Garland v. State
Decision Date | 02 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. A02A0684.,A02A0684. |
Citation | 256 Ga. App. 313,568 S.E.2d 540 |
Parties | GARLAND v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
McDonald & Cody, Douglas W. McDonald, Jr., Cornelia, for appellant.
Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor-General, Jeffrey P. Kwiatkowski, Asst. Solicitor-General, for appellee. RUFFIN, Judge.
A jury found Kevin Brett Garland guilty of driving under the influence with an unlawful alcohol concentration and speeding.1 Garland appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance, in making several evidentiary rulings, and in limiting his closing argument. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
Viewed in favor of the jury's verdict, the evidence at trial showed that Officer J.W. Moody stopped Garland, who was driving over 85 mph in a 65-mph zone. After approaching Garland's car, Moody smelled alcohol on his breath. Upon questioning, Garland told Moody that he had consumed two beers that evening. As part of his field sobriety evaluation, Moody administered an alco-sensor test on Garland's breath, which tested positive for alcohol.
Based on his opinion that Garland was under the influence to the extent that it was less safe to drive, Moody arrested Garland and read him an implied consent warning. After driving Garland to the police station, Moody tested Garland's blood alcohol concentration using an Intoxilyzer 5000. Moody conducted two tests within four minutes, and each time the results measured 0.104 grams. Garland was subsequently charged with the offenses at issue here.
1. Garland asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial so that he could obtain a document that was unavailable in court that morning, but was introduced into evidence at a previous hearing. The record shows that, when he moved for the continuance, Garland explained that the document was a "computer-aided dispatch [that contained] about a three-hour block of radio logs." He informed the court that it was introduced at a previous motions hearing, that the court reporter kept it, and that he "need[ed] to have that evidence to proceed in [the] case." It appears that the court reporter was visiting her sick mother in New York, and Garland first learned that the document was unavailable on the morning of trial. On appeal, Garland argues that the trial court erred in denying a continuance under these circumstances. We disagree.
The trial court had discretion in ruling on Garland's motion for continuance.2 Even if Garland was surprised that the dispatch logs were unavailable on the morning of trial, he has not demonstrated how those logs would have benefitted his defense. And where such a benefit is not shown to exist, we will not conclude that a continuance was necessary.3 Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.4
2. Garland next asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to suppress the Intoxilyzer 5000 results based on a purportedly confusing implied consent warning. Specifically, Garland contends that, when Officer Moody was conducting the alco-sensor test, he erroneously informed Garland that the legal blood alcohol limit in Georgia was 0.08 grams and that, according to the alco-sensor, he was "`just above the legal limit.'"5 Although Garland acknowledges that Moody informed him of the correct legal limit of 0.10 grams when he read the informed consent warning, he argues that the disparity left him confused about his legal rights.
We reject Garland's argument for two reasons. First, while it appears that Officer Moody's erroneous statement was recorded by a videotape, neither the actual videotape nor a transcript of it is included in the appellate record. Thus, to support this assertion, Garland cites the Court to the transcript of the motions hearing during which his trial counsel repeated Moody's alleged misrepresentation. Counsel's statement, however, is not evidence.6 Thus, Garland has not shown by the record that the trial court erred in denying his motion.7
Second, even if Garland had presented actual evidence of Moody's statement, we addressed a similar contention in Maurer v. State8 and concluded that "any understatement of the legal limit did not change the substance of the notice in any way harmful to [the defendant]." Thus, we find no error.
3. In a related enumeration, Garland asserts that the trial court erred in precluding him from testifying about Officer Moody's erroneous statement concerning the 0.08 blood alcohol level and the alco-sensor results. Again, we find no error.
The trial court found that the test results from other individuals were irrelevant and denied Garland's request to introduce the log into evidence. We find no error.
The log at issue here clearly contained irrelevant information. The test results of the other subjects would not show that Moody failed to change mouthpieces when he tested Garland or that Garland's two samples were cross-contaminated. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the log.13
Moreover, it is unclear how the trial court's ruling prejudiced Garland. His Intoxilyzer 5000 test results had already been admitted into evidence, and that exhibit, as well as Moody's testimony, clearly showed that both samples measured 0.104 grams. Thus, to the extent that Garland wanted to use the identical results reflected in the log as the basis for his expert's testimony concerning cross-contamination, the evidence was already before the jury. Likewise, the State had introduced a certificate of inspection revealing that the quarterly inspection, mentioned in the log, was conducted and that the machine was "in good working order." Considering this evidence, introduction of the log "would have been largely cumulative, and a trial court does not abuse its discretion in excluding cumulative evidence."14 Accordingly, we find no error.
In this case, the prosecutor attempted to lay the foundation by asking Officer Moody whether the testing method he used was "approved by the Division of Forensic Sciences (`DFS') and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation." Garland objected to the inquiry, arguing that any such approval...
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