Garcia v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 98-0249.,1 CA-CV 98-0249.
• Citation: 195 Ariz. 510,990 P.2d 1069
• Parties: Theresia GARCIA, a married woman, individually; and Angela Hatton, a minor by and through her parent and guardian, Theresia Garcia, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Phoenix Tabernacle of Latin America, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Sarah Alvarado, a minor, by and through her parents and guardians John Alvarado and Guadalupe Alvarado; John Alvarado and Guadalupe Alvarado, husband and wife, individually; Guillermina Camacho, a minor by and through her parents, Guillermina G. Camacho and Antonio Camacho; Antonio Camacho and Guillermina G. Camacho, husband and wife, individually; Guadalupe Gallardo, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian Juan M. Gallardo; Juan M. Gallardo, individually; Phillip Daniel Garcia, a minor, by and through his parent and guardian, Deborah Garcia; Rachel Lydia Garcia, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian, Deborah Garcia; Deborah Garcia, individually; Lydia Martinez, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian Gloria Martinez; Gloria Martinez, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Phoenix Tabernacle of Latin America, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Leticia Garcia, a married woman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Phoenix Tabernacle of Latin America, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

990 P.2d 1069

195 Ariz. 510

Theresia GARCIA, a married woman, individually; and Angela Hatton, a minor by and through her parent and guardian, Theresia Garcia, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Phoenix Tabernacle of Latin America, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Sarah Alvarado, a minor, by and through her parents and guardians John Alvarado and Guadalupe Alvarado; John Alvarado and Guadalupe Alvarado, husband and wife, individually; Guillermina Camacho, a minor by and through her parents, Guillermina G. Camacho and Antonio Camacho; Antonio Camacho and Guillermina G. Camacho, husband and wife, individually; Guadalupe Gallardo, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian Juan M. Gallardo; Juan M. Gallardo, individually; Phillip Daniel Garcia, a minor, by and through his parent and guardian, Deborah Garcia; Rachel Lydia Garcia, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian, Deborah Garcia; Deborah Garcia, individually; Lydia Martinez, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian Gloria Martinez; Gloria Martinez, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Phoenix Tabernacle of Latin America, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Leticia Garcia, a married woman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Phoenix Tabernacle of Latin America, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. -0249.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D.

May 6, 1999.

Reconsideration Denied June 29, 1999.

Review Denied January 4, 2000.

Bowman & Brooke, L.L.P. by Jeffrey R. Brooke, Thomas M. Klein, Lori A. Zirkle, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant General Motors Corp.

Rosenthal & Greene, P.C. by Elden M. Rosenthal, pro hac vice, Portland, Oregon, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz by John C. Hepworth, pro hac vice, Twin Falls, Idaho, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Robbins & Green, P.A. by Alfred W. Ricciardi, Phoenix, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Kern & Wooley, L.L.P. by Robert L. Greer, Mesa, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Tabernacle of Latin America.

OPINION

BERCH, Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant General Motors Corporation appeals from an adverse jury verdict arising from a single-car rollover accident in Idaho. General Motors claims that the trial court erred in applying Idaho law, which precluded evidence that Plaintiffs were not wearing their seatbelts at the time of the accident. Because we find that choice-of-law principles dictate the application of Arizona comparative fault law to the facts of this case, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 1993, Plaintiffs, all Arizona residents and members of a church group, rented a van from Defendant National Car Rental in Phoenix for a trip to a camp near Walla Walla, Washington. While passing through Idaho, the Arizona driver lost control of the van, which ran off the road and overturned. All of the passengers were injured in the accident. Although the van was fully equipped with functional seatbelts, none of the passengers was wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident. As a result, most of the eleven passengers were ejected from the van.¹ Plaintiffs assert that the accident was caused by a design defect in the van, which was manufactured by Defendant General Motors.

¶ 3 Ilsy Echeverria, one of the passengers in the van, immediately sued General Motors and other defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. Applying Idaho state law, that court granted Echeverria's motion in limine to exclude all evidence that she failed to wear her seatbelt. The Idaho law provides that "[t]he failure to use a safety belt shall not be considered under any circumstances as evidence of contributory or comparative negligence, nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in any civil action with regard to negligence." Idaho Code § 49-673(6). The court reasoned that Idaho law should apply because the accident occurred in Idaho and Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that Idaho law would apply to conduct that occurred in that state. The court also noted that Idaho law should apply because of its "ease in determination and application." After this ruling but before trial, Echeverria settled with all of the defendants.

¶ 4 On August 16, 1995, the remaining passengers in the van filed lawsuits in Maricopa County Superior Court against Defendants General Motors, National Car Rental, and Phoenix Tabernacle. Plaintiffs moved to strike General Motors' use of the "seatbelt defense," arguing that the Idaho court's ruling on Echeverria's motion in limine bound General Motors in this case, and regardless of the estoppel effect of the Idaho court's ruling, choice-of-law principles dictated that the court apply Idaho law rather than Arizona law to this case. General Motors responded, arguing that it should not be collaterally estopped from asserting the seatbelt defense because Arizona courts apply choice-of-law principles differently than Idaho courts do, and Plaintiffs' attempted use of collateral estoppel was offensive, not defensive, and therefore improper. The trial court struck General Motors' use of the seatbelt defense and affirmed that the Idaho rule would apply.

¶ 5 The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs against General Motors. The trial court denied General Motors' motion for a new trial and General Motors timely appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying Idaho law and striking the seatbelt defense. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(B) (1994).

DISCUSSION

I. Collateral Estoppel

¶ 6 Plaintiffs contend that the Idaho federal district court's ruling on the choice-of-law issue binds the Arizona courts in this case. They also claim that collateral estoppel bars General Motors from reasserting the seatbelt defense, an argument that it already fully and fairly litigated in Idaho, but lost. We review the availability of collateral estoppel de novo. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.1988); Baroldy v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 157 Ariz. 574, 578, 760 P.2d 574, 578 (App.1988) (legal issues are reviewed de novo).

¶ 7 Plaintiffs correctly assert that federal law, the law of the forum to first decide the issue, governs the effect to be given the Idaho federal court ruling. See Marrese v. American Academy of Ortho. Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985). See generally Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 Mich. L.Rev. 945 (1998) (noting that courts should apply the preclusion doctrines of the court that rendered the judgment at issue). In this case, the first court was the federal district court in Idaho. Although it is unclear on which law the trial court relied, the result would be the same under either Arizona or federal law.

¶ 8 Plaintiffs also assert, and the trial court agreed, that their application of collateral estoppel was defensive and therefore proper. The answer to this question may depend on whether we apply federal or Arizona law. Compare Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), with Food for Health Co., Inc. v. 3839 Joint Venture, 129 Ariz. 103, 105, 628 P.2d 986, 988 (App.1981).² We need not decide this issue, however, because we conclude that whether the Idaho ruling was offensive or defensive, the Idaho court's decision is not entitled to collateral estoppel consequences, and thus the Arizona courts are not bound by it.

¶ 9 For collateral estoppel to apply, (1) the issue must have been actually litigated in a previous proceeding, (2) the parties must have had a full and fair opportunity and motive to litigate the issue, (3) a valid and final decision on the merits must have been entered, (4) resolution of the issue must be essential to the decision, and (5) there must be common identity of the parties. See Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 189 Ariz. 387, 397, 943 P.2d 747, 757 (App.1996); see also In re Evans, 161 B.R. 474, 477 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1993) (federal elements virtually the same). We conclude that, because the previous court ruled in limine on the seatbelt issue and the case settled before the final judgment, elements (3) and (4) are not met as to this issue and collateral estoppel therefore does not apply.³

¶ 10 The parties have cited us to no cases, and we have found none, in which a motion in limine is accorded collateral estoppel consequences when parties settle a case before trial. The critical inquiries in determining whether estoppel should apply are whether the in limine ruling was sufficiently final to be entitled to collateral estoppel effect and whether the ruling was "essential" to the court's decision. Whether a ruling is essential must be determined on a case-by-case basis. A consent judgment based on the parties' agreement to settle renders rulings on underlying discovery and evidentiary motions, while perhaps an impetus to the parties in deciding whether to settle, unlikely to be essential to the ultimate judgment in the case. In this case, for example, either the Plaintiff or General Motors could have prevailed in the lawsuit even if the in limine motion had been decided differently, for whether General Motors negligently designed its vans is only peripherally related to whether Ms. Echeverria was wearing her seatbelt. Seatbelt use goes only to the apportionment of fault for purposes of determining damages; the failure to wear a seatbelt does not make one a cause of an accident. See Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 155, 755 P.2d 1135, 1143 (1988). Because the ruling in limine was not essential to the judgment in the Idaho suit, it is not entitled to preclusive effect in this subsequent suit.

¶ 11 Nor did the Idaho court...