Gardner & Meeks Co. v. N.Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1905
• Citation: 72 N.J.L. 257,62 A. 416
• Parties: GARDNER & MEEKS CO. v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

62 A. 416

72 N.J.L. 257

GARDNER & MEEKS CO.

v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 20, 1905.

Error to Circuit Court, Hudson County. Action by the Gardner & Meeks Company against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant railroad company brings error. Affirmed.

Edmund W. Wakelee and Vredenburgh, Wall & Van Winkle, for plaintiff in error. Charles E. Hendrickson, Jr., for defendant in error.

PITNEY, J. This is an action upon a mechanic's lien claim brought by the Gardner & Meeks Company (plaintiff below) against the Chert Stone Company, as builder, and the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, as owner. The latter company alone made defense, and the only controversy raised was under its statutory plea that the building and lands in question were not liable to the builder's debt. Upon the trial in the circuit court it appeared that the railroad company had made a written contract with one Crowe for erecting the building in question and furnishing the materials therefor. This contract was not filed until after the materials in question in this suit were furnished. Crowe made a subcontract with the Chert Stone Company for the execution of a part of his contract with the railroad company, including the furnishing of materials. The stone company in undertaking to perform their subcontract, purchased of the plaintiffs the materials upon which their mechanic's lien claim is based. The sole ground of defense was that a mechanic's lien cannot be claimed in favor of a person supplying materials to a subcontractor, but that the right of lien, under the first section of the mechanic's lien law (P. L. 1898, p. 538), is restricted to the principal contractor and to those who do work for him and furnish materials directly to him.

The language of the section is broad. It declares that every building shall be liable for the payment of any debt contracted and owing to any person for labor performed or materials furnished for the erection and construction thereof, which debt shall be a lien on such building, etc. In Van Pelt v. Hartough, 31 N. J. Law, 332, Beasley, C. J., declared: "This provision is so comprehensive that, if it had been left unconfined by subsequent restrictions, a lien would have been given to all persons who, under any circumstances whatever, performed any labor in the erection of a building, or whose materials entered into its structure." In Murphey-Hardy Lumber Co. v. Nicholas, 66 N. J. Law at page 417, 49 Atl. at page 449, Justice Collins said: "The normal effect of this legislation is to subject lands upon which a building is erected, by authority of the owner, to a lien in favor of any one who furnishes labor or materials therefor. To limit this effect strict compliance with the proviso of the second section of the act is essential." In Coddington v. Drydock Co., 31 N. J. Law at page 482, Justice Vredenburgh, speaking for this court, put the rationale of the mechanic's lien upon its fundamental basis, viz.: "To hold a lien on the estate of the owner of the building in the land, on account of the increased value given by the building to the land, and the natural injustice there is in the owner of the land appropriating to his use, without compensation, the toil and capital of others." It is true that under the language of the first section of our mechanic's lien law it has been held that, if materials are furnished for the erection of a building, the mere fact that they are not used in the building does not defeat the lien thereon. Morris County Bank v. Rockaway Mfg. Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 189, cited with approval in Campbell v. Taylor Mfg. Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 347, 51 Atl. 723. But this does not at all impair the force of the view declared by Justice Vredenburgh.

The argument for the plaintiff in error lays especial stress upon the words "contracted and owing" in the first section of the act. It is insisted that this expression limits the benefit of the first section to those whose debts are contracted by one who has authority to contract such indebtedness. While it is conceded that the master builder may subject the building to a lien for a debt contracted by him, it is insisted that his subcontractor cannot do the like. This argument proves too much, for, if the force of the first section is to limit the lien to debts contracted by persons who, in the absence of the statute, would have authority to bind the land, it would debar all claims saving such as were contracted by the owner himself. It is manifest that the Legislature had no such intent, for section 2, by limiting the lien to the contractor alone where the contract is in writing and properly placed on file, distinctly recognizes that in the absence of that formality there may be a lien by virtue of section 1 in favor of parties not standing in privity of contract with the owner. Section 16 (page 543) which prescribes the form of the lien claim, plainly recognizes that the party contracting the debt may be some other person than the owner of the land, or his immediate contractor, for it not only requires a separate statement of the...