Garland v. Dai
| Decision Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-1155, No. 19-1156,19-1155 |
| Citation | 141 S.Ct. 1669,210 L.Ed.2d 11 |
| Parties | Merrick B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Petitioner v. MING DAI; Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, Petitioner v. Cesar Alcaraz-Enriquez |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
David Z. Su, Law Offices of David Z. Su, West Covina, CA, David J. Zimmer, Edwina B. Clarke, William E. Evans, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA, for Respondent.
Jeffrey B. Wall, Acting Solicitor General, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley, Dawn S. Conrad, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley, Dawn S. Conrad, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
The Ninth Circuit has long applied a special rule in immigration disputes. The rule provides that, in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals, a reviewing court must treat a petitioning alien's testimony as credible and true. At least 12 members of the Ninth Circuit have objected to this judge-made rule, and we granted certiorari to decide whether it can be squared with the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq .
The question comes to us in cases involving Cesar Alcaraz-Enriquez and Ming Dai. Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez is a Mexican national. Authorities detained him when he attempted to enter this country illegally. In proceedings before an immigration judge (IJ), Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez sought to avoid being returned to Mexico on the ground that his life or freedom would be threatened there. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). But Congress has said this form of relief from removal is unavailable if, among other things, "the Attorney General decides that ... the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime[,] is a danger to the community of the United States." § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). This proviso posed a problem for Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez because, during a previous illegal entry, he pleaded nolo contendere to "inflict[ing] corporal injury [on a] spouse [or] cohabitant" under California law and received a 2-year sentence. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 273.5(A) (West 2014).
The key question thus became whether Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's California conviction amounted to "a particularly serious crime." The parties appear to agree that the answer to that question turns on which version of events one accepts: The version found in a probation report issued at the time of Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's conviction, or the version he testified to years later as part of his removal proceeding. The IJ received and considered both.
The probation report indicated that Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez locked his 17-year-old girlfriend in his bedroom one evening, caught her trying to escape, dragged her back into the room, threatened to stab her and dump her body in a dumpster, and forced her to have sex with him. The next morning, he beat the young woman, leaving bruises on her back, neck, arms, and legs—stopping only when she begged for her life. Later that evening, when she asked to leave, he dragged her out, threw her against the stairs, and kicked her as she rolled down. Her ordeal lasted nearly 24 hours. Police arrested Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez days later as he tried to flee his residence. At that time, Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez admitted to the officers that he chased, grabbed, and punched his girlfriend in the face. He also admitted that he prevented her from leaving the house. But he claimed that he didn't hit her "that hard." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–1156, p. 14a.
Against this evidence, the IJ considered Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's testimony during his immigration proceeding. There, he "admitted hitting his girlfriend, but not in the manner as described in the report." Ibid. Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez testified that he was upset with his girlfriend because "he believed that [she] was hitting his daughter." Ibid. In Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's view, he was coming to his daughter's defense. Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez denied dragging or kicking the young woman, or forcing her to have sex with him. He also submitted a letter from his mother, who stated that when she saw the girlfriend immediately after the altercation, "she looked completely fine." App. 256.
Ultimately, the IJ held Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez ineligible for relief, relying in part on the version of events in the probation report. Among other things, the IJ found it significant that there was "no mention" in the contemporaneous probation report of the girlfriend hitting Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's daughter. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–1156, at 14a. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) "adopt[ed] and affirm[ed]" the IJ's decision. Id., at 7a. The BIA held that the IJ had "properly considered all evidence of record," "weighing and comparing [Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's] testimony at the hearing and the probation officer's report." Id., at 8a. The BIA also stressed its view that the IJ was not required to credit Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's "version of events over other plausible alternatives." Ibid.
The Ninth Circuit saw the matter differently. Applying circuit precedent, it held that " ‘[w]here the BIA does not make an explicit adverse credibility finding, [the court] must assume that [the alien's] factual contentions are true.’ " Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Sessions , 727 Fed.Appx. 260, 261 (2018). And because this rule required taking Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's testimony as true—even in the face of competing evidence—the Ninth Circuit held that the BIA erred in denying relief and granted the petition for review.1
Ming Dai is a Chinese national who came to the United States on a tourist visa. Shortly after arriving, he sought asylum. To win relief, Mr. Dai bore the burden of proving that he was a "refugee"—someone "unable or unwilling" to return to China "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution ... for failure or refusal to undergo [involuntary sterilization] or for other resistance to a coercive population control program." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1101(a)(42). As in Mr. Alcaraz-Enriquez's case, the parties have proceeded on the assumption that everything here turns on questions of fact—whether Mr. Dai was persecuted in the past or fears persecution in the future—and we do the same.2
Once more, the evidence before the IJ cut both ways. On the one hand, Mr. Dai claimed that, after his wife became pregnant with their second child in 2009, family-planning officials abducted her and forced her to have an abortion. Mr. Dai further testified that, when he tried to stop his wife's abduction, police broke his ribs, dislocated his shoulder
, and jailed him for 10 days. According to Mr. Dai, he lost his job, his wife was demoted, and his daughter was denied admission to superior schools. In applying for asylum, Mr. Dai stated, "I eventually found a way to reach the USA," and asked the government to "[p]lease grant me asylum so that I can bring my wife and daughter to safety in the USA." App. 155.
On the other hand, Mr. Dai failed to disclose the fact that his wife and daughter had already traveled to the United States—and voluntarily returned to China. The IJ observed that Mr. Dai "hesitated at some length" when confronted with these facts. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–1155, p. 170a. After being asked to tell the "real story," Mr. Dai proceeded to admit that his daughter returned to China to go to school; that his wife chose to return to her job and her elderly father; that Mr. Dai did not have a job in China; and this was "why he stayed" in the United States. Id., at 171a. Asked directly why he did not return to China with his family, Mr. Dai responded, "[b]ecause at that time, I was in a bad mood and I couldn't get a job, so I want to stay here for a bit longer and another friend of mine is also here." App. 103.
The IJ denied relief. In the IJ's view, the "principal area of concern" arose when Mr. Dai was confronted with his wife and daughter's trip to the United States and their voluntary return to China. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–1155, at 169a. The record showed that Mr. Dai failed "to disclose" these facts in his own statements, and that he "paused at length" when confronted with them. Id., at 163a, 173a. The IJ concluded that "I do not find that [Mr. Dai's] explanations for [his wife's] return to China while he remained here are adequate." Id., at 175a. In the IJ's view, Mr. Dai's eventual admissions regarding his wife and daughter's return to China to pursue school and economic opportunities undermined his claims of past and future persecution, particularly given that his wife was "the primary object of the persecution in China." Ibid. On appeal, the BIA "adopt[ed] and affirm[ed]" the IJ's decision. Id., at 163a.
Again, the Ninth Circuit saw things differently. Much as it had in Alcaraz-Enriquez , a divided panel held that "in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility finding by the IJ or the BIA," Mr. Dai's testimony had to be "deemed" credible and true. Ming Dai v. Sessions , 884 F.3d 858, 868 (2018). On the strength of that testimony, the court then proceeded to find Mr. Dai eligible for asylum. Later, the court of appeals denied the government's petition for rehearing en banc over the objections of 12 judges.
For many years, and over many dissents, the Ninth Circuit has proceeded on the view that, "[i]n the absence of an explicit adverse credibility finding [by the agency], we must assume that [the alien's]...
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