Garcia v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 30 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. CV 81-4411-WMB.,CV 81-4411-WMB.
• Citation: 588 F. Supp. 700
• Parties: Jose GARCIA, Conception Garcia, Celia Garcia Solis, Graciela Garcia and Julieta Garcia, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, Charles Cortez and Rollin Church, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

588 F. Supp. 700

Jose GARCIA, Conception Garcia, Celia Garcia Solis, Graciela Garcia and Julieta Garcia, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, Charles Cortez and Rollin Church, Defendants.

No. CV 81-4411-WMB.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

April 30, 1984.

Benjamin P. Wasserman, Hermosa Beach, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Richard E. Townsend, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

WM. MATTHEW BYRNE, Jr., District Judge.

Plaintiffs Jose, Conception, Graciela and Julieta Garcia and Celia Garcia Solis bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) against the County of Los Angeles (County), the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (Department) and deputy sheriffs Charles Cortez and Rollin Church. Plaintiffs allege violations of the fourth and eighth amendments, the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and constitutional rights to personal security and privacy. Plaintiffs allege that on August 12, 1979, after arresting two (non-plaintiff) members of the Garcia family, defendant deputy sheriffs followed plaintiffs into the Garcia residence and there "wantonly, willfully, intentionally, maliciously and in bad faith, did severely beat plaintiffs ... causing bodily and emotional injury."

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that, (1) the complaint fails to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because, under Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), the availability to plaintiffs of state tort remedies invalidates their underlying constitutional claims, and (2) neither the County nor the Sheriff's Department are proper parties to this action, the Department because it is not a legal entity with capacity to be sued and the County because it exercises no policy control over the Department.

I. DUE PROCESS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF STATE REMEDIES

Defendants read plaintiffs' complaint as stating a claim for assault and battery clothed in the constitutional garb of an action for deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), and Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983), defendants argue that the liberty deprivation of which plaintiffs complain required only a postdeprivation remedy to satisfy due process and that, in the absence of allegations to the contrary, state tort remedies constitute such a postdeprivation remedy.

Defendants' position is correct insofar as plaintiffs allege violation of procedural due process. Defendants' argument, as discussed below, however, does not apply to any substantive constitutional claims plaintiffs assert.

A. Parratt and Its Progeny

1. Parratt v. Taylor

In Parratt v. Taylor, a state prisoner (Taylor) claimed deprivation of property without due process of law under section 1983 in the loss of $23.50 worth of hobby materials. Taylor contended the materials were lost as the result of prison officials' negligence in failing to follow established procedures for safeguarding prisoner mail. The Court initially differentiated Taylor's claim of due process simpliciter, or procedural due process, from earlier section 1983 cases decided by the Court which involved substantive claims under the fourth and eighth amendments. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536, 101 S.Ct. at 1913.

Acknowledging that Taylor had satisfied the due process prerequisites of action under color of state law, property interest and deprivation of that interest, the Court turned to the manner of the deprivation. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated:

Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment protects against all deprivations of life, liberty, or property by the State. The Fourteenth Amendment protects only against deprivations "without due process of law." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, at 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, at 2695 61 L.Ed.2d 433. Our inquiry therefore must focus on whether the respondent has suffered a deprivation of property without due process of law. In particular, we must decide whether the tort remedies which the State of Nebraska provides as a means of redress for property deprivations satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.

Id. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 1914.

The Court found that because Taylor's property deprivation stemmed from an unauthorized departure from procedure by state officials and Taylor did not allege that either the procedures were inadequate or that a predeprivation hearing was practical, due process required only a postdeprivation hearing. Id. at 543-44, 101 S.Ct. at 1916-17. The Court held that the state tort remedies available to Taylor satisfied this postdeprivation hearing requirement. Id.

2. Ninth Circuit Interpretation of Parratt

The Parratt Court did not confront the question of whether its adequate state remedy — due process analysis would apply to deprivations of liberty as well as property. Justices Blackmun and White, concurring, opposed such a result. Id. at 545, 101 S.Ct. at 1917. Cases in the Ninth Circuit on the issue are not in total accord, but the weight of circuit decisions is that Parratt due process analysis does apply to liberty deprivations.

The Ninth Circuit first took up the question of liberty deprivations under Parratt in Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). The plaintiff in Rutledge, a scholarship football player at the University of Arizona, alleged violation of his civil rights when football coach Frank Kush allegedly struck him on the helmet after he made a bad punt. The Ninth Circuit, apparently treating the claim as one for violation of procedural due process, held that it was invalid under Parratt. The court found that the plaintiff did not state a constitutional claim because the circumstances of the incident were such that a predeprivation hearing was impossible and state tort law provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Id.

Shortly after the Rutledge opinion was handed down, another Ninth Circuit panel confronted the same issue of liberty deprivations post-Parratt but reached an opposite result. Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1005, 102 S.Ct. 2294, 73 L.Ed.2d 1299 (1983). The Wakinekona court, without citing Rutledge, refused to apply Parratt to the claim of a state prisoner alleging deprivation of liberty without due process in a prison transfer. Id.

The most recent Ninth Circuit panels to take up the issue have sided with Rutledge. Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir.1983); Bretz v. Kelman, 722 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.1983). The Ninth Circuit, however, has recently decided to rehear these cases en banc. Haygood v. Younger, Bretz v. Kelman, Piatt v. MacDougall, 729 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1984). In Haygood, plaintiff alleged he had served more time in prison than state law warranted for his conviction. He sued state correctional officers for violation of his due process and eighth amendment rights. The court held that:

Parratt applies to situations in which process prior to deprivation of liberty would not be feasible or practicable. It is the adequacy of the state postdeprivation process that is properly at issue once it is clear that predeprivation process was neither feasible nor practicable. The distinction between deprivations of property and those of liberty in that context is unimportant.

Haygood, 718 F.2d at 1480.

The Haygood court proceeded to apply Parratt to plaintiff's due process claim, finding that state procedures with regard to parole, state habeas corpus and state tort law, satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process. Id. at 1481.

Similarly, in Bretz v. Kelman, 722 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.1983), another Ninth Circuit panel applied Parratt to an alleged deprivation of liberty without due process stemming from wrongdoing in a criminal prosecution.

Based on Bretz and Haygood, the Court finds that Parratt applies to procedural due process claims involving deprivation of liberty.¹

3. Applying Parratt

To the extent that plaintiffs' claim for violation of due process is procedural in nature, it is invalid under Parratt as interpreted in the Ninth Circuit. In the arrest-type situation described in the complaint, a hearing on the use of force before its application was clearly impracticable. If force was needed, it was required immediately. Thus the Court must turn to plaintiffs' postdeprivation remedies. Defendants accurately point out that plaintiffs had tort remedies under state tort law. Plaintiffs do not contend that these were inadequate. Thus the requirement of procedural due process in this instance — an adequate post-deprivation remedy — is met and plaintiffs have not stated a valid claim for violation of procedural due process. Parratt, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420; Haygood, 718 F.2d 1472; Rutledge, 660 F.2d 1345.

B. Parratt and Substantive Constitutional Claims

A close examination of the Supreme Court's decision in Parratt and the Ninth Circuit's interpretations of it reveal that Parratt analysis does not apply to claims for violation of substantive constitutional rights. Rather, the analysis is peculiarly suited to claims for violation of procedural due process.

There are two basic elements to a claim for violation of procedural due process: (1) deprivation of a protected interest, (2) by means of inadequate procedures. Only if both elements are present is a constitutional claim stated. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 1913. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 ...