Gardiner v. York, 2010 UT App 108 (Utah App. 4/29/2010)
| Decision Date | 29 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20090562-CA. |
| Citation | 2010 UT App 108 |
| Parties | Richard Gardiner, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. William York, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Fourth District, Fillmore Department, 080700055 The Honorable Samuel D. McVey.
William York, Delta, Appellant Pro Se.
James K. Slavens, Fillmore, for Appellee.
Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Voros.
¶ 1 William York appeals from two trial court orders. The first order denied York's motion to set aside the court's 2008 ruling that York had violated the Wrongful Lien Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7 (2005).1 The second order sentenced York to two days in jail for contempt and declared York a "vexatious litigant" subject to restrictions on his ability to file pleadings with the court. We affirm the denial of York's motion to set aside, and we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion respecting the sanctions for contempt and the filing restrictions.
¶ 2 This appeal constitutes the latest episode in nearly a decade of litigation involving these parties. In early August of 2000, Richard Gardiner served Interport, Inc. with a summons and complaint alleging breach of contract, filed in Virginia. See Gardiner v. York (York III), 2006 UT App 496, ¶ 3, 153 P.3d 791; Gardiner v. York (York I), 2006 UT App 433U, para. 5 (mem.) (per curiam). Almost immediately, York, acting as Interport's president, transferred title to a warehouse in Delta, Utah, to his parents, Betty York and William York Sr.2 See York III, 2006 UT App 496, ¶ 3. At the conclusion of the breach of contract action, the Virginia court entered judgment against Interport in the amount of $7182. See id. ¶ 2. Gardiner domesticated that judgment in Utah and then filed a petition with the Utah court, claiming that the transfer to William York Sr. and Betty York was fraudulent. See id. ¶ 3. The trial court entered default judgment against Interport for failure to defend but held a bench trial with Betty York as the only remaining defendant.3 See id. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that York had fraudulently transferred the warehouse to his parents. See York I, 2006 UT App 433U, para. 1. We upheld that decision on appeal.4 See id.
¶ 3 York next filed a lawsuit against Gardiner. The trial court dismissed York's action because it was not brought within the applicable statute of limitations, and we affirmed that decision on appeal. See York v. Gardiner (York II), 2006 UT App 471U, para. 1 (mem.) (per curiam). Two years after his action against Gardiner was dismissed, York filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See York v. Gardiner (York IV), 2009 UT App 277U, paras. 1, 3 (mem.) (per curiam). The trial court denied the motion as untimely; we again affirmed the trial court's decision on appeal. See id.
¶ 4 Despite the final, unfavorable resolution of the issues related to the fraudulent transfer of the warehouse and those related to York's claims against Gardiner, York refused to pay the Virginia judgment. Consequently, Gardiner prepared to enforce his judgment lien against the warehouse. In early 2008, Gardiner obtained a "Certified Foreclosure Report," which showed that in 2005, York had filed a $628,000 "Claim of Lien" against the warehouse. York alleged that the lien secured a similar amount owed to him by his parents.5 On February 13, 2008, Gardiner sent a letter to York warning him that the lien was wrongful and demanding that it be removed. York refused to do so.
¶ 5 On March 24, 2008, Gardiner filed a wrongful lien action against York, which is the subject of this appeal. On April 1, 2008, Gardiner served York with a copy of the complaint and notice of a hearing set for April 3, 2008. York did not attend the April 3 hearing, instead indicating to Gardiner's attorney that he was entitled to twenty days to respond to the complaint and was, therefore, not required to attend. Upon being informed of York's position, the trial court found that Gardiner had provided York with sufficient notice of the hearing and that York's lien was wrongful. On April 21, 2008, the trial court entered a written order directing York to remove the wrongful lien and to pay damages and attorney fees to Gardiner. York did not appeal that order.
¶ 6 Before the wrongful lien order was entered, York filed a motion to dismiss Gardiner's complaint. York's motion was rife with inappropriate material, including accusations that opposing counsel had acted fraudulently; statements that the trial judge had not "taken the time to learn . . . the law"; slurs calling opposing counsel and Gardiner "charlatans" and suggesting that they "re-attend grade school to re-lea[r]n their reading skills"; and claims that the trial judge was guilty of "obvious legal negligence, incompetence, bias and prejudice." After a hearing on September 25, 2008, the trial court denied York's motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that York had received adequate notice of the wrongful lien hearing.6 The trial court also concluded that York should have requested a continuance, rather than simply failing to attend the hearing. York did not file a timely appeal of that order.
¶ 7 Five months later, on February 27, 2009, Gardiner filed a motion for a supplemental hearing to enforce the April 21, 2008 order, to which York responded with a motion to dismiss. Gardiner then filed a motion for rule 11 sanctions, see Utah R. Civ. P. 11, which requested, among other things, that York be barred from further filing written materials without the assistance of a licensed attorney. York then filed a rule 60(b) motion to set aside the wrongful lien order. The trial court denied both York's rule 60(b) motion and Gardiner's motion for sanctions at an April 22, 2009 hearing. In response, York filed a motion to disqualify the trial court judge, accusing him of "bias and prejudice"; giving "special treatment" to his "fellow bar members"; making up evidence; fraud; "violations of the judicial canon, his oath of office, his oath as an attorney, [and] his oath as a Marine"; "criminal activity"; and "corruption." The presiding judge of the district court denied York's motion to disqualify on May 22, 2009.
¶ 8 On May 27, 2009, the trial court, acting on its own motion and without hearing, issued a Finding and Judgment of Contempt (contempt order), in which it referred to York's history of frivolous and disrespectful pleadings and behavior, and found that York's motion to disqualify "clearly enter[ed] the realm of conduct proscribed in Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, 151 P.3d 962." The trial court found York in contempt and sentenced him to two days in jail. The trial court also declared York to be a "vexatious litigant" and as "a further sanction" restricted him from filing any "pleadings or other papers whatsoever in the Utah State District Courts unless the pleading is accompanied by a certificate from a District Court Judge certifying that the paper has potential merit and is not scandalous, vexatious or disrespectful." York has completed his two-day jail sentence.
¶ 9 On May 28, 2009, the trial court entered a written order denying York's motion to set aside the wrongful lien judgment under rule 60(b). York timely appealed the order denying his rule 60(b) motion and the contempt order. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition, which we denied pending plenary consideration. In addition to denying summary disposition, we requested additional briefing on specific issues. Although the briefing provided by the parties, both initially and in response to our request for supplementation, was inadequate, see generally Utah R. App. P. 24 (enumerating briefing requirements), we exercise our discretion to address the issues raised by this appeal, see State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ¶ 8, 1 P.3d 1108 (). We do so to give guidance to trial courts struggling with the difficulties presented by unruly litigants. Thus, we now address the issues raised in this fifth appeal concerning a dispute that began a decade ago over $7182.
¶ 10 York challenges the court's denial of his rule 60(b) motion to set aside, claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We have previously explained that
[a]n appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals.
Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ¶ 19, 2 P.3d 451 (emphasis omitted) (quoting James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999)). However, State v. All Real Prop., 2001 UT App 361, ¶ 5, 37 P.3d 276 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 11 York also maintains that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of contempt and in imposing sanctions against him. "We review a trial court's exercise of its contempt power to determine whether it exceeded the scope of its lawful discretion," Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ¶ 39, 100 P.3d 1151, which "is subject to constitutional and statutory restraints regarding [due process]," Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 36, 123 P.3d 416 (internal...
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