Anderson v. Great Northern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1914
• Citation: 138 P. 127,25 Idaho 433
• Parties: A. J. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY CO., Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

138 P. 127

25 Idaho 433

A. J. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY CO., Respondent

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 19, 1914

LABORER'S LIEN-LABOR UPON RAILROAD TIES-LOGGER'S LIEN FOR GROCERIES AND SUPPLIES-TIES INCLUDED IN TIMBER-TITLE TO ACT NOT QUESTIONED AFTER SECTION INCLUDED IN REVISED CODES-SECTIONS 5125 AND 5140 CONSTRUED-CHAP. 226, 1911 SESS. LAWS, HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL-DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

1. Sec 5125 of the Rev. Codes which provides that "every person performing labor upon, or who shall assist in obtaining or securing, saw-logs, spars, piles, cordwood, or other timber or in obtaining or securing the same," is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to confer a lien upon laborers who work in the employ of a contractor in moving a large quantity of railroad ties a distance of a couple hundred feet from the place where they were piled upon the railroad company's right of way and loading them upon cars for transportation.

2. Held, further, that the statute, sec. 5125, confers the same lien in favor of every person "performing labor upon" saw-logs, etc., as it confers on every person who assists in "obtaining or securing" such material.

3. A statute (sec. 5125) which confers a lien in favor of laborers who perform work upon or aid in obtaining or securing "saw-logs, spars, piles, cordwood, or other timber," is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to confer a lien in favor of persons who work upon or assist in obtaining or securing railroad ties, and the words "other timber" are sufficiently comprehensive to include ties.

4. Sec 5140 of the Rev. Codes, which provides for the recovery of damages from anyone who eloigns certain property on which a lien exists for labor performed, is held constitutional and valid.

5. Where a section of a legislative act has been incorporated in the Revised Codes and adopted as a part of the complete statutes of the state, the court will not inquire into or consider the sufficiency of the original title of the act in which such section was originally adopted by the legislature. In such case, it is too late to raise the sufficiency of the title to the original act which was adopted prior to the date of its incorporation and adoption in the Revised Codes of the state.

6. Held, that sec. 5140 of the Rev. Codes is not obnoxious to sec. 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution as depriving anyone of his property without due process of law or denying him the equal protection of the laws.

7. The purpose and intent of sec. 5140 of the Rev. Codes is to render every person who injures, destroys or removes any of the property therein described on which a lien exists liable for the amount of the claim held against the property, or if the property be of less value than the lien claimed, then it allows the claimant the damages which he has sustained by reason of the removal or destruction of the particular property.

8. Held, that chap. 226 of the 1911 Session Laws is invalid void and inoperative, for the reason that it does not provide for any notice to the owner of the property on which the lien is to attach, and affords him no means or method of protecting himself against such claim, and does not provide a method of procedure for taking his property for such claim by "due process of law" and does not give such property owner the "equal protection of the law."

9. No process is "due process" which does not give notice, either actual or constructive, and no taking of property for debt is lawful unless the debt has been created with the knowledge and consent of the debtor.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District for Bonner County. Hon. John M. Flynn, Judge.

Action to establish certain liens against railroad ties and to assess the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the eloignment of the ties by the defendant and to have the amount of damages trebled. Judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Reversed.

Judgment reversed as to the first six causes of action and case remanded, with direction, and judgment affirmed as to the seventh cause of action. Appellant awarded six-sevenths of the taxable costs of this appeal.

G. H. Martin, for Appellant.

The lien in favor of these six men was created and came into existence when the work was done. The filing of the statement of the claims for the lien does not create the lien but merely perpetuates it. (25 Cyc. 1588; Viles v. Green, 91 Wis. 217, 64 N.W. 856; Day v. Green, 63 Ore. 293, 127 P. 772.)

Because of the presence of the words "cordwood" and "shingle bolts" preceding the words "or other timber," it was held that a person performing labor upon or who assisted in obtaining and securing any other completely manufactured product was entitled to a lien. (Forsberg v. Lundgren, 64 Wash. 427, 117 P. 244.)

The decision of the Washington court under a statute from which our own was copied can leave no doubt but that the words "other timber" in sec. 5125, preceded by the words "cordwood," require a construction to be placed thereon which includes every other species of manufactured product.

The laws giving the right to a lien on logs and lumber for services or supplies rendered in connection therewith are constitutional. (25 Cyc. 1581; 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 350.)

"Although an act from which a section of the code was taken is subject to the constitutional objection, that it contains matter different from that embraced in the title, this defect in the act does not render the section of the code invalid." (26 Cyc. 1068.)

Practically every state that has any lumber industry at all has placed in its code statutory provisions which give to the laborer a lien for the labor performed in the manufacture and transportation of timber products, and some of the states have provided for the creation of liens for supplies furnished to contractors engaged in manufacturing or transporting timber products. Georgia, New Hampshire and Wisconsin each have supply lien laws. (Chap. 14, Jones on Liens; Stacy v. Bryant, 73 Wis. 14, 40 N.W. 632; St. Croix Timber Co. v. Joseph, 142 Wis. 55, 124 N.W. 1049.)

In the case of Jones v. Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 30 C. C. A. 108, will be found a full, complete and able discussion of the constitutionality of a lien law of Ohio, which the supreme court of Ohio had held invalid on the same grounds assigned by respondent here, and which the federal court, through Circuit Judge Lurton, holds to be valid and not in contravention of the due process clause of the federal constitution. (Affirmed by U. S. supreme court in Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 24 S.Ct. 576, 48 L.Ed. 778. See, also, 4 Ann. Cas. 620, and note, and 24 Ann. Cas. 339, and note.)

A mechanic's lien law, when so construed as to give a lien for a debt due to a person further removed from the owner than the first subcontractor, is not unconstitutional as depriving the owner of his property without due process of law, or as interfering with the liberty of acquiring, possessing and protecting his property. (Gardner & Meeks Co. v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 72 N.J.L. 257, 62 A. 416; Snyder v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 72 N.J.L. 262, 62 A. 418.)

A statute which subjects property to a lien charged for the payment of a claim of a subcontractor against the principal contractor for labor and materials used in the building or improvement without regard to the condition of the account between the owner and the principal contractor does not deprive the owner of property without due process of law. If a subcontractor's liens are enforced by judgment under the statute and the judgment is collected by sale of the property or paid by the owner to save his property, the statute gives such owner a remedy by action against the principal contractor for all sums so paid by the owner in excess of the amount unpaid to the principal contractor. (Mallory v. La Crosse Abattoir Co., 80 Wis. 170, 49 N.W. 1071; Henry etc. Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo. 47, 10 S.W. 868, 3 L. R. A. 332.)

C. S. Albert, H. H. Taylor and Thos. Balmer, for Respondent.

Lien statutes should receive neither a liberal nor a strict construction, but should be construed to embrace such cases as were clearly within the contemplation of the legislature and to exclude the cases which it is evident the legislature did not have in mind. (Jones on Liens, sec. 105; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 24; Hutchins v. Blaisdell, 106 Me. 92, 75 A. 291.)

Since the statute before us does not expressly provide for a lien on railroad ties, we must consider whether they are included among "other timber." (25 Cyc. 1545; Jones on Liens, secs. 731, 732.)

"Logs, spars, piles, cordwood and other timber" are "obtained or secured" within the meaning of sec. 5125 when they come into the possession of the purchaser, even though the point of delivery be distant from the market and it require further transportation to get them to the point of consumption or beneficial use. (McGeorge v. Stanton-De Long Lumber Co., 131 Wis. 7, 110 N.W. 788.)

The provision giving a lien to the cook is proof of the legislature's intent to confine the application of the statute to work performed in the logging camps. As to the meaning of the words "obtain or secure," see Ryan v. Guilfoil, 13 Wash. 373, 43 P. 351.

The act in which sec. 5140 was enacted was given a specific title which was not made broad enough to embrace the subject treated in said section. (Gerding v. Board of County Commrs., 13 Idaho 444, 90 P. 357; Megins v Duluth, 97 Minn. 23, 106 N.W. 89; Somerset County Commrs. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 81 N.E. 1109; Memphis St. R. Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460; ...