Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n., 20050806.

• Citation: 151 P.3d 962,2007 UT 2
• Decision Date: 12 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 20050805.,No. 20050806.,20050806.,20050805.
• Parties: Paul Howard PETERS, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME ASSOCIATION aka Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association and as Pine Meadow Ranch Association, Defendant and Respondent. Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, L.L.C., Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association aka Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association and as Pine Meadow Ranch Association, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah

151 P.3d 962

2007 UT 2

Paul Howard PETERS, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME ASSOCIATION aka Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association and as Pine Meadow Ranch Association, Defendant and Respondent.

Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, L.L.C., Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Association aka Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association and as Pine Meadow Ranch Association, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 20050806.

No. 20050805.

Supreme Court of Utah.

January 12, 2007.

Boyd Kimball Dyer, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Edwin C. Barnes, Walter A. Romney, Jr., Salt Lake City, for defendant.

DURRANT, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 We granted certiorari in these two related cases to review the issue of whether the beneficiary of a trust has authority to impose binding covenants, conditions, and restrictions on real property held in trust. We decline to reach this issue, however, because petitioners' briefs in each case are replete with unfounded accusations impugning the integrity of the court of appeals panel that heard the cases below. These accusations include allegations, both direct and indirect, that the panel intentionally fabricated evidence, intentionally misstated the holding of a case, and acted with improper motives. Further, petitioners' briefs are otherwise disrespectful of the judiciary. Accordingly, we strike petitioners' briefs as containing irrelevant and scandalous matters in violation of rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, affirm the result reached by the court of appeals in each case, and assess attorney fees against petitioners' counsel. Because we have not considered the certiorari question in either case and have not taken the opportunity to review the merits of the court of appeals' decisions, we limit those decisions to their facts and deem them without precedential effect.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 These cases share in large measure a complex and interesting set of facts that because of the conduct of counsel (the same lawyer represented the petitioners in both cases), is made irrelevant to our resolution of either case. Accordingly, we give only a brief overview here. A more detailed recitation of the facts can be found in the court of appeals' opinions.¹

¶ 3 In 1965, F.E. and Mae P. Bates deeded a large tract of land in Summit County to "Security Title Company" as "Trustee." Respondent Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owner's Association (the "Association") seeks to levy fees against each petitioner to maintain roadways and other improvements in subdivisions that were established on this tract of land and in which the petitioners now own property. The Association seeks to levy such fees against Petitioner Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, L.L.C. ("Forest Meadow") based on covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC & Rs") purportedly imposed by Deseret Diversified Development ("Deseret") in 1971. The Association seeks to levy such fees against Petitioner Paul Howard Peters based on CC & Rs purportedly imposed by Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. ("PMRI") in 1973.

¶ 4 The petitioners brought these actions to have the CC & Rs declared invalid. In both cases, the district court granted summary judgment to the Association, concluding that the CC & Rs were effective based on various legal and equitable principles. The petitioners appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the district court's determinations that Deseret and PMRI had the authority as beneficial owners to impose the CC & Rs.² The court of appeals also concluded that even if Deseret or PMRI had lacked such authority as beneficial owners, Security had ratified the CC & Rs as trustee.³ We granted certiorari to consider whether Deseret and PMRI had the authority as beneficial owners to impose binding CC & Rs. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a), (5).

¶ 5 In his briefs in support of Peters's and Forest Meadow's petitions for certiorari, and in his briefs to us following our grants of certiorari, counsel accuses the court of appeals panel that heard the cases below of judicial misconduct. This accusation stems largely from the court of appeals' statement that W. Brent Jensen signed a plat on behalf of both Deseret and Security.⁴ The court of appeals erred in making this statement. In fact, W. Brent Jensen signed on behalf of Deseret, and Leo D. Jensen signed on behalf of Security. Based on this error, petitioners' counsel accuses the court of appeals panel of intentionally fabricating evidence. He further contends that the error was motivated by some improper motive. He offers no support for these accusations of impropriety beyond the mere fact that the error occurred.

¶ 6 Additionally, counsel accuses the court of appeals of misstating the holding in Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell.⁵ Indeed, the court of appeals did err in its interpretation of this case. But counsel goes beyond demonstrating the error. He contends that this error, too, was intentional and the product of an improper motive by the court of appeals. Again, he offers no support for this accusation beyond the purported error itself.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 Petitioners' counsel was fully entitled to note the factual error made by the court of appeals with respect to the signatories to the plat. Indeed, it was his obligation as an advocate to do so. So, too, was it fully appropriate for counsel to assert that the court of appeals had incorrectly interpreted the Capital Assets case. Indeed, to address errors of fact and law is the very purpose of the appellate process. But to argue that a court has committed an error is one thing; to argue that a court has intentionally committed that error due to an improper motive is quite another. There is a light year's difference between an innocent mistake of fact or law and the intentional fabrication of evidence or the intentional misstatement of a holding.

¶ 8 Should a lawyer be faced with genuine judicial misconduct, there are appropriate avenues available for him or her to address it, both within the context of a particular case and in a separate proceeding before the Judicial Conduct Commission. To make bald and unfounded accusations of judicial impropriety in briefs filed with this court is not such an avenue. In so doing, counsel has overstepped the bounds of appropriate appellate advocacy.

¶ 9 Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[a]ll briefs under this rule must be . . . free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, . . . and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer."⁶ Counsel's unfounded accusations regarding the supposed improper motives of the court of appeals panel are irrelevant to the questions upon which we granted certiorari. Further, those accusations are scandalous in that they are defamatory and offensive to propriety.⁷

¶ 10 In his briefs, counsel argues that the court of appeals panel that decided these cases committed both legal and factual errors. As noted, it was fully appropriate for counsel to do so. But he has taken the additional step of claiming that these errors were intentional and the result of improper motives. In support of these accusations, counsel offers nothing beyond the fact that the errors were made.

¶ 11 That unsupported accusations of this kind are inappropriate should have been apparent to counsel. Rule 8.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make a public statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. . . ."⁸ Further, standard 3 of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility provides that "[l]awyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to . . . the court improper motives, purpose, or conduct."⁹ Finally, standard 1 provides that "lawyers shall treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner."¹⁰

¶ 12 Counsel's briefs before this court in both Forest Meadow and Peters include a substantial amount of material that is offensive, inappropriate, and disrespectful, and his conduct in either case, standing alone, violates rule 24(k) and warrants the sanctions we impose. In Forest Meadow, these accusations include the following:

• Good judges never fabricate evidence because the actual evidence is the foundation for their decisions.

• [I]f judges start with decision [sic] they want to reach for reasons of prejudice, bias, corruption or whatever, and then work backwards to the evidence, they may fabricate the evidence they need to make their decisions plausible. Petitioner respectfully asks the Court to judge for itself what happened in this case.

• [The authoring judge] needed evidence to justify her decision that W. Brent Jensen was the trust beneficiary in 1965. There was no such evidence, so she simply fabricated it sua sponte.

• This was no innocent mistake.

• The Court might want to think about the question Petitioner's President asked when he read [the authoring judge's] opinion. "Everyone knows Brent Jensen was never president of Security Title, so why did she do this to me, is it because I'm German, is it because I'm not Mormon?" The only right way to deal with his "why" question is for this Court to grant certiorari and make it moot.

• [F]or the Court of Appeals to dispose of a case on the basis of prejudice, bias, corruption or any basis other than the actual evidence in the record was to deny Petitioner due process of law.

• The Court of Appeals then goes on to say that Security transferred title to the lots in Plat D to Deseret to develop, but that is another fabrication.

• No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of Appeal's holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the...