Garmon v. Cassell
Docket Number | 32299. |
Decision Date | 04 March 1949 |
Citation | 52 S.E.2d 631,78 Ga.App. 730 |
Parties | GARMON v. CASSELL. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The evidence authorized the verdict and the court therefore did not err in overruling the general grounds of the motion for a new trial.
2. The charges of the court, quoted in division two of the opinion were not error for the reasons assigned.
(a) It is the duty of the operator of a motor vehicle on a highway to have the vehicle under immediate control not only when he is conscious of the presence of a pedestrian on a highway but also when he should discover the presence of such pedestrian by the exercise of ordinary care.
(b) The term 'immediate control' as used in Code, § 68-304 is not too vague, indefinite and uncertain to be enforced.
(c) The court did not err in not defining the term in the absence of a request.
3, 4 5. The assignments of error in grounds two, three, four five, and six of the amended motion for a new trial are without merit.
6. The word agent as used in Acts 1947, p. 568, Code § 38-1801 means any agent available to the party (principal) as a witness in a pending case and does not refer merely to an agent who has some relation or connection with the transaction in litigation. The assignment of error in ground seven is without merit for any reason assigned.
7. The court did not err in refusing to permit the defendant Garmon to cross examine an agent of defendant Hall who was put on the stand for the purposes of cross-examination by the plaintiff.
8. It was not error for the court not to apprise the jury of the fact that the defendant Garmon did not have insurance after the jury had been qualified as to the insurance carrier of the defendant Hall.
Mrs. John W. Cassell instituted this action for damages against Jesse T. Garmon and Charles M. Hall for the homicide of her husband, allegedly caused by the negligent operation of an automobile driven by Garmon and owned by codefendant Hall. The petition alleged substantially the following: That on December 6, 1947, at about 10 P.M., the deceased husband was returning home from his work as a railroad crossing watchman. While deceased was walking across Glenwood Avenue in the unmarked crosswalk at the corner of Cameron Street and Glenwood Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia, going from the northeastern corner to the southeastern corner of said intersection at a place where pedestrians cross Glenwood Avenue, defendant Garmon driving a 1947 Lincoln Sedan, belonging to defendant Hall came down Cameron Street, approaching deceased from the rear, and turned into Glenwood Avenue, striking deceased with said automobile, inflicting injuries which resulted in his death. That Garmon at the time of the injury was driving said car as the agent of Hall and was acting within the scope of his authority. That defendants were negligent in the following particulars and such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of deceased: (a) driving said automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquors in violation of city ordinance of Atlanta and in violation of State law, (b) driving said automobile in excess of 25 miles per hour in violation of city ordinance of Atlanta, (c) entered said intersection at excessive rate of speed charged to be in excess of 25 miles per hour, (d) failed to yield the right away to deceased as required by city ordinance, (e) failed to have said automobile under his immediate control, (f) failed to stop before entering said intersection, (g) failed to stop before turning into Glenwood Avenue, (h) failed to reduce speed before making said turn into Glenwood Avenue, (i) failed to give warning to deceased by sounding his horn. The petition specially pleaded the following ordinances of the City of Atlanta relating to (1) right of way of pedestrian crossing at an intersection, (2) driving under the influence of intoxicants, and (3) maximum speed limit of 25 miles per hour. Defendant in his answer denied all material allegations of the petition and further answered alleging that deceased's death resulted from his failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and that deceased's negligence was greater than that charged against him.
There were no eyewitnesses to the collision, and plaintiff bases her case solely on circumstantial evidence. Substantially the following evidence was adduced on the trial of the case: Richard A. Boone, city detective for the Atlanta Police Department testified:
Mrs. John Cassell, wife of deceased, testified that he was 68 years of age, in good health, and earning from $2300.00 to $2400.00 annually.
S.D. Burnett testified for the plaintiff as to the location of the injured man: 'If the sidewalk had extended across the street, he would have been in the extension of the sidewalk, I think.'
R. W. Cagle, witness for the plaintiff, testified as follows:
H. E. Grizzle testified for plaintiff:
Charles Hall, codefendant, testified:
Harry McCollister, Jr., city detective, testified:
W. G Manders, ambulance driver,...
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