Garcia v. Penske Logistics, L.L.C.
| Decision Date | 02 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-40061,15-40061 |
| Parties | YVETTE GARCIA, Plaintiff - Appellant v. PENSKE LOGISTICS, L.L.C., Defendant - Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Summary Calendar
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
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Plaintiff-Appellant Yvette Garcia ("Garcia") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Penske Logistics, LLC ("Penske") in this suit arising out of Garcia's discrimination and retaliation claims. For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM.
Starting in 2002, Garcia worked as a Customer Service Representative for Penske1 at its Mines Road distribution center ("the Mines Road facility") in Laredo, Texas.2 Penske's sole customer from its Mines Road facility was Delphi Automotive Systems, LLC ("Delphi").3
During her tenure at Penske, Garcia suffered from several serious health problems. Starting in 2004, Garcia experienced chronic bronchitis and asthma, which were later diagnosed as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, "COPD." Garcia also suffered from a bleeding disorder that manifested in 2005. These problems intensified over time, causing Garcia to request leave twenty-five times from 2006 to 2011 under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Each request was granted by a supervisor at Penske. Penske did not discipline Garcia for taking sick leave or a leave of absence, and Garcia was not placed in a different job position at any point upon returning to Penske.
However, her frequent sick leave began to cause issues at work. Various co-workers complained to Garcia's facility manager, Hector Javier Garcia ("Mr. Garcia"), that Garcia would call in sick at the last minute and would be inaccessible during her absences from the office.4 Similarly, when Garcia was offered and accepted a Sales Manager position in 2008 directly working with Delphi, Mr. Garcia noted to Delphi executive, Mark Heacox ("Heacox"), that he had concerns about Garcia because she was "sickly and cannot always come towork." On April 13, 2010, due to Garcia's continuing illness, Garcia's then supervisor, John Kalusniak, informed Garcia that she could work from home when she saw fit.
That same spring, Garcia began a romantic relationship with Heacox. Shortly thereafter, Garcia's co-workers began to complain to Delphi Investigations Manager Jarriel Koplin ("Koplin") that Garcia was abusing her relationship with Heacox. Specifically, Koplin received a complaint from a Delphi employee alleging that Heacox paid Garcia's expenses for lodging, vehicles, and meals using company funds, although these expenses were not business related. Delphi investigated the complaint and found irregularities concerning personal expenses charged to Heacox, but otherwise found no evidence of fraud. However, the investigation uncovered additional complaints against Garcia. One complaint detailed a telephone conversation where Garcia allegedly yelled at an employee, saying Koplin received a second complaint describing Garcia as "rude and demanding"; this complaint detailed several conversations where she warned that she would rely on Heacox to ensure that the employee no longer worked for Delphi. A final complaint from a third employee, Delphi Warehouse General Supervisor David Mercer, described a "verbal beating" he received from Garcia during two telephone calls. Garcia allegedly threatened to take her concerns to upper management "whenever she encounters an answer she doesn't like."
In March 2011, amidst the ongoing investigation, Penske requested that Garcia return to the office instead of continuing to work from home. Garcia was also removed from the Delphi account at Delphi's request. Specifically, Mark Cashdollar ("Cashdollar"), Delphi's Director of Americas Human Resources, stated in an e-mail in early June 2011 that Delphi would "no longer be requiring Garcia's services." As a result, Penske identified two alternatepositions that Garcia was eligible for, both of which would require Garcia to continue to work with Delphi. However, Cashdollar informed Penske that they no longer wanted Garcia to work with Delphi in any capacity. Garcia was fired on July 1, 2011.
Garcia filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that Penske terminated her because of (1) her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); (2) her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"); (3) her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"); and (4) her exercise of FMLA leave rights. Mr. Orlando Lopez ("Lopez"), Garcia's brother, was appointed to represent Garcia before the EEOC.5
Garcia filed this civil suit on May 29, 2013 and Penske filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and entered judgment in Penske's favor, finding that Garcia's Title VII, ADEA and ADA claims were untimely. The district court also found that while Garcia presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case under the FMLA, Penske had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Garcia's termination, and Garcia did not provide sufficient evidence that Penske's non-discriminatory reason was merely pretextual. Garcia timely appealed. We address each of Garcia's challenges in turn.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as toany material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). There is no genuine issue of material fact "[i]f the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Steadman v. Tex. Rangers, 179 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1999)). In making this determination, we view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001).
The district court correctly determined that Garcia's Title VII, ADEA and ADA claims were untimely. Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing employment discrimination claims in federal court. See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002). For Title VII and ADA claims, "[e]xhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to sue." Id. (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff must file her civil suit within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue-letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII claims); Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1984); see also Dao, 96 F.3d at 788-89 (ADA claims).
The requirement that a party file a lawsuit within this ninety-day limitations period under Title VII and the ADA is strictly construed. See Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. "[C]ommencement of the ninety-day period begins to run on the day that notice is received at the address supplied to the EEOC by the claimant." Bowers v. Potter, 113 F. App'x 610, 612 (5th Cir. 2004). When the date on which the right-to-sue letter was actually received is unknown, the Fifth Circuit follows the presumption that the letter was received three daysafter the mailing date of the letter. See Jenkins v. City of San Antonio, 784 F.3d 263, 266-67 (5th Cir. 2015). This court routinely dismisses untimely claims involving delays after receipt of the right-to-sue letter in the absence of a recognized equitable consideration. See, e.g., Stokes v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 367 F. App'x 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2010) ().
The ADEA follows a different administrative exhaustion mechanism. See Julian v. City of Houston, 314 F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 2002); Hawkins v. Frank Gillman Pontiac, 102 F. App'x 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2004) (). Once a plaintiff has filed a timely EEOC charge of discrimination under the ADEA, the plaintiff must wait 60 days before filing a civil action in state or federal court. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (ADEA claims); see also Julian, 314 F.3d at 726. If the charge is dismissed, the plaintiff must file within ninety days of the receipt of a notice of dismissal from the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the Dismissal and Notice of Right-to-Sue letter states that it was mailed on Wednesday, January 23, 2013; an EEOC case log reflects that the letter was mailed on January 24, 2013. The letter was addressed to Plaintiff "c/o Orlando Lopez." It warned that the EEOC planned to close Garcia's file and that any lawsuit must be filed within ninety days of receipt of the notice, or Garcia's right to sue based on this charge would be lost. The letter was delivered to Lopez at the address provided to the EEOC. Prior to receiving this notice, Lopez e-mailed Garcia to inform her that she would be receiving a forthcoming Dismissal and Notice-of-Right-to-Sue. However, because Lopez moved from his residence prior to the letter actually being delivered, he claims that he did not become aware of the letter's existence until after the case was closed. Lopez testified that he could not recall the date the letter was received, had no way of knowing when it was received, and had nodocuments which could assist him in identifying that date. Garcia also repeatedly testified that she too had no knowledge of when the letter was...
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