Gardner v. Appellate Div. of the Superior Court
| Citation | 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 58,6 Cal.5th 998,436 P.3d 946 |
| Decision Date | 28 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | S246214 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
| Parties | Christopher GARDNER, as Public Defender, etc., Petitioner, v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF the SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest. |
Phyllis K. Morris and Christopher Gardner, Public Defenders, and Stephan J. Willms, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
Steven Harmon, Public Defender (Riverside) and Laura Arnold, Deputy Public Defender, for Law Offices of the Public Defender County of Riverside and California Public Defenders Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
O'Melveny & Myers, Brett J. Williamson and Ryan W. Rutledge, Newport Beach, for the Innocence Project, the California Innocence Project, the Project for the Innocent at Loyola Law School, the Northern California Innocence Project, the University of San Francisco Criminal & Juvenile Justice Clinic, the American University Washington College of Law Criminal Justice Clinic, Professor Lara Bazelon and Professor Jenny Roberts as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Robert L. Driessen for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
With the help of court-appointed counsel, a criminal defendant facing misdemeanor charges filed a successful motion to suppress the prosecution’s evidence against her. The prosecution appealed. The question is whether the defendant is entitled to the help of appointed counsel in responding to the prosecution’s appeal of the suppression order. Based on article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, we conclude the answer is yes.
This case arises from the criminal prosecution of Ruth Zapata Lopez, who was charged by misdemeanor complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol ( Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a) ) and driving while having a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher ( id. , § 23152, subd. (b) ). The complaint also alleged that Lopez had suffered a prior conviction for driving while having a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher. The charges against Lopez are punishable by confinement in county jail. (See id. , § 23540, subd. (a) []; see also id. , § 23542, subd. (a)(1)(B) [].)
The petitioner in this case is the Public Defender of San Bernardino County, whom the superior court appointed to represent Lopez.1 (See Pen. Code, § 987, subd. (a) ; see also id. , § 987.2, subd. (i).)2 On behalf of Lopez, petitioner filed a motion under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress evidence collected during a warrantless traffic stop. The court conducted a limited hearing on the motion, during which Lopez was assisted by a Spanish language interpreter. Petitioner argued that the traffic stop leading to Lopez’s detention was invalid, rendering the subsequent search unlawful. The court agreed and granted the motion to suppress.
The court then dismissed the underlying case under Penal Code section 1385. ( Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (a) [].)
The prosecution appealed the suppression order to the appellate division of the superior court. (See Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (j) [].) Questions promptly arose as to who, if anyone, would represent Lopez in responding to the appeal. Petitioner took the view that the public defender’s office was no longer obligated to represent Lopez,3 and asked the appellate division to appoint new counsel to represent her.4 The appellate division refused. Court clerks informed petitioner that, as the respondent in a misdemeanor appeal, Lopez was not eligible for appointment of appellate counsel. In an e-mail to a member of the office, a clerk also wrote that, in the court’s view, the public defender " ‘is still counsel’ " for Lopez. ( Morris v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 636, 654, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 749 ( Morris ).)
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the appellate division. The petition asked the court to direct the superior court "to appoint counsel for all indigent appellees in all misdemeanor criminal appeals," as well as to issue a judgment declaring that the superior court "may not appoint the Public Defender to represent indigent appellees in misdemeanor criminal appeals, or declare the Public Defender to remain appointed in cases where the Public Defender previously represented an indigent appellee in the Superior Court." The appellate division summarily denied the petition. Petitioner then sought a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, which also issued a summary denial. This court granted review and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to show cause.
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal again denied the petition. Without addressing whether the public defender remains appointed to represent Lopez, the Court of Appeal held that Lopez neither has the right to appointment of counsel under court rules nor a constitutional entitlement to be represented by counsel on appeal. ( Morris , supra , 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 644, 653, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 749.)
The Court of Appeal explained that the appellate division had been correct as to court rules: While the California Rules of Court provide for the appointment of appellate counsel for an indigent criminal defendant "convicted of a misdemeanor" ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.851(a)(1), (2) ), the rules make no provision for the appointment of appellate counsel to represent a misdemeanor defendant who, like Lopez, has not yet been convicted. ( Morris , supra , 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 644, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 749.) The court went on to consider whether, notwithstanding the limited scope of the court rules, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require that Lopez be represented by counsel if she so chooses. The court answered that question in the negative. As an initial matter, the court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel does not apply in appellate proceedings; the right to appellate counsel is instead governed by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Morris , at p. 645, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 749.) But in any event, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments alike, the right to counsel applies only when the defendant may lose his or her physical liberty as a direct consequence of the action. ( Morris , at pp. 646–647, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 749.) Here, the court opined, that is not the case; even if no counsel is appointed for purposes of the appeal, Lopez faces no deprivation of "the right to be free from uncounseled imprisonment" "since she will be represented at trial even if the People prevail in the appellate division." ( Id. at p. 647, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 749.)
We granted review.
Before turning to the merits, we address a threshold issue concerning the legal framework for our decision. In their initial briefing before this court, the parties focused on the scope of the right to counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That amendment, which is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, gives an indigent defendant facing incarceration the right to court-appointed counsel for his or her defense. ( Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 342–343, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 ( Gideon ).)
But in California courts, the federal Constitution is not the sole source of a criminal defendant’s right to representation. Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, too, guarantees a right to "the assistance of counsel for the defendant’s defense" in a "criminal cause." ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Much like its federal counterpart, article I, section 15 has been understood to confer a right to state-appointed counsel for indigent defendants. ( Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301, 110 Cal.Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273 ( Mills ); In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 329–330, 42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420 ( Johnson ).) But it has also been understood to extend more broadly than its federal counterpart, particularly in relation to misdemeanor cases like this one. (Compare Alabama v. Shelton (2002) 535 U.S. 654, 661–662, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 ( Shelton ) [], with Mills , at p. 301, 110 Cal.Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273 [].) To implement the state constitutional guarantee, the Legislature has enacted several statutory provisions governing the appointment of counsel for defendants facing both felony and misdemeanor charges. (See Pen. Code, §§ 686, 987, subd. (a), 987.2, subd. (i).)
Because of its importance to full consideration of the issue before us, we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs regarding the relevance of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. We now conclude that article I, section 15 is dispositive of the question presented. Our holding makes it unnecessary for us to decide whether the same result would obtain under the federal Constitution.
Under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, a defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel is not limited to trial, but instead extends to other, "critical" stages of the criminal...
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