Garcia v. State

• Decision Date: 21 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC03-1677.,SC03-1677.
• Citation: 901 So.2d 788
• Parties: Jorge GARCIA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

901 So.2d 788

Jorge GARCIA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC03-1677.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 21, 2005.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Carol J.Y. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Chief Assistant Attorney General and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

QUINCE, J.

We have for review the decision in Garcia v. State, 854 So.2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in Goodman v. State, 839 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons more fully expressed below, we quash the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, and approve Goodman.

FACTS

The facts of this case are thoroughly set forth in the Second District's decision as follows:

In the early morning hours on June 9, 2001, Pasco County Deputy Sheriff Joseph Irizarry observed Garcia driving a truck. Garcia's vehicle first came to Deputy Irizarry's attention when it passed through a flashing yellow light without slowing down. Thereafter, Deputy Irizarry saw Garcia's vehicle go off the road while making a right-hand turn and then weave off the roadway onto the grassy shoulder three times. After observing this behavior and following Garcia's vehicle for approximately a quarter of a mile, Deputy Irizarry decided to stop Garcia's vehicle.

After the vehicle stopped and Deputy Irizarry approached the driver's window of the vehicle, he smelled alcohol and observed that Garcia's eyes were bloodshot and that Garcia's speech was slurred. Garcia was alone in the truck. Deputy Irizarry proceeded to conduct field sobriety tests. After conducting the tests, Deputy Irizarry arrested Garcia for driving under the influence.

In the meantime, Deputy Wilkins and Deputy Banner arrived at the scene. In the course of searching Garcia's truck incident to his arrest, Deputy Wilkins found an item — which looked like a softball wrapped in black electrical tape — underneath the passenger's seat of Garcia's truck. Garcia told the deputies at the scene that he did not know what the item was, that he had not seen it before, and had not known that it was in the truck. He also stated that his truck had recently been stolen and that some friends had been in his truck earlier that night. Subsequent tests conducted by the FDLE crime laboratory determined that an off-white powder contained within the item was a mixture containing methamphetamine and a cutting agent.

Garcia was charged by information with trafficking in methamphetamine, driving under the influence, and obstructing or resisting an officer without violence. In his testimony at trial, Garcia stated that the night of his arrest he had the truck at a party from about 7:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. His truck was used at the party for playing CDs. Garcia also used the truck on two occasions during the party to take friends to buy beer. Garcia denied using drugs. He testified that he did not put the tape-covered item in the truck, know it was there, or know what it contained. Finally, Garcia testified that his truck had been stolen on Wednesday, May 31, from a shop where he had taken it. The truck was recovered the following Monday in a dirty condition and containing items that did not belong to Garcia. After recovering the truck, he returned it to the shop for the installation of a stereo. When he later picked up the truck, it was clean.

Garcia was found guilty of the driving under the influence charge and guilty of the lesser-included crime of possession of methamphetamine on the trafficking offense. He was found not guilty of the obstructing or resisting charge.

During the trial, at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, Garcia moved for a judgment of acquittal on the trafficking charge pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380(a). The motion was denied.

Id. at 760-61. At the jury charge conference, Garcia objected to the standard jury instruction that permitted the jury to infer or assume knowledge of the presence of the methamphetamine based on exclusive possession. The trial court overruled the objection, rejected Garcia's proposed special instructions, and read the standard instructions on trafficking. In listing the elements of trafficking, the trial court instructed the jury that "the defendant's knowledge `that the substance was methamphetamine or a mixture containing methamphetamine' was a material element of the offense of trafficking." Id. at 764 (emphasis added). The trial court also instructed the jury concerning actual and constructive possession and stated as follows:

If a thing is in a place over which the person does not have control, in order to establish constructive possession, the State must prove the person has control over the thing, knowledge of the thing which was in the person's presence, and the knowledge of the illicit nature of the thing.

Id. at 765 (alteration in original). The trial court then gave an instruction on the elements of the lesser included offense of simple possession. That instruction omitted any reference to the requirement that the defendant have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. However, the trial court did state that the prior instruction regarding the "definition of possession... applies to the lesser charge as it did to the greater charge." Id. at 765. Garcia did not object to the failure to include the element of "knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance" in the jury instruction on the lesser included offense of possession.

During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court: "What is the difference between trafficking and possession of methamphetamine?" The court then reread the instructions on possession and trafficking, but not the instructions concerning actual and constructive possession. The jury acquitted Garcia of trafficking but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of possession. Garcia renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal and moved for a new trial. Both motions were denied.

Garcia raised several claims on appeal. The district court summarily denied all but the following two claims: (1) the trial court erred when it denied Garcia's motion for judgment of acquittal based on his contention that there was insufficient evidence to establish knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance, and (2) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of possession that did not include the "knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance" element, i.e., the "guilty knowledge element."

The district court held that the illicit nature of the substance is an indisputable element of the crime of drug possession pursuant to Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 737 (Fla.1996) (holding that guilty knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia). The district court rejected the State's argument that the holding in Chicone was superseded by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002). That statute provides that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of drug offenses, but lack of knowledge is an affirmative defense. The statute became law after Garcia committed the offense in this case. The district court then concluded that the instruction given was clearly inadequate and erroneous. However, the court also found that Garcia did not request an instruction concerning guilty knowledge with regard to the possession offense, nor did he object to the trial court's failure to give such an instruction. The error was not preserved, and the district court found that it was not fundamental. On this issue, the Second District certified conflict with Goodman, which holds that when a defendant denies knowledge of the presence of an illegal substance, he or she automatically places into dispute any knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance.

Law and Analysis

In 1973, this Court established a presumption of the scienter element of drug charges arising from actual possession. See State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394 (Fla.1973)

. In Medlin, the defendant gave a capsule to another person, and it contained an illegal substance. Despite the fact that Medlin told the other person that the capsule would make her "go up," Medlin argued that there was no proof at trial to show that he delivered the capsule with knowledge that it contained a barbiturate. Medlin was convicted of delivery of an unlawful barbiturate. The district court reversed the conviction finding that there was no proof adduced to show that Medlin delivered the capsule with knowledge that it contained a barbiturate or barbiturate derivative. On review, this Court quashed the district court's decision and held that the State was not required to prove knowledge or intent since both were presumed from the doing of the prohibited act. The standard jury instructions for the crime of possession — the relevant crime in this case — were then adopted. In the instruction, knowledge of the presence of the substance was listed as an element, and the Medlin presumption was incorporated into that instruction by the following language: "If a person has exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed." However, the instruction did not list knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance as an element. An accompanying note to the instruction stated that "[i]f the defense seeks to show a lack of knowledge as to the nature of a particular drug, an additional instruction may be required." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) Drug Abuse (1981).

In 1987, this Court addressed whether the jury instructions on trafficking offenses were erroneous because they did not include knowledge of the nature of the substance as an...