Garcia v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 21 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 8:19-cv-659-CEH-AEP |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | JOSE J. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. Respondent. |
JOSE J. GARCIA, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. Respondent.
No. 8:19-cv-659-CEH-AEP
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
March 21, 2022
ORDER
Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge
Jose J. Garcia petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges his state court convictions for possession of child pornography. (Doc. 1) The respondent argues that Ground Three is unexhausted and procedurally barred from federal review. (Doc. 8 at 5, 14-16) Upon review of the petition, the response, and the relevant state court record (Doc. 8), the petition will be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An information charged Garcia with one hundred counts of possession of child pornography. (Doc. 8-2 at 2-84) Each count in the information charged a sentencing reclassification under Section 775.0847(2), Florida Statutes, for the possession of ten or more images with at least one image containing a child younger than five, sadomasochistic abuse, a sexual battery, sexual bestiality, or a movie involving a child. (Doc. 8-2 at 2-84) Garcia pleaded guilty to twenty counts in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to dismiss the remaining eighty counts and recommend a
sentence that did not exceed thirty years of prison. (Doc. 8-2 at 86-89, 93-94) Garcia and the prosecutor stipulated to the following factual basis (Doc. 8-2 at 98-99):
[Prosecutor:] Beginning in July of 2010, law enforcement officers with the Internet Crimes Against Children task force located in West Palm Beach began an online investigation for an IP address that ultimately belonged to a Jose Jorge Garcia. During that investigation, they noticed that [the] IP address had been trading in child pornography and ultimately drew up a search warrant and brought it to a magistrate for approval
That search warrant was executed at the residence belonging to Jose Jorge Garcia in Dover, Florida in Hillsborough County, and that was executed August 13th, 2010, at which point multiple items of electronics were taken from the home and analyzed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Office of the Attorney General
The forensic review of those computers, including a Western Digital external hard drive, contained images of child pornography, of children under the age of 12 engaged in sexual conduct. Mr. Garcia was interviewed and said he was the person who chatted with the undercover officer believing him to be a sexual predator. This offense occurred in Hillsborough County. He can be identified by witnesses
The trial court sentenced Garcia to 15 years of prison for nineteen counts and a consecutive 15 years of prison for a twentieth count, resulting in an aggregate thirty-year sentence. (Doc. 8-2 at 106-31, 258) Garcia appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed. Garcia v. State, 132 So.3d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (table).
The state post-conviction court denied Garcia relief after an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 8-6 at 2-17, 81-95), and the state appellate court affirmed. Garcia v. State, 262 So.3d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (table). Garcia's federal petition follows.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
AEDPA
Because Garcia filed his federal petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, AEDPA governs the review of his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to require:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) interprets this constraint on the power of the federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's petition:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Clearly established federal law refers to the holding of a U.S. Supreme Court's opinion at the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (italics in original). Even clear error is not enough. Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017). A federal petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). “This is ‘meant to be' a difficult standard to meet.” LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. at 1728 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102).
A factual determination by the state court is not unreasonable “merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). A federal habeas court may grant relief only if “in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings, no reasonable jurist would agree with the factual determinations upon which the state court decision is based.” Raleigh v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't Corrs., 827 F.3d 938, 948-49 (11th Cir. 2016). A state court's factual determination is presumed correct, and a petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
“[AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). Consequently, “review under [Section] 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181-82 (2011). Accord Landers v. Warden, Att'y Gen. of Ala., 776 F.3d 1288, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying Pinholster to Section 2254(d)(2)).
If the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons in the opinion and defers to those reasons if reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). If the last state court decision is without reasons, the federal court “should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. at 1192.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Garcia asserts ineffective assistance of counsel - a difficult claim to sustain. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) explains:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
“There is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
“During plea negotiations defendants are ‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.'” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (citation omitted). “[W]hen a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'” Lee v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Id. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. Because the standards under Strickland and AEDPA are both highly deferential, “when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly' so.” Richter,
562 U.S. at 105. “Given the double deference due, it is a ‘rare case in which an...
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