Gardner v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority

• Decision Date: 25 February 1965
• Citation: 204 N.E.2d 887,348 Mass. 532
• Parties: Alfred GARDNER et al. v. MASSACHUSETTS TURNPIKE AUTHORITY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 887

204 N.E.2d 887

348 Mass. 532

Alfred GARDNER et al. v. MASSACHUSETTS TURNPIKE AUTHORITY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 8, 1965.

Decided Feb. 25, 1965.

J. Joseph Maloney, Jr., Boston, for respondent Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.

Dennis L. Ditelberg, Boston, for respondent Lee J. Schnackenberg.

Marshall Simonds, boston (Donald N. Sweeney, Boston, with him), for petitioners.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, and SPIEGEL, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

In this petition for attachment for contempt the petitioners are the members of the Massachusetts Crime Commission, so called, established pursuant to Res.1962, c. 146. The respondents are the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, established by St.1952, c. 354, as amended, and one Britton and one Schnackenberg, employees of the Authority, summoned as witnesses by the Commission. In a previous proceeding for the enforcement of process by the Commission against the Authority and five of its employees, two of whom were Britton and Schnackenberg, our order concluded: 'The rescript to the county court shall direct that an order issue requiring the attendance of the five witnesses before the Commission for the purposes stated in the respective summonses and that the respondent Britton bring records and answer questions, all in accordance with this opinion. * * * The county court in its order will therefore retain jurisdiction with leave to the parties, or any agents, representatives, or employees of the Authority who may become parties by intervention to apply upon motion and short notice for additional relief as occasion may arise.' GARDNER V. MASSACHUSETTS TURNPIKE AUTHY. 347 MASS. ----, 199 N.E.2D 186, 195^A.

Pursuant to the decree Schnackenberg, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Authority, and Britton, the custodian of its minutes, appeared at separate hearings of the Commission on June 15, 1964. Each was accompanied by a lawyer, and counsel for the Authority also was in attendance advising Britton. The hearings were conducted by the one member present, who was the chairman, Alfred Gardner. The Authority, through Britton and its counsel, refused to produce its minutes, and Britton and Schnackenberg refused to answer any questions. The sole ground given for refusal was the absence of a majority of the seven members.

Thereafter a single justice heard (1) motions for further relief by Schnackenberg and the Authority, (2) a petition for attachment for contempt by the Commission, and (3) motions to strike and to dismiss the petition by Britton and the Authority, respectively. All the matters were disposed of by a final decree. The motions and the prayer in the petition that the respondents be adjudged in contempt were denied; the prayer in the petition for further relief was granted; and the decree contained an order which in effect required various respondents to answer specific questions, to testify on enumerated subjects, and to produce specified volumes of the minutes of the Authority. The concluding statement of the decree was 'That any single member of the commission may conduct a hearing and when so doing may represent and have the authority of the commission in the reception of evidence and the conduct of the hearing.' The respondents Schnackenberg and the Authority appealed from the final decree.

The Commission was established with powers of the broadest character: 'That an unpaid special commission to consist of seven members appointed by the governor is hereby established to investigate and study as a basis for legislative action the existence and extent of organized crime within the commonwealth and corrupt practices in government at state and local levels, the existence of conditions which tend or may tend to prevent or interfere with the proper enforcement of the laws relating thereto, the existence of physical, legal and policy limitations on the powers and functions of those charged with the duty of enforcement of said laws and the extent to which the power of the government of the commonwealth in relation to the enforcement of said laws may or should be properly exercised at state and local levels.' Res.1962, c. 146, first paragraph. Sheridan v. Gardner, 347 Mass. 8, 11, 196 N.E.2d 303, appeal dismissed, per cur. 379 U.S. 647, 85 S.Ct. 612, 13 L.Ed.2d 552 (January 19, 1965).

The Commission relies upon Rule 1 of its Rules of Procedure, which reads in part: 'Hearings shall be held as authorized by vote of the Commission. The vote authorizing a hearing shall identify the subject matter to be investigated at such hearing. Any single member of the Commission may conduct a hearing and when so doing shall represent and have the authority of the Commission in the reception of evidence and the conduct of the hearing.'

Authorization for the adoption of the rule is grounded upon that part of the fifth paragraph of Res.1962, c. 146, which reads, 'The commission shall establish rules of procedure governing the conduct of its hearings which shall be made available in printed form to each witness prior to his testimony.' The present rules were established by vote of the Commission.

Beyond question, the Legislature has power to provide that a single member of a board or commission may conduct hearings. Attorney Gen. v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 180-181, 171 N.E. 82. Indeed it has often done so, and so has Congress. The immediate issue is whether this has been done by implication in Res.1962, c. 146. This is purely a question of interpretation of our own State legislation. Cases from other jurisdictions dealing with other statutes are without relevance. In GARDNER V. MASSACHUSETTS TURNPIKE AUTHY. 347 MASS. ----, ----, ---- - ----, 199 N.E.2D 186^B, it was held that the hearings are conducted in pursuance of a valid legislative function.

The repondents bank heavily upon that part of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 4, § 6, which reads: 'In construing statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same statute: * * * Fifth, Words purporting to give a joint authority to, or to direct any act by, three or more public officers or other persons shall be construed as giving such authority to, or directing such act by, a majority of such officers or persons.'

The character and scope of the work intended to be performed by the Commission cry out eloquently against the restriction upon the taking of testimony which the respondents seek to impose. The asserted limitation would be completely 'inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body.' From the outset the magnitude of the task which would confront the Commission was entirely clear. There had been an earlier crime commission created by Res.1953, c. 100, ¹ which served as a model for Res.1962, c. 146. Commonwealth v. Benoit, 347 Mass. 1, 6-7, 196 N.E.2d 228. The intricacies of the duties of the earlier commission were evident from its reports. See 1956 Senate Doc. No. 714; 1957 Senate Doc. No. 511, p. 3. ² The experience of the present Commission has been confirmatory. ³

The Commission's area of investigation is the entire...