Garcia v. State
Decision Date | 11 September 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 478S58,478S58 |
Citation | 271 Ind. 510,394 N.E.2d 106 |
Parties | Shirley GARCIA, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Thomas D. Ryan, East Chicago, for appellant; Jay N. Given, East Chicago, of counsel.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted in a trial by jury of conspiracy to commit murder, a class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 (Burns 1979), and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Her sentence was suspended and she was placed on five years probation. On appeal she raises the following issues:
(1) Whether the defendant can be convicted of conspiracy when the only person with whom the defendant conspired was a police informant who only feigned his acquiescence in the scheme.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the potential penalties upon conviction of the defendant.
At the close of all of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal alleging that the State had failed to prove that there was an "agreement" between the defendant and the alleged co-conspirator. The motion was denied by the trial court, which denial the defendant now assigns as error.
The evidence introduced at trial consisted of the following: On September 30, 1977, State's witness, Allen Young, was first contacted by the defendant with regard to certain marital problems that she was having. She stated that her husband constantly beat her and her children and that she "couldn't take it any longer" that she wanted her husband killed. Young suggested that she go to the police or see an attorney, but she refused, stating that to do so would only make matters worse. Young then mentioned the sum of $5000.00 in an attempt to discourage her. She responded that the amount was out of the question and ended the conversation. Young testified that he had not taken the defendant seriously at that point, because he thought that she was simply upset and needed to "blow off stem." He received a second call from the defendant on October 4, 1977. During this conversation, the defendant said that she had $200 in cash and wanted to know whether he had found anyone to kill her husband. Young responded that he did not think he could help her since he did not know anyone who was in that line of "business." She asked him to look around anyway. Young testified that, although he did not directly promise to find someone for her, he probably left her with the impression that he would do so. Shortly after talking with the defendant, Young went to the Whiting Police Department and discussed the matter with two detectives. He offered to call the defendant and let them listen and record the conversation, which they did. During that conversation, Young again asked the defendant if she wanted him to help her find someone to kill her husband, and she responded affirmatively. Young replied that he would try to find someone. Several more conversations took place between the defendant and Young. On each occasion the defendant reaffirmed her desire to have her husband killed, and she rejected the idea of going to the police instead. At their final meeting, Young, accompanied by a plain-clothed detective, introduced the defendant to the detective, stating that here was a man who might be willing to do the job. The defendant then produced $200, a picture of her husband, and a record of his daily habits and gave them to the detective. She agreed to pay the balance of the contract price when the "job" was completed. Defendant was subsequently arrested.
At trial, Young testified that he only feigned his acquiescence in the plan and at no time did he intend to actually carry it out.
The issue is whether the conspiracy section of our new penal code adopts the Model Penal Code's "unilateral" concept or whether it retains the traditional "bilateral" concept.
The bilateral concept is the traditional view of conspiracy as derived from common law. It is formulated in terms of two or more persons agreeing to commit a crime, each with intent to do so. In cases where the person or persons with whom the defendant conspired only feigned his acquiescence in the plan, the courts have generally held that neither person could be convicted of conspiracy because there was no "conspiratorial agreement." See, e. g., United States v. Chase, (4th Cir. 1967) 372 F.2d 453, 459, cert. den., 387 U.S. 907, 87 S.Ct. 1688, 18 L.Ed.2d 626; Sears v. United States, (5th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 139, 142; King v. State, (1958) Fla., 104 So.2d 730; People v. Atley, (1974) 392 Mich. 298, 220 N.W.2d 465, 471; Regle v. State, (1970) 9 Md.App. 346, 264 A.2d 119; Moore v. State, (1974) Miss., 290 So.2d 603, 605; Johnson v. Sheriff, Clark County, (1975) 91 Nev. 161, 532 P.2d 1037, 1038; State v. Mazur, (1978) (App.), 158 N.J.Super. 89, 385 A.2d 878; State v. Horton, (1969) 275 N.C. 651, 170 S.E.2d 466, 470; Delaney v. State, (1932) 164 Tenn. 432, 51 S.W.2d 485, 486-487; Odneal v. State, (1931) 117 Tex.Cr. 97, 34 S.W.2d 595; Woodworth v. State, (1886) 20 Tex.App. 375. Reacting to criticism of this viewpoint, the drafters of the Model Penal Code, though not without internal disagreement, 1 adopted a "unilateral" concept, as follows:
In explanation of their new approach, the Drafters of the Model Penal Code commented:
MPC § 5.03, Comments at pp. 104-105.
The Drafters further stated that the only basis for the old rule was a "strict doctrinal approach toward the conception of a conspiracy as a necessarily bilateral relationship." In effect, the Drafters adopted a new definition of conspiracy, one which measures the culpability of each defendant individually.
This concept has been adopted, in whole or in part, in at least 26 states and is under consideration in most of the remaining states. See, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 Col.L.R. 1122, 1125 (1975).
In 1976, our Indiana Legislature repealed the existing conspiracy statute 2 and adopted Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 (Burns 1979), to be effective October 1, 1977, and which reads as follows:
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