Gardner v. Denison

• Decision Date: 21 May 1914
• Parties: GARDNER v. DENISON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

217 Mass. 492

105 N.E. 359

GARDNER v. DENISON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 21, 1914

COUNSEL

J. L. P. St. Coeur and George H. Mellen, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Hamilton & Eaton, of Boston, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

The facts upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover are these His father, who was on friendly terms with the defendant's testator, Edward Gerrish, told the latter, in November, 1900, that the birth of a child was expected in his family. Mr. Gerrish, after several interviews, promised that if a boy should be born and named for him, Edward Gerrish Gardner, he would make some provision for the child. When the child was born, on January 1, 1901, he was named for the defendant's testator. On January 23, 1901, the plaintiff's father, at the request of Mr. Gerrish, wrote at the latter's dictation the following:

'Jan 23, 1901.

'I, Edward Gerrish, promise to place in trust for Joseph A. Gardner's youngest son, born Jan. 1, 1901, $10,000, for naming his son after me.

Edward Gerrish Gardner.'

No specific sum of money had been mentioned before. Mr. Gerrish then signed the paper in the presence of the plaintiff's father, who since has had the possession and control of it. Mr. Gerrish later lived in the family of the plaintiff's father and showed special attention to the child, bestowing many gifts upon him and constantly referring to him as 'my boy.' He died in 1906 at the age of 64 years, leaving an estate of more than $200,000, never having made any provision for the benefit of the plaintiff.

The privilege of naming a child is a valid consideration for a promise to pay money. The child had a direct and immediate interest in his name and is more affected by it than any one else. He loses the opportunity of receiving a more advantageoud name, and is compelled to bear whatever detriment may flow from the name imposed upon him. The consideration moves in part from the child, although he is not in a position personally to yield an assent to the promise at the time it is made. It is a general rule that one who is not a party to a contract cannot bring an action on it even though it be made for his benefit. But the circumstances of the parties respecting the naming of a child are so peculiar, the nearness of the relation so great, and the obligation resting on the father and mother so important, and the consequence to the child so vital, that the inference may be drawn that the father is acting in the interests of and as agent for the son in making any contract as to giving him a name. Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287, as interpreted by Marston v. Bigelow, 150 Mass. 45, 53 22 N.E. 71, 5 L. R. A. 43. It was said in Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218, at 220, 42 N.E. 1127, 52 Am. St. Rep. 511, respecting...