Garden Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. MARTA
Decision Date | 30 November 2000 |
Docket Number | No. S01A0069.,S01A0069. |
Citation | 273 Ga. 280,539 S.E.2d 811 |
Parties | GARDEN HILLS CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC. et al. v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White & Williams, Richard N. Hubert, Mary C. Cooney, Atlanta, for appellant.
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Carl E. Westmoreland, Jr., Pursley, Howell, Lowery & Meeks, Charles N. Pursley, Jr., Christian F. Torgrimson, Atlanta, Maddox, Nix, Bowman & Zoeckler, Thomas A. Bowman, Conyers, David D. Blum, Atlanta, for appellee.
Allen, Kopet & Boyd, Matthew D. Gansereit, Atlanta, amicus curiae.
The dispute in this case arises from the proposed development of the 47 acres of land surrounding the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) Lindbergh Station. MARTA initiated the project by issuing a Request For Proposal (RFP), which solicited plans from prospective developers. The RFP did not include the submission of bids as a criterion for selection and did not express MARTA's intention to dispose of the property. Instead, MARTA noted its preference for a ground lease, but its willingness to consider other business arrangements. Although the RFP did not state that MARTA would make any capital contribution, MARTA subsequently committed $40 million of its funds toward improvement of the property. The size of the development, including the density, was left open for negotiation. Two developers submitted proposals and, after negotiations MARTA selected Carter & Associates (Carter). Appellants oppose the project and brought suit to prevent MARTA from implementing its agreement with Carter. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Appellants' motion for an interlocutory injunction, and they appeal from that ruling.
1. The trial court based its denial of injunctive relief upon several findings, one of which was Appellants' failure to show "a substantial likelihood that [they] will succeed on the merits of their claims." Appellants urge that the trial court erred in requiring that they make such a showing as a prerequisite to obtaining a preliminary injunction. A trial court may grant an interlocutory injunction Outdoor Advertising Assn. of Ga. v. Garden Club of Ga., 272 Ga. 146, 147(1), 527 S.E.2d 856 (2000). In establishing an equitable balance between the opposing parties, the likelihood of the applicant's ultimate success is not the determinative factor. (Emphasis supplied.) Glen Oak v. Henderson, 258 Ga. 455, 457(1)(d), 369 S.E.2d 736 (1988). See also Zant v. Dick, 249 Ga. 799, 800, 294 S.E.2d 508 (1982) ( ) (Emphasis supplied.)
Although the merits of the case are not controlling, they nevertheless are proper criteria for the trial court to consider in balancing the equities.
If the trial court determines that the law and facts are so adverse to a plaintiff's position that a final order in his favor is unlikely, it may be justified in denying the temporary injunction because of the inconvenience and harm to the defendant if the injunction were granted. [Cit.]
Lee v. Environmental Pest & Termite Control, 271 Ga. 371, 373(2), 516 S.E.2d 76 (1999). See also Ledbetter Bros. v. Floyd County, 237 Ga. 22(1), 226 S.E.2d 730 (1976). Thus, (Emphasis supplied.) Lee v. Environmental Pest & Termite Control, supra at 373(2), 516 S.E.2d 76.
Under the principle of balancing equities,... an interlocutory injunction should be refused where its grant would operate oppressively on the defendant's rights, especially in such a case that the denial of the temporary injunction would not work "irreparable injury" to the plaintiff or leave the plaintiff "practically remediless" in the event it "should thereafter establish the truth of (its) contention." [Cits.]
McKinnon v. Neugent, 226 Ga. 331, 332, 174 S.E.2d 788 (1970). In this case, the trial court did consider the relative merits of the claims, but did not predicate the denial of the injunction entirely upon its finding that Appellants failed to show a substantial likelihood of success. The order reflects the trial court's additional findings that Appellants were "not likely to suffer immediate and irreparable injury if the interlocutory injunction is not entered" and that the potential "injury to [MARTA] outweighs any harm to" Appellants. Therefore, the trial court applied the correct standard.
The record further shows that, in making its ruling, the trial court adhered to the principle that, American Buildings Co. v. Pascoe Building Systems, 260 Ga. 346, 348(1), 392 S.E.2d 860 (1990). Where, as here, Zant v. Dick, supra at 799-800, 294 S.E.2d 508. Whether the trial court was correct in its application of the law to the undisputed facts remains for determination in this appeal, but there is no merit in Appellants' contention that, in denying the injunction, the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard.
2. The provision of the Georgia Constitution which authorizes the creation of MARTA provides that "the acquisition, establishment, operation or administration of a system of public transportation of passengers for hire within the metropolitan area ... is an essential governmental function and a public purpose...." Art. XVII, Sec. I, Par. I of the Ga. Const. of 1945. Because this constitutional provision "created or authorized the creation of [a] metropolitan rapid transit authorit[y]" and was "in force on the effective date of [the 1983] Constitution," it "continued in force as a part of [that] Constitution...." Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. IV(d) of the Ga. Const. of 1983. Appellants urge that MARTA's agreement with Carter is ultra vires, as the proposed Lindbergh Project is not within the scope of this limited purpose and function.
The constitutional provision "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose...." Art. XVII, Sec. I, Par. V of the Ga. Const. of 1945. Moreover, it authorizes the General Assembly to grant MARTA "such other powers as may be necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of the aforesaid function and purpose." (Emphasis supplied.) Art. XVII, Sec. I, Par. II of the Ga. Const. of 1945. In the exercise of that broad authority, the General Assembly has empowered MARTA to "lease (as lessor), transfer, or dispose [of real property] whenever same is no longer required for [its] purposes...." Ga. L.1965, pp. 2243, 2253, § 8(c). The 47-acre tract surrounding the Lindbergh Station is a MARTA asset, but MARTA has no present need to possess the entirety of that parcel in order to accomplish its rapid transit purpose. By leasing the property to Carter, MARTA intends to convert the real estate into an income-producing asset, with the resulting rent used to fund its existing operations and future expansion. Increasing MARTA's revenue base through the lease of surplus property is in furtherance of its underlying purpose of providing the metropolitan Atlanta area with a functioning rapid transit system. See Concept Capital Corp. v. DeKalb County, 255 Ga. 452, 339 S.E.2d 583 (1986) ( ).
MARTA is authorized to exercise only those powers " Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. MARTA, 253 Ga. 219, 222, 320 S.E.2d 742 (1984). There is no reasonable doubt as to the existence of MARTA's power to lease its excess real property, because such authority is expressly granted by the act creating that entity.
3. Appellants maintain that, even if MARTA has the general constitutional and statutory authority to lease its real property, the agreement with Carter is still invalid because MARTA cannot engage in an independent enterprise of the type usually...
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