Garcia v. Serv. Transp. Co.

Decision Date30 August 2022
Docket Number01-21-00235-CV
PartiesMELISSA GARCIA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OFTHE ESTATE OF OBERLIN GARCIA, DECEASED, AMY GARCIAMORALES, CONRADO GARCIA, AND OBERLIN GARCIA, JR.,INDIVIDUALLY, Appellants v. SERVICE TRANSPORT COMPANY, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

MELISSA GARCIA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OFTHE ESTATE OF OBERLIN GARCIA, DECEASED, AMY GARCIAMORALES, CONRADO GARCIA, AND OBERLIN GARCIA, JR.,INDIVIDUALLY, Appellants
v.

SERVICE TRANSPORT COMPANY, Appellee

No. 01-21-00235-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, First District

August 30, 2022


On Appeal from the 189th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2018-23951

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Guerra, and Farris Justice Landau, concurring without separate opinion.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

April L. Farris Justice

1

Appellants are individuals related to Oberlin Garcia, a truck driver who died as a result of injuries he suffered from falling off the top of his tanker trailer.[1]Appellants sued Garcia's employer, appellee Service Transport Company ("STC"), alleging that STC was grossly negligent by allowing or requiring Garcia to climb the ladder on the side of his trailer to open vent doors on top of the trailer without providing fall training and protective equipment.[2] The trial court granted summary judgment in STC's favor. In two issues, appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because (1) they adduced evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on both elements of their gross negligence action against STC; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding proximate causation. We affirm.

Background

Oberlin Garcia was a commercial truck driver who transported hazardous liquid chemicals in a tanker trailer for delivery to various customer facilities throughout the country. Garcia worked for STC. On May 16, 2016, Garcia arrived at a facility in Livonia, Michigan, to deliver a load of chemicals to BASF Corp., STC's largest customer. This was Garcia's first time at the Livonia facility, and a

2

fellow STC truck driver informed him that the facility required drivers to climb on top of the tanker trailer to open a vent door, also called a crash box, so that BASF personnel could unload the chemicals from the tanker. Other facilities generally had their own employees open the crash box before unloading chemicals from tankers. Garcia exited his truck and climbed the ladder attached to the side of the tanker. When he reached the top of the ladder, Garcia attempted to step onto the top of the tanker and reach for the crash box when his right foot slipped. Garcia fell ten feet onto the pavement below, suffering fatal injuries.[3]

Appellants sued STC and BASF, asserting causes of action against STC for gross negligence and aggravated assault resulting in Garcia's death.[4] Appellants asserted numerous gross negligence claims against STC, including claims that STC failed to protect drivers working at heights with adequate policies, training, and supervision; failed to instruct or warn Garcia of unsafe conditions; and violated numerous federal regulations. Appellants alleged that STC's failures resulted in an extreme degree of risk to Garcia.

3

STC filed a motion for summary judgment on no-evidence and traditional grounds.[5] STC listed all of appellants' various gross negligence claims against it and separated the numerous claims into nine categories. The categories included allegations that STC did not provide Garcia with the proper safety equipment, training, or supervision to climb the ladder of the tanker. STC went through each category and argued, among other things, that no evidence supported appellants' allegations concerning an extreme degree of risk.

STC also argued that summary judgment was proper on traditional grounds, and it relied upon numerous exhibits. For example, STC relied on a video recording of the incident, which is not included in the record on appeal. STC also relied on appellants' discovery responses; excerpts from depositions of various STC employees and the parties' expert witnesses; expert reports; service records for the tanker trailer from which Garcia fell; and Garcia's training records. Finally, STC relied on reports of its employees' falls from trailers during the company's thirty-year history. These reports showed that five employees had fallen from trailers and

4

four of these falls resulted in minor injuries, such as a stiff knee and bruises that did not require medical treatment. The fifth fall resulted in a broken leg by a trainee driver.

Appellants filed a response. They argued that STC failed to provide its drivers with fall training or equipment, which involved an extreme degree of risk about which STC knew. Appellants relied on excerpts from the depositions of various STC employees, including two truck drivers and a safety director. They also relied on documents from the Cargo Tank Risk Management Committee ("CTRMC"), an organization which appellants claimed set the trucking industry standard for safely working on top of tankers. Finally, appellants relied on the policies of Trimac Transportation, Inc., a competitor of STC, which required its drivers to use fall protection when working more than eight feet above the ground. Appellants also argued that STC had subjective awareness of the extreme risk but acted with conscious indifference to Garcia's rights, safety, and welfare.

STC filed a reply. STC challenged appellants' characterization of the summary judgment evidence. STC also argued that appellants' response did not adduce any evidence that climbing the tanker ladder involved an extreme risk or that STC knew of such a risk and was consciously indifferent to it. The trial court granted STC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellants' claims against STC.

5

STC filed a motion to sever appellants' claims against it into a new lawsuit. While this motion was pending, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's summary judgment ruling. In this motion, appellants raised many of the arguments they had previously raised and focused primarily on STC's knowledge of a risk accompanying the climbing of a ladder to open the crash box. STC filed a response opposing reconsideration of the court's summary judgment ruling. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for reconsideration. At the end of the hearing, the court orally denied the motion. The court later entered a written order denying the motion. Finally, the court granted STC's motion for severance and severed appellants' claims against STC into a new cause number resulting in a final judgment. This appeal followed.

Summary Judgment

In their first issue, appellants argue that they produced evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on both elements of their gross negligence action. In their second issue, appellants argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding proximate causation. Our resolution of the first element of gross negligence-whether STC's conduct involved an extreme degree of risk-is dispositive of this appeal.

6

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018); Mason v. AMed-Health, Inc., 582 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). When, as here, the trial court grants summary judgment without specifying the grounds for its ruling, we will affirm the judgment if any ground presented in the motion is meritorious. Mason, 582 S.W.3d at 780.

A party may move for summary judgment on no-evidence or traditional grounds. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c), (i). When a party moves on both grounds and the trial court's order does not specify its reasons for granting summary judgment, we first review the propriety of the summary judgment under the no-evidence standard. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). If the trial court properly granted summary judgment on no-evidence grounds, we need not consider whether the summary judgment was also proper on traditional grounds. Id.

A party may move for no-evidence summary judgment after an adequate time for discovery has passed. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i). A trial court must grant summary judgment if the movant identifies one or more essential elements of a claim or defense for which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial and the nonmovant produces no admissible summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. See id.; Mason, 582 S.W.3d at 780-81.

7

To defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must adduce at least a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element of the nonmovant's claims. Mason, 582 S.W.3d at 781. "More than a scintilla of evidence exists when reasonable and fair-minded people could reach different conclusions based on the evidence." Martinez v. Kwas, 606 S.W.3d 446, 462 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (quoting Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 616 (Tex. 2018)). "Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact." Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003) (quoting King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, the court must grant the motion." Mason, 582 S.W.3d at 781 (quoting W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005)).

B. Law of Gross Negligence

Gross negligence includes both objective and subjective components. Medina v. Zuniga, 593 S.W.3d 238, 247 (Tex. 2019); Martinez, 606 S.W.3d at 463. Gross negligence requires proof that (1) when viewed objectively from the defendant's standpoint at the time of the event, the act or omission involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others;

8

and (2) the defendant had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but the defendant nevertheless...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT