Garfield Hts. City School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn., 89AP-713

• Decision Date: 20 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89AP-713,89AP-713
• Citation: 575 N.E.2d 503,62 Ohio App.3d 308
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 68 Ed. Law Rep. 811 GARFIELD HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. *

Page 308

62 Ohio App.3d 308

575 N.E.2d 503, 68 Ed. Law Rep. 811

GARFIELD HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. ^*

No. 89AP-713.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided Dec. 20, 1990.

Arter & Hadden, Tom McDonald, M. Neal Rains, Z. Sonali Bustamante, Cleveland, and David C. Patterson, Columbus, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Christopher M. Culley, Columbus, for appellee.

STRAUSBAUGH, Judge.

Appellant appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas affirming appellee's decision approving the transfer of territory from the Cleveland City School District to that of appellant. The subject area is located in the northeast corner of the city of Garfield Heights ("Garfield Heights") bordering the southeast section of the city of Cleveland ("Cleveland"). The proposed transfer area contains Precincts A, C, E, and F of Ward 1 of Garfield Heights. Transfer proceedings were initiated when electors residing in those precincts and Precinct F of Ward 2 of Garfield Heights filed petitions pursuant to R.C. 3311.24 requesting the transfer of those areas from Cleveland to Garfield Heights. While Precinct F of Ward 2 was included in the legal description in the petitions, it was not shown on the map contained in the petitions and therefore subsequently excluded from the proposed transfer area. On March 24, 1988, Cleveland filed the petitions with appellee, the State Board of Education ("board").

On June 13, 1988, the board adopted a resolution declaring its intent to consider the proposed transfer. On July 8, 1988, appellant, Garfield Heights City School District, submitted its request for a hearing regarding the proposed transfer. On February 8, 1989, the referee assigned by the board to hear the transfer matter issued his report and recommended that the board approve the request for the proposed transfer of territory. Appellant then filed its objections to the report, and on April 10, 1989 the board held a public meeting to which interested parties were invited to give brief testimony. During the public meeting, appellant filed a motion for a continuance with the board requesting that it take no final action on the proposed transfer of territory until the vacancy left on the board by the resignation of Ronald M. Popek was filled. Popek was the board member from the Twentieth Congressional District which includes Garfield Heights. The board denied appellant's motion and passed a resolution adopting in full the referee's report and approved the transfer of territory.

Appellant then appealed the board's decision and filed a motion to stay execution of the decision pending appeal. Appellant's motion was granted and implementation of the board's decision was stayed until May 26, 1989, the date that the trial court scheduled the matter for hearing. On June 7, 1989, the trial court held that the board had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings and render a decision on the transfer matter despite the inconsistency between the map and legal description contained in the transfer petitions. The trial court also held that a "work session," which appellant argued unfairly prejudiced the results of the board's decision, was properly noticed and did not violate appellant's due process rights. The trial court thereafter affirmed the board's decision transferring the subject area from Cleveland to Garfield Heights and held that the board's decision was based upon reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

On June 8, 1989, the city of Cleveland passed a resolution transferring the territory in accordance with the board's decision. On June 13, 1989, appellant appealed the trial court's judgment to this court. Appellant also filed a motion with the trial court requesting a stay of its judgment pending appeal which the trial court denied. Appellant then filed a motion for stay with this court and that motion was granted on July 14, 1989, with the trial court's judgment being stayed during the pendency of this appeal.

On appeal, appellant sets forth the following five assignments of error for this court's review:

"1. The trial court erred in ruling that the transfer petitions were valid.

"2. The trial court erred in holding that ex parte communications between the State Board and the Petitioners' representatives did not violate Garfield's due process rights.

"3. The trial court erred in holding that the State Board's failure to postpone its transfer decision pending replacement of the Board member from the 20th Congressional District did not constitute prejudicial error.

"4. The trial court abused its discretion in holding that the State Board's transfer decision was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence.

"5. The trial court erred in affirming the State Board's Order because the transfer will not result in coterminous municipal and school boundaries."

At the outset, it is necessary for this court to delineate the appropriate standard for review of the trial court's decision in this matter. Recently, in Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 356, 544 N.E.2d 651, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this court's decision and held in the syllabus:

"An appeal may be taken to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12 from an order of the State Board of Education resulting from a hearing or adjudication pursuant to a request for transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.24."

R.C. 119.12 codified the standard under which an administrative appeal is to be decided by the trial court. R.C. 119.12 provides, in pertinent part:

"The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the absence of such a finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. * * * "

Thus, the trial court is to affirm the order of the agency from which an appeal has been taken pursuant to R.C. 119.12 where the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In re Wellesley Corp. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 176, 18 OBR 229, 480 N.E.2d 461; Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 17 O.O.3d 65, 407 N.E.2d 1265; Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control (1955), 164 Ohio St. 275, 58 O.O. 51, 131 N.E.2d 390. However, upon appeal to an appellate court, the standard of review is even more limited. In Lorain City Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 533 N.E.2d 264, the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the standard by which an appellate court is to review an order of an administrative agency:

"In reviewing an order of an administrative agency, an appellate court's role is more limited than that of a trial court reviewing the same order. It is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence. Such is not the charge of the appellate court. The appellate court is to determine only if the trial court has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion ' " * * * implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency." ' * * * Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, a court of appeals must affirm the trial court's judgment. * * *

"The fact that the court of appeals, or this court, might have arrived at a different conclusion than did the administrative agency is immaterial. Appellate courts must not substitute their judgment for those of an administrative agency or a trial court absent the approved criteria for doing so." Id. at 260-261, 533 N.E.2d at 267.

Accordingly, it is within this limited standard of review that we address appellant's assignments of error.

In its first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court's decision should be reversed since the petitions which initiated the transfer contained an inconsistency between the map and legal description of the transfer area. Appellant argues that since the petitions were defective, the board was without jurisdiction to decide the transfer issue. Appellant insists that as there exists substantial discrepancy between the map and the legal description of the transfer area on the face of the petition, reversal is warranted since such error would tend to mislead qualified electors as to the actual area proposed for transfer.

R.C. 3311.24, as in effect at the time of the trial court's decision, provided, in pertinent part:

"If the board of education of a city school district or of an exempted village school district deems it advisable to transfer territory from such district to an adjoining city or exempted village school district or to a county school district, or if a petition, signed by seventy-five per cent of the qualified electors residing within that portion of a city or exempted village school district proposed to be transferred voting at the last general election, requests such a transfer, the board of education of the district in which such proposal originates shall file such proposal, together with a map showing the boundaries of the territory proposed to be transferred, with the state board of education prior to the first day of April in any even-numbered year. * * * " ¹

In the present case, the petitions which were circulated regarding the proposed transfer included a map, a legal description, and an included summary.

While the map on the petitions accurately reflected the proposed transfer area, the legal description erroneously included a list of lot numbers which were not part of the map or summary description. Upon review of the statute, we agree with the trial court that R.C....