Gardner v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 January 1917 |
| Citation | 225 Mass. 439,114 N.E. 717 |
| Parties | GARDNER v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Frederick Lawton, Judge.
Action by Clarence J. Gardner against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Case reported. Judgment for plaintiff.
Carver & Carver, of Boston, for plaintiff.
Butler, Cox, Murchie & Bacon and J. F. Bacon, all of Boston, for defendant.
This is an action brought upon a policy of insurance dated May 14, 1894, for $1,000, issued to the plaintiff by the defendant. The policy is upon the endowment plan and is payable at the expiration of 20 years from its date. It contains the following provision:
‘This policy shall become void whenever the insured named therein shall leave the service of the said company except by cause of his death.’
The case is presented upon a report made by a judge of the superior court, from which it appears that the policy was issued by the defendant to the plaintiff as a prize for his work as superintendent of the defendant's branch office at Brockton in this commonwealth. It is agreed that, aside from the clause in the policy above quoted:
‘All things had been done and performed by the plaintiff necessary to entitle him to recover in this action.’
On, and for some time before, September 7, 1896, the plaintiff was in the service of the defendant as superintendent of its branch office in Salem. On that day a letter was delivered to him dated September 3, 1896, and signed by one Thomas, superintendent of agencies of the defendant, who, it is admitted, had full authority to act in the matter for the defendant. This letter was delivered to the plaintiff by one Gibson and is as follows:
‘September 3, 1896.
‘Mr. C. J. Gardner, Supt., 223 Essex Street, Salem, Mass.-Dear Sir: This letter will he handed to you by Mr. Launcelot Gibson, whom we have though it best to make superintendent at Salem in your stead. His superintendency will date from the presentation of the letter and you will please place him in complete possession of the office and the company's property, introduce him to the members of your staff, and remain with him during the week of his arrival. We will in the event of your meeting our request forward you your salary for that week.
‘Our action will not be altogether a surprise to you, Mr. Gardner. We have taken it only after careful deliberation, and after we became satisfied that the change would be to the best interests of the company.
‘If you will forward your resignation we will accept it to take effect from the time of Mr. Gibson's arrival.
‘Yours truly,
E. J. Thomas, Supt. of Agencies.'
On September 8, 1896, the plaintiff wrote the defendant's superintendent [Thomas] the following letter:
The question is whether the policy became void after the time when the plaintiff was no longer in the service of the defendant. It is the contention of the defendant that when the plaintiff's employment ended for whatever reason, even by his discharge by the defendant, the policy was terminated. The defendant also contends that the plaintiff voluntarily resigned his position.
Subject to the defendant's exception, the presiding judge submitted to the jury the question, ‘Was the plaintiff discharged?’ The answer was in the affirmative, and thereafter the parties waived further trial by jury. The judge found and ordered judgmentfor the plaintiff for the amount named in the policy with interest.
We are of opinion that the words ‘shall leave the service of the company’ in the clause in question, cannot be held to mean that the policy becomes void if for any reason the plaintiff ceases to be in the employ of the company; but that these words properly construed, signify that the policy shall become void if the plaintiff should by his own act abandon his employment in the service of the defendant. The word ‘leave,’ as used by the parties, means to leave voluntarily, and does not apply if the plaintiff is arbitrarily and without justifiable cause discharged by the defendant. This interpretation would seem to be in accord with the natural and ordinary meaning of the word construed in connection with the clause where it appears. It was said by this court in Price v. Minot, 107 Mass. 49 (), that:
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Brown v. Little, Brown & Co.
...his expulsion or dismissal by the act of the company, without his consent, and against his remonstrance.’ In Gardner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 225 Mass. 439, 114 N. E. 717, there was presented for construction the words in a policy of insurance: ‘This policy shall become void whenever ......
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...instant case where it is conceded that plaintiff was discharged. The following cases support this conclusion. Gardner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 225 Mass. 439, 114 N.E. 717; Price v. Minot, 107 Mass. 49; Muesling v. International Ry. Co., 85 Misc. 309, 147 N.Y.S. 177. The cases cited by......
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