Gardner v. Gardner

• Decision Date: 08 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 285A92,285A92
• Citation: 334 N.C. 662,435 S.E.2d 324
• Parties: Jacqueline Harrington GARDNER, Administratrix of the Estate of Seth Campbell Gardner, Jacqueline Harrington Gardner, Individually v. Benjamin A. GARDNER.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 324

435 S.E.2d 324

334 N.C. 662

Jacqueline Harrington GARDNER, Administratrix of the Estate of Seth Campbell Gardner, Jacqueline Harrington Gardner, Individually v. Benjamin A. GARDNER.

No. 285A92.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 8, 1993.

Gaskins and Gaskins, P.A. by Herman E. Gaskins, Jr., Washington, for plaintiff-appellee.

Baker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, P.A. by Ronald G. Baker and R.B. Daly, Jr., Ashoskie, for defendant-appellant.

Nichols, Caffrey, Hill, Evans & Murrelle by Richard L. Pinto, Greensboro, for amicus curiae NC Ass'n of Defense Attys.

WHICHARD, Justice.

This case presents the question whether a mother who is not present at the scene of a car accident in which her child is injured may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) when she suffers mental anguish upon being informed of the accident, rushing to the hospital where she observes resuscitative efforts by emergency personnel upon her child, and later learning of her child's death. We hold that because the pleadings and forecast of evidence fail to establish the reasonable foreseeability of her injury, she cannot, and we therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for reinstatement of the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's NIED claim with prejudice.

On 18 August 1990, thirteen-year-old Seth Campbell Gardner was injured when the truck being driven by his father, defendant Benjamin Gardner, ran into a bridge abutment on a rural road near Greenville. The accident occurred several miles away from the home of Seth's maternal grandmother, where his mother, plaintiff Jacqueline Gardner, was residing. Upon learning of the accident by telephone, plaintiff went directly to the emergency room at Pitt County Memorial Hospital. About five minutes after she arrived, she saw her son wheeled into the emergency room and observed emergency room personnel applying resuscitative techniques to him. The boy was taken immediately to a treatment room, and plaintiff was taken to a private waiting room. Plaintiff did not see her son again but periodically was advised of his condition. Some time later plaintiff was told that her son had died and was requested to donate his organs.

In her capacity as administratrix plaintiff sued defendant for the wrongful death of their minor son, and in her individual capacity she sued him for negligent infliction of emotional distress. She alleged that she suffered severe emotional distress and, as a result, has sought and received professional counseling; that the injury to her son and emotional distress she suffered were caused by defendant's negligence; and that it was reasonably foreseeable that defendant's negligent conduct would cause her severe emotional distress.

The trial court treated defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. For purposes of that motion the parties stipulated that their son had died as a result of defendant's negligence and that plaintiff had suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the accident and death. The trial court granted summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim for NIED and dismissed that claim with prejudice. It ruled that, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not establish a claim for NIED because she did not witness the accident nor was she in sufficiently close proximity thereto to satisfy the "foreseeability factors" set forth in Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's emotional distress as a result of defendant's negligence was foreseeable. Emphasizing that the Ruark factors were not requirements for foreseeability but were "to be considered on the question of foreseeability," the court stated:

In common experience, a parent who sees its mortally injured child soon after an accident, albeit at another place, perceives the danger to the child's life, and experiences those agonizing hours preceding the awful message of death may be at no less risk of suffering a similar degree of emotional distress than ... a parent who is actually exposed to the scene of the accident.

Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C.App. 635, 639, 418 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1992). The court held that defendant "could have reasonably foreseen that his negligence might be a direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress," id., and it accordingly reversed the trial court.

Judge Eagles dissented on the grounds that plaintiff did not observe and was not in close proximity to the negligent act and therefore "failed to establish sufficient proximity to satisfy the foreseeability requirements of Ruark." Id. at 640, 418 S.E.2d at 263 (Eagles, J., dissenting). Defendant appealed to this Court as a matter of right based on the dissent. N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (1989).

Summary judgment can be sustained only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1990). "[I]ts purpose is to eliminate formal trials where only questions of law are involved." Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971). It is, however, "a drastic measure, and it should be used with caution." Williams v. Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 402, 250 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1979). Notwithstanding, "summary judgment ... is proper where the evidence fails to establish negligence on the part of defendant ... or establishes that the alleged negligent conduct was not the [foreseeable and] proximate cause of [plaintiff's] injury." Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 355, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985) (quoting Williams v. Power & Light Co., 36 N.C.App. 146, 147, 243 S.E.2d 143, 144, rev'd on factual grounds, 296 N.C. 400, 250 S.E.2d 255 (1979)).

In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85, we concluded that an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress had its roots in one hundred years of North Carolina jurisprudence, beginning with Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890). We noted that Young and, subsequently, Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916), permitted a cause of action for emotional distress arising not from a plaintiff's concern for his own welfare, but from his concern for that of another. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 296, 395 S.E.2d at 93. From these cases we concluded that in order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a "plaintiff need not allege or prove any physical impact, physical injury, or physical manifestation of emotional distress." Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The only requisite allegations were "that (1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress ..., and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress." Id. " '[S]evere emotional distress,' " we specified, "means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so." Id. The touchstone for whether a plaintiff may recover for NIED is whether "the plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered such severe emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence." Id. To guide the determination of whether the plaintiff's injury was a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence, we suggested three factors to be considered: " the plaintiff's proximity to the negligent act, the relationship between the plaintiff and the other person for whose welfare the plaintiff is concerned, and whether the plaintiff personally observed the negligent act." Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. Notably, these factors were not termed "elements" of the claim. They were neither requisites nor exclusive determinants in an assessment of foreseeability, but they focused on some facts that could be particularly relevant in any one case in determining the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. Whatever their weight in this determination, we stressed that "[q]uestions of foreseeability and proximate cause must be determined under all the facts presented" in each case. Id. (emphasis added).

In this case the parties stipulated to two of the three factors necessary to state a claim for NIED. They agreed that their minor son died as a result of defendant's negligence and that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the accident and the death of her son. The third requisite factor--that it was reasonably foreseeable defendant's conduct would cause plaintiff's severe emotional distress--is the crux of this appeal. In order to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to this question, we must look at all of the facts guided by the factors suggested in Ruark.

Plaintiff here, like the plaintiffs in Ruark, alleges that she is the parent of the child who died as a result of defendant's negligence. Plaintiff was not, however,...