed a motion todismiss both claims against Lewis. (Defendants' Opp'n Mot. Remand, ECF No. 21; Mot. Dismiss.) These Motions are now before the Court for decision.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Removal

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an action presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To exercise diversity jurisdiction, a federal court must find complete diversity of citizenship among the adverse parties and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, usually exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988)). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566).

B. Fraudulent Joinder

Removal based on a court's diversity jurisdiction is proper, despite the presence of a non-diverse defendant, where that defendant is fraudulently joined—also known as a sham defendant. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Defendants claiming fraudulent joinder must "have the opportunity prove that individuals joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory." See Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). "If the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against the [non-diverse] defendant, and the failure is obviousaccording to the settled rules of the state," the joinder is considered fraudulent, and the party's citizenship is disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)).

However, "[i]f there is a non-fanciful possibility that plaintiff can state a claim under [state] law against the non-diverse defendant[,] the court must remand." Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206; see also Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("The defendant must demonstrate that there is no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action in State court against the alleged sham defendant."). Given this standard, "[t]here is a presumption against finding fraudulent joinder, and defendants who assert that a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a party carry a heavy burden of persuasion." Plute v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2001). "Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206 (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998)).

C. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such allegations." LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1150 n. 2 (9th Cit. 2000). All such allegations are to be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). "In general, the court should only look to the contents of the complaint during its review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. However, the court may consider documents attached to the complaint or referred to in the complaint whose authenticity no party questions." World Chess Museum, Inc. v. World Chess Fed'n, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00345-RCJ-GWF, 2013 WL 5663091, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2013).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Garcia fraudulently joined Lewis to destroy diversity jurisdiction and that her claims against Lewis fail as a matter of law. (Not. Removal ¶¶ 17-27.) For these reasons, Defendants request that this Court deny Garcia' Motion to Remand and grant their Motion for Dismiss Garcia's IIED and NIED claims against Lewis. (See Defendants' Opp'n Mot. Remand; Mot. Dismiss.) The Court will address each Motion in turn.

A. Garcia's Motion to Remand

When assessing fraudulent joinder, a court may pierce the pleadings to determine whether a plaintiff has a...