Garcia v. State
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 62-2021 |
| Parties | ROGER JOHANN GARCIA v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Eaves, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) Getty, Joseph M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.
In this case, we consider whether a valid legal foundation exists to convict a defendant of second-degree intent to kill murder, as an accessory before the fact. The Court of Special Appeals held that it is conceivable for an accessory before the fact to aid, on impulse and without premeditation, another in the commission of a homicide with the intent to kill. State v. Garcia, 253 Md.App. 50 (2021), cert granted, 477 Md. 382 (2022). That reasoning is consistent with the principal distinction between premeditation and the intent to kill. Therefore, we hold in accordance with Sheppard v. State, 312 Md. 118 (1988), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270 (1992), a defendant may be liable as an accessory before the fact to second-degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
On the night of June 5, 2017, one day prior to their high school graduation, Shadi Najjar and Artem Ziberov were gunned down while waiting to sell one of Najjar's extra graduation tickets. The event that led to the shooting, however, took place months prior.
In December 2016, a man named Jose Ovilson Canales-Yanez arranged to sell marijuana to Najjar. Although Canales-Yanez initially spoke with Najjar about the purchase, Canales-Yanez's then pregnant wife, Kara Yanez, was present to complete the sale. The sale, however, did not go smoothly. At some point, Kara Yanez alleged Najjar took the marijuana from her without paying, and as Najjar fled, he assaulted her. Despite the alleged assault, neither Canales-Yanez nor Kara Yanez reported the crime to the police. Instead, Canales-Yanez recruited his friends, Edgar Garcia and Rony Galicia (collectively "Co-Defendants"), to exact his own revenge.[1] Edgar Garcia later enlisted his half-sibling, Petitioner, Roger Garcia,[2] to help the Co-Defendants in carrying out the revenge plan. Specifically, Garcia's role was to help the others inconspicuously communicate with Najjar because he and Najjar went to the same high school and were about the same age.
Several months after Garcia's recruitment, on May 31, 2017, Garcia became friends with Najjar on Snapchat, a social media app where users can share pictures, communicate via text, and see their friends' locations. A few days after Garcia and Najjar became friends on Snapchat, Najjar posted a picture to the app advertising an extra graduation ticket he had for sale. Later that evening, while in the presence of the Co-Defendants, Garcia told them about Najjar's Snapchat post. Sensing an opportunity for revenge, Garcia responded to the Snapchat post, and following an exchange via the app's texting function, Najjar agreed to meet with Garcia later that night to sell the extra graduation ticket.[3] Ultimately, during the arranged meet-up, Najjar and Ziberov, a passenger in the vehicle, were shot and killed while waiting in their car for Garcia.
After an investigation by law enforcement, the State charged Garcia in an indictment with eight offenses, including murder, conspiracy to commit murder, armed robbery, and use of a firearm in a felony or violent crime. At trial, after the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree intent to kill murder, second-degree grievous bodily harm murder, and accomplice liability. The jury found Garcia guilty of two counts of second-degree murder, as well as the two corresponding firearm-use counts. The jury acquitted Garcia on all other charges.
Garcia appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals. In his appeal, Garcia contended that an accessory before the fact to second-degree intent to kill murder necessarily deliberates and premediates the murder and therefore cannot be guilty of second-degree murder. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected this theory and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Garcia v. State, 253 Md.App. 50 (2021).
Garcia petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on February 9, 2022. 477 Md. 382 (2022). Garcia presented the following questions (which we have rephrased slightly)[4] for our review:
For the reasons outlined below, we answer the first question in the negative, and therefore, we need not address the second.
Garcia argues that an accessory before the fact to second-degree murder acts with intent and foreknowledge of the future murder when the accessory provides aid. Garcia opines that this intent and foreknowledge is the same as the sort of reflection needed to prove premeditation. Therefore according to Garcia, the accessory's inherent premeditation should elevate a crime of accessory before the fact to second-degree intent to kill murder to first-degree premeditated murder. Additionally, Garcia contends that the law of accomplice liability does not permit an accessory to be guilty as an accessory to the incidental offense.
In opposition, however, the State argues that aid and premeditation are not the same or even substantially similar. The State bases its argument on the fact that an accessory's state of mind is assessed at the time they themselves act, and accessory's state of mind is independent from the state of mind of the other actors. The State further contends that an accessory before the fact, pursuant to accomplice liability, is culpable for the incidental crimes committed, by others, in furtherance of the planned crime.[5]
These arguments raise two questions as a matter of law. First, does the accessory's aid in the future crime equate to premeditation? Second, does accomplice liability allow for an accessory before the fact to second-degree murder? To answer these questions, we first look to the law and how it defines murder and accomplice liability, and then we apply those definitions to the case before us. Accordingly, as legal questions, we apply the de novo standard of review. Shannon v. State, 468 Md. 322, 335 (2020).
Common law murder is the unlawful "killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation." Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340 (1987). Although murder is still a common law crime in Maryland, the General Assembly has, by statute, separated it into degrees, with the express purpose of mitigating punishment. See 1809 Md. Law, ch. CXXXVIII; Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355, 375 (1874) (); Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 442, 451 (1855) ).
Since 1809, the murder statutes have remained relatively true to their original drafting and enactment.[6] Maryland Code ("Md. Code") (1957, 2021 Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.), Criminal Law Article ("CR") §§ 2-201, 2-204, maintain the first- and second-degree distinction first codified in 1809. Accordingly, first-degree murder is:
CR 2-204 defines second-degree murder as "[m]urder that is not in the first-degree under [CR] § 2-201." CR § 2-204(a).
In essence, CR § 2-201(a)(1)-(4) describe the various mens rea (states of mind) "and circumstantial modalities that will qualify murder as murder in the first degree, [they] do not represent separate crimes but only establish alternative ways of finding the requisite aggravation." Jeffries v. State, 113 Md.App. 322, 335 (1997) (citing Wood v. State, 191 Md. 658, 666-67 (1948)).
Unlike first-degree murder, second-degree is broader. However, this Court has "defined it more precisely as embracing four kinds of murder." Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 147 (2001). The four kinds of murder are killings accompanied by any one of the following states of mind: (1) killing another with the intent to kill-"bring[ing] about the death of another," State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 163 (1990)-without premeditation; (2) killing another person with the intent to inflict serious bodily harm that death would be the likely result; (3) depraved-heart murder; and (4) felony murders, where the killing is done during the commission of certain felonies. See Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 147 (2001).
One issue here, as articulated by Garcia, is related to the first variety of second-degree murder-the killing of another with the intent to kill. We note that the difference between this variety of second-degree murder and first-degree murder is the former's lack of the element of premeditation. Id. at 148. The reason for the distinction is because "the absence of premeditation does not prevent there being present [the intent to kill]." Abney v State, 244 Md. 444, 448 (1996). Instead, one must prove the element of premeditation by showing that the "design to kill must have preceded the...
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