Lebron-Torres v. Whitehall Laboratories

• Decision Date: 08 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1724,VALENTIN-MERCAD,LEBRON-TORRE,HER,AND,00-1724
• Citation: 251 F.3d 236,2001 WL 563801
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2001) MARIBELHUSBAND NORBERTOTHEIR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. WHITEHALL LABORATORIES, Defendant, Appellee. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 236

251 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2001)

MARIBEL LEBRON-TORRES, HER HUSBAND NORBERTO VALENTIN-MERCADO, AND THEIR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. WHITEHALL LABORATORIES, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 00-1724

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard March 8, 2001

Decided May 30, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge] Juan F. Matos-Bonet, with whom Javier A. Morales Ramos was on brief for appellants.

Anita Montaner-Sevillano, with whom Maria Victoria Munera-Pascual and McConnell Valdes were on brief for appellee.

Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Maribel Lebron-Torres ("Lebron") brought suit against her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Whitehall Robins Laboratories ("Whitehall"), alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12771 ("the ADA").¹ The district court allowed defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Lebron failed to proffer sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could find that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. We affirm.

I.

The summary judgment record before the district court was composed of the depositions of Lebron, her husband, and a Whitehall supervisor, and various medical and employment records. Both parties filed their own versions of the uncontested facts. See D.P.R. Loc. R. 311.12. From these sources, we describe the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the appellant. New York State Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Northeast Dairy Compact Comm'n, 198 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999).

For nearly three years, from 1993-1996, Lebron worked in the manufacturing department of Whitehall, a pharmaceutical manufacturing company located in Guayama, Puerto Rico. For the first two and one half years, she worked as a manufacturing operator. The task of a manufacturing operator required both manual and administrative work. Lebron had to carefully document the manufacturing process in a log book and perform tests to check the quality of the product being manufactured. She also used heavy equipment, such as forklifts, to move and sort pallets of materials. She sifted materials with a large screen and transported, by hand, thirty-five pound pails. There is no dispute that Lebron's job as a manufacturing operator required moderate but constant physical labor, such as climbing ladders, using heavy machinery, bending over, reaching above shoulder level, and lifting moderately heavy loads.

In July 1994, Lebron first reported to Whitehall's infirmary complaining of back pain. She was treated with acupuncture. On May 1, 1995, she returned, complaining of the same kind of back pain. On that second time, she was given a safety belt to support her back and then she returned to work. The following day, Lebron visited her personal physician, Dr. Murabak, for a consultation about her back pain. Dr. Murabak ordered rest and suggested that she see the State Insurance Fund ("SIF") for treatment. On May 8, 1995, Lebron was diagnosed by an SIF physician as suffering from cervico dorso lumbar strain. She was ordered to rest while receiving physical therapy under the auspices of the SIF.

On May 22, 1995, SIF authorized Lebron to return to work. She did not return to the same exact duties, however, having asked for and received a transfer to the compression area of the manufacturing department, which requires less strenuous, but nonetheless physical, activity. According to Lebron, however, she performed many of the same tasks as before. On May 31, 1995, Lebron returned to the SIF for a check-up and was ordered to return home to rest. Thereafter, Lebron went on leave until July 7, 1995.

Upon her return to work on July 7, 1995, neither the SIF nor Lebron's personal physician recommended or issued her any work-related restrictions. Lebron did continue with physical therapy, however, until August 13, 1996, when she was officially released from treatment with the SIF. On November 13, 1996, Lebron was fired from Whitehall. Lebron contends she was fired because she was disabled by her back injury. Whitehall contends she was fired because of her repeated violations of safety and quality protocols occurring (and documented) in April 1994, October 1995, and October 1996.

We note that from the time of her return to work on July 7, 1995, until her termination on November 13, 1996, Lebron did not complain to her employer, Whitehall, that she suffered from back pain while at work. However, SIF medical records show that during this period she was being treated for complaints of chronic neck and back pain that restricted mobility in her arms and back, preventing her from lifting her arms above her head without some pain and sitting or bending over for long periods of time. She says that she did not have trouble walking or standing for any length of time. On January 23, 1997, the SIF notified Lebron of an award of a twenty percent impairment of her general physiological function due to her cervico dorso lumbar strain.

Lebron now works nearly full-time as a hair stylist, running a salon out of her home. While at Whitehall, Lebron worked weekends and weekday evenings as a hair stylist. She is presently also the primary care-giver to her grandson. She says she requires help with household chores and avers that she still experiences chronic pain from her work-related injury, making it more difficult for her than most people to accomplish her necessary daily chores.

II.

The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against qualified persons with a disability.² To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, Lebron must show: (1) that she suffers from a "disability" within the meaning of the Act; (2) that she was able to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the employer discharged her in whole or in part because of that disability. See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1998). Like the district court, we conclude that Lebron's ADA case founders for failure to show that she had a disability as that term has been construed for purposes of the statute.

Not all physical impairments rise to the level of disability under the ADA. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999). Rather, the ADA defines the term "disability" as (A) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual," (B) "a record of such an impairment," or (C) "being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). Lebron asserts that she fits within prong (A) of the statute.

In contending that she qualifies for ADA protection under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), Lebron argues that her back injury substantially limits her major life activity of working. Whether a condition is an impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities is determined in a three-step analysis. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). First, we need to determine whether Lebron's back injury constitutes a physical impairment. Second, we must determine whether the life activity which Lebron claims is affected -- working -- meets the definition of a major life activity within the ADA. Third, tying the two statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impairment substantially limits the activity found to be a major life activity. See id.

Read most favorably to Lebron, her evidence satisfies the first two requirements of this analysis. Her back condition was a physical impairment under the relevant EEOC definitions, being a "physiological disorder or condition" affecting the "musculoskeletal" system. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). And the activity claimed to have been impaired -- working -- has been explicitly recognized as a "major life activity" under EEOC regulations. See id. § 1630.2(i). See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity but noting the "conceptual difficulty in defining 'major life activities' to include work, for it seems to argue in a circle"); Lessard v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 175 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing working as a major life activity for purposes of the ADA). See also Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999) (activities listed in EEOC regulations are treated as major life activities per se, rather than as major life activities only to the extent that they are shown to affect a particular ADA plaintiff).

Where Lebron's claim falters is at the third and final step of the analysis: she has not shown that her back impairment substantially limits her ability to work. In order to prove such a limitation, Lebron is required to demonstrate that her back injury has precluded her from a substantial class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92; Santiago Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2000). Even "[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(j)(3)(I). "If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not...