Garcia v. State Of N.M.

• Citation: 237 P.3d 716,148 N.M. 414
• Decision Date: 13 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 31,328.,31,328.
• Parties: Jose A. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico

148 N.M. 414

237 P.3d 716

Jose A. GARCIA, Petitioner v STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.

No. 31,328.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

May 13, 2010.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} Defendant Jose Garcia pleaded guilty to intentional child abuse resulting in death, a crime that carries a life sentence where, as here, Child is under 12 years old. In this direct appeal, Defendant seeks leave to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that it was not knowing and voluntary, due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant claims that he pleaded guilty because trial counsel incorrectly advised him that negligent and intentional child abuse resulting in death are both “first degree felonies,” carrying a 30-year prison sentence, and that he could be convicted “even if it was an accident.” After reviewing the record, the 2005 amendments to the child abuse statute, the noncapital sentencing guidelines, and the related case law, we agree that trial counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced Defendant. We, therefore, reverse the trial court and remand to permit Defendant to withdraw his plea and for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

BACKGROUND Events Leading to Defendant's Arrest

{2} Early on the morning of April 15, 2007, sheriff's deputies and paramedics responded to a call reporting the death of a 17-month-old child in San Juan County. When detectives arrived at the scene, they found the deceased child lying on the living room floor under a blanket, and they noticed “an obvious foot wear pattern” on her stomach. The officers then interviewed Defendant, 18 years old at the time, and Defendant's girlfriend, both of whom had been babysitting Child earlier that night.

{3} During his interview with law enforcement, Defendant admitted that he had stepped on Child's foot earlier that evening and that she had made “a screech noise.” Upon further questioning about whether “[Defendant] possibly stepped on [Child's] stomach,” he stated that he “guessed that he could have” when he attempted to jump over her while she was lying on the floor under some clothing. The detectives noted that the pattern on the soles of Defendant's shoes was similar to the pattern on Child's stomach, and Defendant allowed his shoes to be taken into evidence.

{4} Defendant's girlfriend informed the police that she did not know how Child was injured. She further stated that there were several points during the evening when Defendant was alone with Child. She claimed that Defendant had helped her babysit on several other occasions and that he had never hurt the children. At the conclusion of the investigation, Defendant was charged with Abuse of a Child-Intentional (Resulting in Death), Tampering with Evidence, and Aggravated Battery (Great Bodily Harm) (Household Member).

Legislative History

{5} The record indicates confusion throughout the proceedings regarding the child abuse charge and specifically (1) the precise crimes with which Defendant was charged, and (2) the potential punishments that Defendant faced. The child abuse charge therefore is the focus of this Opinion and requires a more detailed explanation.

{6} The definition of child abuse is provided in NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D) (2009), and has remained unchanged since 1973:

Abuse of a child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be:

(1) placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; (2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished; or

(3) exposed to the inclemency of the weather.

(Emphasis added.); see also 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 360, § 10.

{7} Prior to 2005, whether the accused acted intentionally or negligently was irrelevant for conviction and sentencing purposes: the statute punished both the same. See § 30-6-1. In fact, until 1993, Section 30-6-1(D) and its predecessor were interpreted by New Mexico's appellate courts to require only a showing of civil negligence. See Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 219-23, 849 P.2d 358, 362-66 (1993) (overturning prior case law and holding that a conviction under Section 30-6-1(D) requires a showing of criminal negligence).

{8} Rather than focusing on the mens rea of the accused, the pre-2005 statute differentiated the level of offense and sentence based on the effect of the abuse on the child. See § 30-6-1(E). When death or great bodily harm resulted, the offense was a first-degree felony punishable by 18 years in prison; in all other circumstances, child abuse in violation of Section 30-6-1(D) was a second- or third-degree felony, depending on whether it was a first or subsequent offense.

{9} In 2005, the Legislature added several new provisions to the child abuse statute and the noncapital felony sentencing guidelines relating to child abuse resulting in death. See § 30-6-1(F) (“A person who commits negligent abuse of a child that results in the death of the child is guilty of a first degree felony.” (Emphasis added.)); § 30-6-1(G) (“A person who commits intentional abuse of a child twelve to eighteen years of age that results in the death of the child is guilty of a first degree felony.” (Emphasis added.)); § 30-6-1(H) (“A person who commits intentional abuse of a child less than twelve years of age that results in the death of the child is guilty of a first degree felony resulting in the death of a child.” (Emphasis added.)); NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15(A) (2007) (“If a person is convicted of a noncapital felony, the basic sentence of imprisonment is as follows: (1) for a first degree felony resulting in the death of a child, life imprisonment ....” (Emphasis added.)). These amendments, for the first time, differentiated levels of the offense based on the mental state of the accused and the age of the child.

{10} Important for our analysis, the statutes continued to provide that a person is guilty of a “first degree felony,” punishable by 18 years imprisonment, if that person commits (1) negligent child abuse resulting in the death of a child of any age, see § 30-6-1(F), or (2) intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child between the ages of 12 and 18, see § 30-6-1(G); see also § 31-18-15(A)(3) (providing that the basic sentence of imprisonment for a “first degree felony” is 18 years).

{11} However, the amended child abuse statute also provided that a person who commits intentional child abuse that results in the death of a child under the age of 12 is guilty of a “first degree felony resulting in the death of a child.” Section 30-6-1(H) (emphasis added). To grasp the import of this last phrase, we look to the amended sentencing guidelines, which include a new noncapital felony-a “first degree felony resulting in the death of a child,”-which carries a sentence of life imprisonment. Section 31-18-15(A)(1).

{12} The history of the 2005 amendments demonstrates that the distinction between negligent and intentional child abuse resulting in death played an important role in their passage. The original bill was entitled, “An Act Relating to Criminal Sentencing; Imposing a Life Sentence for Child Abuse Resulting in Death When the Child is Under Twelve Years Old.” S.B. 166, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.2005), available at http:// legis. state. nm. us/ Sessions/ 05 % ‍20Regular/ bills/ senate/ SB 0166. pdf. The proposed bill would have imposed a life sentence, irrespective of the mental state of the accused. See id. However, when the bill came back from the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, its scope was narrowed to impose a life sentence for only intentional child abuse resulting in death of a child under 12 years old. Id. (as substituted by Senate Judiciary Committee), available at http:// legis. state. nm. us/ Sessions/ 05 % ‍20Regular/ bills/ senate/ SB 0166 JUS. pdf; id. (as amended by House Judiciary Committee) (emphasis added), available at http:// legis. state. nm. us/ Sessions/ 05 %‍20Regular/ bills/ senate/ SB 0166 JC 1. pdf.

{13} Taken together, the amendments and their history show that the Legislature intended the phrase “first degree felony resulting in the death of a child” to designate an entirely different level of noncapital offense-one that results in life in prison which is unusual, if not unprecedented, for an offense other than first degree murder. The result is a new level of offense and a new prison sentence that is at least 66% longer than the 18-year sentence for any other “first degree felony.” ¹ Compare § 31-18-15(A)(3) (providing that the basic sentence of imprisonment for a first degree felony is 18 years) with § 31-18-15(A)(1) (providing that the basic sentence for a first degree felony resulting in the death of a child is life imprisonment). See also Compton v. Lytle, 2003-NMSC-031, ¶ 28, 134 N.M. 586, 81 P.3d 39 (holding that an individual sentenced to life in prison must serve a minimum of 30 years before being eligible for probation or parole). This new designation and sentence applies only to the crime of intentional child abuse when it results in the death of a child under 12 years old. ²

The Charges Brought Against Defendant

{14} In this case, which arose nearly two years after these amendments were enacted, the State charged Defendant with “Abuse of a Child-Intentional (Resulting in Death),” related to the death of the 17-month-old Child. However, nothing in the record reflects any awareness of the 2005 amendments. No pleading cites the 2005 amendments, makes reference to “a first degree felony resulting in the death of a child,” indicates that Defendant potentially faced a life sentence, or includes the Child's age or states that she was under 12 years old. ³ Instead, all...