Garcia v. Frito-Lay Snacks Caribbean, Inc., Civ. 97-1313(SEC).
| Decision Date | 28 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 97-1313(SEC).,Civ. 97-1313(SEC). |
| Citation | 181 F.Supp.2d 38 |
| Parties | Gloria GARCIA, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. FRITO-LAY SNACKS CARIBBEAN, INC., et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Harry Anduze-Montano, San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.
Sharon R. Coursey, Kathryn O. Pulliam, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Atlanta, GA, Jose L. Gonzalez-Castaner, Gonzalez-Castaner, Morales & Guzman, San Juan, PR, for defendants.
Pending before the Court is Defendant Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, Inc.'s ("Frito Lay") "Motion Requesting the Dismissal of Plaintiff's Disability Claims and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof," (Docket # 143). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
On March 6, 1997, Gloria García-Vázquez ("Gloria García") and her husband filed the above-captioned case for injunctive, compensatory relief, and punitive damages resulting from Frito Lay's alleged discrimination, hostile working environment, harassment, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, and the otherwise unlawful termination of Plaintiff Gloria García from her job (Docket # 1). Originally, Plaintiffs were seeking redress under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et. seq.; the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); and the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et. seq. However, on March 24, 2000 this Court issued an Opinion and Order, upon a motion for summary judgment, whereby Plaintiffs' claims under the ADEA and the EPA were dismissed with prejudice. See Docket ## 103-4. The Court sustained Plaintiffs' ADA claim on grounds that there were material facts in dispute regarding two crucial issues. First, the Court found that there was enough evidence in the record for a jury to find that Gloria García was disabled under the ADA at the time of her termination. Docket # 103 at 11). Second, the Court found that there was enough evidence in the record under the applicable legal standard to allow a reasonable fact finder to believe that Gloria García was constructively discharged. Id. at 15-16. On February 20, 2001 Defendant's motion for reconsideration from this ruling was summarily denied. Docket # 124.
After this ruling, the Court scheduled several settlement conferences, the last of which was held on August 22, 2001. See Docket # 127; cont. sine die at Plaintiffs' request, Docket # 130; and Docket ## 137, 139 & 142. During the conferences, Defendant requested that the Court revisit the narrow issue of what constitutes "working" as a major life activity under the ADA. In making their argument, Defendant noted that two cases had recently been decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals which concern precisely this issue. See Lebrón-Torres v. Whitehall Laboratories, 251 F.3d 236 (1st Cir.2001) and Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.2001).
After considering Defendant's request, at the conclusion of the August 22, 2001 Settlement Conference, the Court ordered Defendant to file its motion and legal memorandum by September 6, 2001. Plaintiffs' response was due on September 21, 2001. Having received the parties' submissions, the Court will now decide, in light of Lebrón and Gelabert, whether Plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of "working" for the purposes of the ADA.1
Defendant has proceeded pursuant to Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) () to discuss the undisputed facts of the case at bar, in comparison with the facts that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit faced in the Lebrón and Gelabert decisions. Finding this approach appropriate, the Court adopts it for this Opinion and Order.
The ADA provides that no employer covered by the ADA "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to" employment decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The statute defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477-478, 119 S.Ct. 2139.
To qualify as a "disabled" person pursuant to the ADA, a person must have an actual disability, have a record of a disability, or be regarded as having one. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The ADA and the EEOC regulations provide that an individual is considered "disabled" for purposes of the ADA only if he/she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478, 119 S.Ct. 2139.
Under the EEOC regulations, a "physical impairment" includes "any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoeskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). The EEOC also defines the term "substantially limits," and defines "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. at § 1630.2(i) and (j).
In Sutton, the Supreme Court clarified that "whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry." 527 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139. Also, "a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does not substantially limit a major life activity." Id.
For a person to be considered limited in the major life activity of "working," the following criteria must be met. First of all, the EEOC has established that:
With respect to the major life activity of working —
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). In order to demonstrate that the claimant is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes" the following factors may be considered:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of an impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). Although proof from a vocational expert is not required for a plaintiff to satisfy this requirement, it is often helpful. See Gelabert-Ladenheim, 252 F.3d at 60.
In the Opinion and Order of March 24, 2000 this Court ruled that Plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of proof for a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) burden-shifting scheme on the issue of disability. Plaintiff alleged that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working, because she "was and still is substantially limited in working full time schedules, carrying, lifting, bending, sitting and standing for prolonged periods of time, and sleeping." Docket # 89, Plaintiff's Opposition, at 54.2
In her opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff alleged that she satisfied the tests to be considered as substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the significant restrictions she faced, "working full time schedules, carrying, lifting, bending, sitting and standing for prolonged periods of time" translated across a broad range of jobs and were not job specific. Id. at 54, citing Quint v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 172 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.1999). At that time, the Court agreed with Plaintiff, relying on the Quint case, where the First Circuit found that the plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome "did more than merely disqualify her for a particular job at [the defendant corporation]," but rather, the court found that: "[t]he inability to lift heavy objects and perform repetitive manual tasks can translate across a broad spectrum of physically demanding jobs." Quint, 172 F.3d at 11.
However, in Quint, the First Circuit specifically noted that Id. at 12. The First Circuit added that plaintiff had provided "corroborative expert testimony," and also, that "[she] adduced competent evidence that her training, knowledge, skills, a high school education and a work history of heavy physical labor likely would restrict her to such jobs, which were also the most prevalent in her geographical...
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Garcia-Velazquez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean
...on the pending ADA claim. The court treated this briefing as another motion for summary judgment. See García v. Frito Lay Caribbean, Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 38, 40 n. 1 (D.P.R.2001). On December 28, 2001, the court granted Frito Lay's motion and entered a final judgment dismissing the ADA claim......