Garibaldi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Norwalk
| Decision Date | 06 June 1972 |
| Citation | 303 A.2d 743,163 Conn. 235 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Frank GARIBALDI et al. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF NORWALK et al. |
Melvin J. Silverman, Norwalk, with whom, on the brief, was Jules Lang, Norwalk, for appellants (plaintiffs).
Vincent D. Flaherty, Norwalk, for the appellees (defendant Robert Hausmann et al.), with whom, on the brief, was Leonard S. Hermann, Norwalk, for the appellee (named defendant).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and RYAN, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and MacDONALD, JJ.
The zoning board of appeals in Norwalk granted the application of Robert Hausmann and Walter Spatta for a variance of the zoning regulations to permit them to move their liquor package store from 55 New Canaan Avenue to premises located at 175, 177, 179 Main Street. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Common Pleas which rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and from that judgment the plaintiffs have taken this appeal.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The two applicants, hereinafter referred to as the defendants, operated a package store in a building owned by them at 55 New Canaan Avenue, Norwalk. The state of Connecticut, through the highway commissioner, took the property by eminent domain proceedings and ordered the defendants to vacate the premises. Thereafter, the defendants made a diligent search of the area for another location in which the operation of a liquor package store was a permitted use. Of the suitable locations, all were either unavailable or in violation of § 7A(2) of the Norwalk building zone regulations, which prohibits the establishment of a retail liquor store 'within a distance of one thousand feet from other premises used for the sale of alcoholic liquor at retail under a package store liquor permit.' In order to relocate their business, the defendants, in July, 1968, purchased land on Main Street and constructed a building, comprised of four stores, with the intention of reestablishing their package store business on those premises. The proposed new location was approximately 200 feet from Franc's Liquor Store, a package store owned by the plaintiffs, and about 2000 feet from the defendants' former place of business.
On January 31, 1969, the defendants applied to the defendant zoning board of appeals for a variance 'to enable them to relocate the Jug & Bottle Liquor Store within 1,000 feet of the entrance of a building used for the sale of alcoholic liquor.' In their application, the defendants stated that the relocation was involuntary and caused by reasons entirely beyond their control and that '(t)he public health, safety and welfare do not require a strict enforcement of the 1,000 foot restriction and the granting of the variance would be in harmony with the purpose and intent of the zoning regulations because the Main Street location is within a zone where the regulations permit retail package liquor stores.' The zoning board of appeals granted the variance on the grounds that 'there is a hardship due to State relocation of Route 7' and 'there is no available property within the perimeter of this area.'
Among the plaintiffs' assignments of error is the claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the requisite legal hardship existed to permit a variance of the zoning regulations. It is their claim that under § 8-6 of the General Statutes and the decisions of this court that a variance is properly granted only where there is a showing before the zoning board of appeals that the hardship caused by the application of zoning regulations relates to the property for which the variance is sought and not to the personal hardship of the owners thereof. We agree with the merits of this contention and find it decisive on this appeal.
The authority for a zoning board of appeals to vary the application of zoning regulations is found in § 8-6(3) of the General Statutes and is specifically limited to variances 'with respect to a parcel of land where, owing to conditions especially affecting such parcel but not affecting generally the district in which it is situated, a literal enforcement of such by-laws, ordinances or regulations would result in exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship so that substantial justice will be done and the public safety and welfare secured.' We have carefully examined the evidence before the board as submitted in the appendices to the briefs and we find nothing which would indicate that the 1000-foot restriction in any way especially affects the defendants' parcel of land in any manner different from the way it generally affects all the parcels of land in the zoning...
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Mayer-Wittmann v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Stamford
...Breunich was not different in kind from that generally affecting properties in the same zone. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 163 Conn. 235, 238, 303 A.2d 743 (1972) ("[i]t is clear that for a hardship to justify the granting of a variance, the hardship must be different i......
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Verrillo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Branford
...law or regulation." Berkman v. Board of Appeals on Zoning, 135 Conn. 393, 399-400, 64 A.2d 875 (1949). In Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 238, 303 A.2d 743 (1972), our Supreme Court held that "a variance is properly granted only where there is a showing before the zonin......
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Verrillo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Branford
...law or regulation.” Berkman v. Board of Appeals on Zoning, 135 Conn. 393, 399–400, 64 A.2d 875 (1949). In Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 238, 303 A.2d 743 (1972), our Supreme Court held that “a variance is properly granted only where there is a showing before the zonin......
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Int'l Investors v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Fairfield
...that variances run with the land, although we did not employ that specific phrase. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 163 Conn. 235, 239, 303 A.2d 743 (1972) ("By its very definition, a variance is granted with respect to a particular piece of property; it can be enjoyed not ......