Garcia v. State
| Decision Date | 12 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-0883 |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ENRIQUE ABOITES GARCIA, Applicant-Appellant, v. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P McLellan, Judge.
Enrique Garcia appeals the dismissal of his fourth application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Christine E. Branstad of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.
This is Enrique Garcia's fourth application for postconviction relief (PCR) stemming from his conviction for first-degree murder in 1998. The facts of the underlying case were summarized by our court on Garcia's direct appeal:
[Garcia] and four companions were together on the evening of March 28, 1998. An unidentified man approached in a vehicle and talked to one of Garcia's companions. The man offered to pay Garcia and his companions $100 each to beat up Daniel Hernandez . . . who allegedly owed money for a drug transaction. The man led Garcia and his companions to Hernandez's home. Four of the men, including Garcia entered the home where they assaulted Hernandez with a baseball bat and beer bottles. In the melee, one of the men shot Hernandez four times. Two bullets entered the victim's right leg, while the other two perforated both of his lungs and his stomach.[1]
In 2001, 2010, and 2014, Garcia filed applications for PCR, all of which were denied. The denials were upheld on appeal.[2]
Garcia filed his fourth PCR application-the current one-on June 24, 2019. After the State filed a motion to dismiss and a hearing was held, Garcia filed an amended application in February 2020. The district court dismissed all of Garcia's claims except his claims of actual innocence and newly discovered evidence. The State moved to reconsider. Garcia resisted and filed his own motion to reconsider. The court granted the State's motion to reconsider, denied Garcia's motion, and dismissed Garcia's PCR application entirely. Garcia appeals.
Generally, we review the district court's denial of an application for PCR for errors at law.[3] Our application of the errors-at-law standard of review to PCR actions includes review of those summarily dismissed.[4] "[F]or a summary disposition to be proper, the State must be able to prevail as if it were filing a motion for summary judgment in a civil proceeding."[5] However, when a claim raises issues of a constitutional dimension, our review is de novo.[6] Likewise, to the extent an applicant's claim of actual innocence raises constitutional issues, our review is de novo.[7]
Garcia contends the district court erred in granting the State's motion to reconsider, claiming the filing was improper under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). Garcia's claim fails for three reasons. First, Garcia failed to raise this issue in the district court. "Nothing is more basic in the law of appeal and error than the axiom that a party cannot sing a song to us that was not first sung in the trial court."[8] As Garcia failed to raise the issue, it is not preserved for our review on appeal.[9] Second, Garcia relies on an outdated version of the rules of civil procedure and cases interpreting the outdated rules in asserting the State's motion was improper because it merely "rehashed" legal issues. The version of the rules in effect at the time of the filings in this case superseded any rules or case law distinguishing between "proper" and "improper" rule 1.904(2) motions.[10] As the State's motion sought reconsideration of the court's ruling, rule 1.904(2) was a proper procedural vehicle upon which to base the motion. Third, the district court has inherent authority to reconsider its rulings so long as it still has jurisdiction over the case.[11] The district court still had jurisdiction over this case when it reconsidered its ruling. For all of these reasons, Garcia's challenge on this point fails.
Other than his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, which will be discussed later, Garcia's primary claim on appeal is that there is newly discovered evidence that shows he is actually innocent. That evidence consists of an affidavit signed by J.M., one of the State's witnesses at Garcia's 1998 trial. J.M. is one of Garcia's four companions from the night of the murder. J.M.'s affidavit, signed in 2012, asserts that his trial testimony in Garcia's case was untruthful.[12] Exactly how the testimony was untruthful is not entirely clear from the affidavit.
A. New Ground of Law or Fact
Based on J.M.'s affidavit, Garcia asserts he is actually innocent so his conviction should be vacated and he should be given a new trial. However, Garcia's claim runs into a significant statute-of-limitations problem. A PCR application must be filed within three years from the date the conviction is final or, if appealed, within three years of the date procedendo issued.[13] There is an exception to this limitation period if a new ground of law or fact is raised that could not have been raised within the three-year period.[14] Here, writ of procedendo on Garcia's direct appeal issued in 2000. He initiated this PCR application in June 2019. Because his current application was filed more than three years after issuance of procedendo affirming his conviction, in order to be successful, Garcia must show a ground of law or fact that could not have been raised within the three-year window.[15] Garcia asserts a new ground of both law and fact excuse his otherwise late filing.
Garcia claims Schmidt v. State[16] created a new ground of law that circumvents the three-year limitation period. We disagree. Schmidt changed the law by recognizing the right of a criminal defendant who has pleaded guilty to assert a freestanding claim of actual innocence in a PCR proceeding.[17] This was a change of law with respect to such defendants because, before Schmidt, defendants who pleaded guilty could only attack "the voluntary and intelligent character" of their pleas.[18] But Garcia did not plead guilty. He was found guilty after trial. As a result, Schmidt did not create a new ground of law that relieved Garcia of the obligation to file his PCR application within three years.
Garcia's claim that J.M.'s affidavit is a new ground of fact that excuses his otherwise untimely PCR application also fails. The affidavit was signed in 2012. It is undisputed that Garcia knew of the affidavit and its contents no later than May 2015, as Garcia communicated with his prior PCR counsel about the affidavit at that time. Garcia filed this PCR application in June 2019, over four years after the latest date that he discovered J.M.'s affidavit. Our case law establishes that, when a new case creates a ground-of-law that would entitle a criminal defendant to PCR, the PCR application must be filed within three years of the filing of the new case.[19] The same logic applies to a new ground of fact.[20] As Garcia did not file this PCR action within three years of his discovery of J.M.'s affidavit, his claim remains time-barred by section 822.3. B. Alternative Claims
Garcia raises two alternative claims for relief from the statute of limitations that bars his claim. First, he claims the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied to keep his claim viable. This claim fails because "equitable tolling does not apply to section 822.3."[21] Second, he claims application of section 822.3 to bar his claim violates his due process rights protected by the Iowa Constitution and the United States Constitution. This claim fails because the three-year "time limit in section [822.3] afforded defendant a reasonable opportunity to be heard, thus ensuring his federal and state due process rights."[22]
For his final claim, Garcia asserts his prior PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims the relation-back doctrine established in Allison v. State[23] permits his application to be heard outside the three-year limitation period set by section 822.3. In Allison, our supreme court held:
[W]here a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been timely filed per section 822.3 and there is a successive PCR petition alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the timing of the filing of the second PCR petition relates back to the timing of the filing of the original PCR petition for purposes of Iowa Code section 822.3 if the successive PCR petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR action.[24]
As a preliminary matter, we note that, in the legislative session that followed the filing of Allison, our legislature statutorily abrogated Allison by prohibiting a PCR application based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel from "relat[ing] back to a prior filing to avoid the application of the limitation periods."[25]We do not need to decide here whether the statutory amendment applies to Garcia's PCR application, which was originally filed before the amendment took effect but was amended to its final form after the effective date. This is because, even if not statutorily abrogated, Garcia's claim under Allison still fails.
The first reason his claim fails is because our court has repeatedly held that the Allison rule does not apply to third or subsequent PCR applications.[26] Since this is Garcia's fourth PCR application, Allison is inapplicable.
Second even if we were to apply Allison to this fourth PCR...
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