Garland v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 17 August 2012
• Docket Number: NO. 2011-CA-000478-MR,2011-CA-000478-MR
• Parties: SHANNON GARLAND APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

SHANNON GARLAND APPELLANT
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

NO. 2011-CA-000478-MR

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

RENDERED: AUGUST 17, 2012

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE SAMUEL T. WRIGHT, III, JUDGE ACTION NO. 05-CR-00079
OPINION AFFIRMING

BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; CLAYTON AND DIXON, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Shannon Garland, appeals from an order of the Letcher Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. Finding no error, we affirm.

In April 2005, a Letcher County Grand Jury indicted Appellant and his girlfriend, Rosemary McClain, for complicity to commit murder, complicity to

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first-degree robbery, complicity to theft by unlawful taking over $300, complicity to theft of a controlled substance, and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was also indicted for being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The charges stemmed from the robbery and brutal stabbing death of Lisa Jenkins. Following the indictments, the Commonwealth filed its notice of aggravating circumstances and intent to seek the death penalty. Prior to trial, however, Appellant filed a motion to enter a guilty plea. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Appellant gave a statement to the Commonwealth that detailed the crimes and agreed to testify against McClain¹ in exchange for the Commonwealth's dismissal of the PFO charge and recommendation of a sentence of life imprisonment. The agreement further stipulated that Appellant could not seek parole for twenty years. On July 14, 2008, the trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly.

On March 9, 2010, Appellant filed a motion to vacate his convictions and sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 raising various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant alleged that counsel failed to investigate and present an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense; pursue suppression of his statements to police; and file a motion to sever the trial from his co-defendant. Finally, Appellant claimed that counsel used manipulation and coercion to force him to plead guilty. On February 4, 2011, the trial court denied Appellant's motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal ensued.

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Appellant's sole argument before this Court is that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel coerced him into entering his plea. Appellant contends that because his counsel manipulated him to plead guilty, he did not understand the consequences of such and thus his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Appellant argues the affidavits of his mother and aunt that were attached to his RCr 11.42 motion clearly establish that he did not want to plead guilty and did not understand the nature of the plea agreement. We disagree.

In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden to establish convincingly that he was deprived of substantial rights that would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). An evidentiary hearing is warranted only "if there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face of the record." Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994); RCr 11.42(5). See also Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026 (1999). "Conclusionary allegations which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a discovery deposition." Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 838...